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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The structure and functioning of our nation, considered 
as an infinitely complex and integrated economic organism, 
has been given all too little study on the scientific plane, 
detached from partisan and group interest.l 
On February 20, 1946 an Act of Congress was signed by the President 
of the United States which inaugurated the most integrated and serious at-
tempt to subject our national economy to a systematic and thorough examina-
tion that has been undertaken in this nation. The Employment Act of 1946 
offered, first, a challenge to economists to bring the tools of their craft 
into closer relation with the needs of a real world, beset with economic, 
social, and political dislocations, and, secondly, a test of the concepts of 
aggregative economics. This paper is an effort to examine the work of the 
President's Council of Economic Advisers in relation to the function of the 
economist in the public service. 
The role of the economist in government presents many difficulties 
and paradoxes. Lionel Robbins, in his Essay~ the Nature and Significance 
of Economic Science, first published in 1932 and recently revised, wrote wha 
has now become a classical expression of the scope and validity of the general -
izations of economic science. In this work he attempted to explain the limi J 
ations and significance of these generalizations, both as a guide to the in-
terpretation of reality and as a basis for political practice. The Presi-
dent's Council of Economic Advisers offers a working example of the principl 
and problems he here set forth. 
1 Council of Economic Advisers, Second Annual Report (December, 1947 
P• 3. 
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In its ma.nii'old capacity as an advisory agency, an analytical b Ody, I 
and an instrument devoted to the formulation of practical programs of action 
in the economic sphere the Council is daily confronted with problems which 
are predominantly extra- economic in their implications. The organizational 
structure of the Council itself and its relation to the ideological, ad-
ministrative,and legislative world around it present conflicts which must be 
resolved in a manner which assures both a healthy solution to difficulties 
and continued souncmess in the structure of economic investigation. The 
succeeding chapters will examine the many aspects of this problem as they 
have presentedthemselves in the first four years of Council operation. 
Chapter II has particular significance in laying down the ideologi-
cal background and climate from which the Cotmcil emerged. Chapter III goes 
on to review the Council's working arrangements and study program and to 
emphasize the clash of ideas about how the Council should operate in its re-
1 
lation to the President and to Congress . Chapter IV presents, in summary, I 
the broad policy discussions contained in the Council ' s Annual Reports to th 
President and reveals some differences of opinion within the Council about 
the goals and methods of economic stabilj_zation. In Chapter V we have a gen 
eral discussion of t he tools of economic analysis employed by the Council, 
the adequacy of stabilization device~ and the question of forecasting. An 
attempt to gauge the reactions of economists and others to the Council is 
made in Chapter VI. It summarizes the main points of criticism of the work 
of the Council and gives attention to t he proposals which have been made to 
overcome its weaknesses or expand its powers . This chapter raises many prob 
lems and conflicts which have not been resolved by the writer. It is in-
tended merely as a glimpse i nto the complexities of an adequate appraisal of 
the Council. The Conclusion points up what the writer conceives as basic 
issues in the Council's venture into political economy and its most out-
standing shortcomings t o date . No attempt will be made at detailed evalua-
2 
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tion of the specific analyses and proposals presented by the President' s 
Council. 
There exists no single work on the Council of Economic Advisers. 
\Vhat inforw~tion is to be obtained must be gotten from reading the voluminou 
Reports and Reviews springing from it and from the Joint Committee, set up 
to examine these reports . The writer has gone to considerable length to 
comb the leading periodicals and economic jo~nals since 1946 to find re-
ferences to the Council. These, at best, have been very scattered and 
' 
fragmentary. An effort has also been made to scrutinize recent economics 
texts and other publications for allusions :,to the agency, with only slight 
success. Newspapers and financial journals have yielded the largest volume 
of cornwent but, by and large, the material found there was not suitable 
to the purposes of the tllesis and hence has been referred to only sparingly. 
The paper covers a period from 1944, when the first legislative 
measure was evolved, to mid-1950. It was felt that no clear purpose could 
be served by pursui ng the Council's studies into the area of planning for a 
war economy. 
3 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMPLOYMENT ACT AND ITS HISTORY 
We have come a long way since the day in 1921 when President Harding 
proclaimed: 
There has been vast unemployment before and there will 
be again. There will be depressi9n and inflation just as sure-
ly as the tides ebb and flow.l 
The Great Depression of the 1930's jolted both the public and the government 
into a realization that neither democracy as we know it nor our economic sys-
tem could survive another shock of such magnitude . Something must be done 
to stem the disastrous tides of the business cycle. It was estimated that 
in the thirties our economy incurred losses of over three hundred billion 
dollars as a result of unemployment,2 to say nothing of the untold suffering 
hardship, and sudden awareness of insecurity which came upon the .American 
people. The first legislative attempt in our history to approach this prob-
lem of instability systematically and to formalize the responsibility of the 
government for the economic health of the nation so that a similar depressio 
would not again occur was the Employment Act of 1946. 
This chapter examines the origins of the Employment Act. That none 
of the original objectives of Senator Murray's Full Employment Bill were 
realized in the final form of the Act will become apparent. The most tangib e 
1 Quoted by .- stephen Kemp Bailey, Congress Makes a Law (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1950), p . 6. 
2 Seymour Harris, Economic Planning (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1949) , p. )8. 
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ultimate result was the creation of the President's Council of Economic Ad-
visers, a body not envisioned in the original measv.re. As a result, we 
have the phenomenon of an organization--the Council--created by law but 
with the purposes which it was intended to serve severed from it. It is 
this separation of means from any well defined ends which offers the first 
clue to the problems confronting the Council, set adrift by the Employment 
Act on a sea of unresolved issues. 
Background of the Murray Bill 
Toward the end of World War II the attentions of many people and 
many governments turned to the new world which was to emerge . Many were 
sharply conscious of the fact that it had only been the emergency which had 
succeeded in wiping out ~nerica ' s problem of unemployment, even after year s 
of effort under the New Deal. President Roosevelt , in January of 1943, 
sounded the call to American efforts at calming the rising fears of post-war 
unemployment and building a program to meet the future prepared by pro-
claiming that veterans 11will have the right to expect full employment--full 
employnent for themselves and for all able-bodied men and women ill America 
who want to work.'P 
previous attempts to strengthen government adm! nistraj There had been 
tion so that it could organize for an effective economic program in response 
to the pressures of depression and war . These went forward on two fronts. 
First, there were the efforts t o · enlarge the power of the President to allow 
for more effective policy coordination. Secondly, there were the attempts 
to institutionalize and centralize long-range planning. In the first catego y 
may be placed the National Emergency Council established by Roosevelt in 
1933 to aid him in coordinating the work of emergency agencies; the Reorgan-
3 Bailey, op . cit., p . 41. 
uar-.r 8, 1943 .) (Quoted from the New York Times, Jan-
5 
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ization Act of 1939, which established the Executive Office of the President 
and included in it administrative assistants and an Office of Government Re-
ports to aid t he Chief Executive in executing his manifold responsibilit ies; 
the Office of Emergency ~funagement, under which the majority of war agencies 
were operated as a part of the Executive Office; the Office of War Mobiliza-
tion and Reconversion, acting as a war and reconversion coordinating body; 
and most i mportant, the Bureau of the Budget .4 In the second class, the 
National Resources Planning Board and its predecessors are of great sig-
nificance . More will be said about that agency below. 
In addi t ion to these institutional beginnings, giving a bac~ground 
of fifteen years of administrative thinking and experience with economic 
programming, a new era of economic theorizing about employment and unemploy-
ment had begun in 1936 with the publication of Jolm Maynard Keynes ' book 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. This work, which had 
an immediate and dynamic impact upon econ0111ists, gave insights into the dif-
ficulties of depression and offered the hope of a way out, chiefly via gov-
ernment spending . Keynesian analysis and its subsequent devel opment by 
other economists formed an important part of the thinking behind the Full 
Employment Bill of 1945. 
Keynes ' thought is basically an underconsumption, underinvestment 
view of the business cycle, and is phrased in terms of national aggregates . 
In his theory employment is dependent on spending, both for consumption and 
for investment . Savings give employment only if they are invested. Accord-
ing to Ke~mes, there is nothing to guarantee automatically that spending 
will be adequate to produce full employment because decisions to save and 
decisions to invest are made at different times by different people, and for 
varying reasons. The amount a community will try t o save is determined 
primarily by its total income and its distribution, more being saved by thos 
with proportionately higher incomes than by those with lower incomes. The 
amount a community will invest is governed primarily by its expectation of 
profit, not by the amount of its savings . Specifically, Keynes' theory as-
swnes that tendencies to save are inclined to become greater than tendencies 
to invest. The rate of interest is not effective in regulating the processes 
of planned saving and planned investment because it will operate only after 
decisive effects on aggregate income have taken place.5 
Other developments that helped to lay the foundation of the new 
approach included the work of the National Bureau of Economic Research, a 
private research organization. Of special consequence was the development 
of the statistical concept of the national product by Simon Kuznets of the 
Bureau staff. Within the government two agencies acted as "intellectual 
middlemen 11 in bringing the results of Keynesian thought to bear on the prob-
lems of government. One was the Fiscal Division of the Bureau of the Budget 
which evolved the concept of the national budget; an achievement of primary 
i mportance . The other was the National Resources Planning Board.6 
The NRPB was or iginally created by Roosevelt in 193L~ and grew out of 
the National Planning Board of t he Public Works Administration. During the 
thirties t he Board made fundamental studies in relation to such problems as 
land and water use , mineral and energy use, a broad programming of public 
works , population trends, the social effects of inventions , research as a r e-
source, r egions and cities, and reports upon the structure of the national 
5 William Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 19Ziii')';" pp. 93-9'7 presentaa summary of the Keynes 
ian idea. See also Elmer Clark Bratt, Business Cycles and Forecasting 
(Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1948), pp. 190-93. 
6 Bailey, op . cit., p . 15 and pp . 25-28. For further reference to 
the Nation's Economic EUdget see Chapter V, pp . 78-86. 
7 
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economy and of consumer expenditures and income . In the Reorganization Act 
of 1939 the body was placed in the Executive Office as a long- range planning 
agency, where it remained relatively cloistered from Congress and drew upon 
other government departments for aid in the preparation of its reports . In 
1943 the Board transmitted to President Roosevelt a massive report entit led 
Security, Work, and Relief Policies, dealing with postwar policy. This 
document was a..n elaborate program resting upon what the Board called a "New 
Bill of Rights . 11 One of the nine tenants of this new bill was the "ri ght to 
work, usefully and creatively, through the productive years." This program, 
says Bailey, "was fundamentally Keynesian in its basic assumptions, and re-
presented, perhaps better than any other single document of the war years, 
t he cutting edge of progressive postwar thinking in the federal government . " 
Three months after this report was issued the NRPB was killed in an approp-
riations bill . 
The years 194L~ to 1946 saw the publication of documents of many 
nations emphasizing again the world awareness of the need for fully employed 
economies. These strivings , of course, were most notable among the indust-
r i alized capitalist countries of the worlcl, which had been hardest hit by 
the depression years . The concern was reflected in the Report of the Pre-
paratory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, 
which said, in part, 11The Preparatory Committee considers that government s 
owe. a responsibility not only to their citizens but also to the citizens of 
other countries to do all that is vdthin their power to maintain full and 
productive employment within their territories . 118 
7 Ibid. , p. 27 . 
8 Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and-unemployment, London, Oct ober, 1946, 
p . 4, quoted in Seymour Harris , op . CJ..t ., p. 41. 
The publication of the British ~fuite Paper ~ Employment Policy in 
1944 was noted with interest in this country.9 In it the British government 
promised to take vigorous measures to maintain total expenditure and nt0 ac-
cept in future the responsibility for taking action at t he ealiest possible 
stage to arrest a threatened slump" and to accept nas one of their primary 
aims and responsibilities the maintenance of a high and stable level of em-
ployrnent after the war. n The White Paper set forth a mild form of Keynesian 
approach, with some reliance on government spending, although this was not 
great because of the concern about the size of the public debt .lO :Most stir 
ring in its effect upon the public discussion of full employment policy, al-
though it appeared too late to have any direct effect on the drafting of the 
American bill,11 was the Beveridge Report. Therein was presented a complete 
program for assuring not only high levels of employment, but full employment 
in its fullest sense. 
I t means having always more vacant jobs than unemployed 
men, not slightly fewer jobs. It means the jobs are at fair 
wages, of such a kind, and so located that the unemployed men 
can reasonabley be expected to take them; it means, by con-
sequence, that the normal lag between losing one job and find-
ing another ·will be very short .12 
In the meantime, in the United States plans were under way to draft 
some type of legislation to ease the pain of reconversion. Stephen Kemp 
Bailey, in his book, Congress Makes ~ Law, gives a detailed account of these 
early efforts . Many bills were introduced into Congress, some with far more 
limited aims than others. During 1943-44 there was considerable jockeying 
between Senators Kilgore, George,and Murray to dominate reconversion policy. 
The more limited George version, rather than the Kilgore version of the Office 
9 Alvin Hansen, Business Cyles and National Income (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co., 1951), p. 524 and Harr is, op . cit., p. 41. 
10 Harris, op. cit., pp . 158-160. 
ll Bailey, op. cit ., p . 47. 12 Beveridge, op. cit., P• 18. 
9 
10 
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of War Mobilization and Reconversion measure passed into law, leaving a void 
in policy dealing with comprehensive postwar planning for jobs. Into this 
void, with the support of President Roosevelt, Senator Murray stepped in 
1944 with his Full Employment Bill. 
The Full Employment Bill of 1945 
The 1944 political platforms of both parties paid tribute to the idea 
of full employment. The Democratic platform envisioned a nguarantee 11 
employment in its opening paragraph. Republican utterances were more guarde 
their platform stating that they would "promote the fullest stable employment 
tho·ugh private enterprise." Thus, no clear issue was drawn between the two 
parties . The Republicans had, however, indicated that they would reject "the 
theory of restoring prosperity through government spending and deficit financ 
ing.nl3 
The issue of government spending to insure high employment had been 
raised by the Patton amendment to the Kilgore reconversion measure, which was 
not passed . The Patton amendment provided that a Joint Committee on I nterna 
Revenue Taxation, with the help of appropriate government agencies, should 
make annual studies of prospective total investment in the nation and deter-
mine to what extent that prospective t otal investment would fall below a 
specified amount--forty billion dollars.14 vVhen the definite figure was de-
l3 Bailey, op. cit ., P• 41. 
14 The amendment gets its name from James G. Patton, president of th 
National Farmers Union, a private organization~ich, with the National Plan-
ning Association, was active in Washington in the cause of full employntent. 
(See Bailey, op. cit., pp. 20-25.) The forty billion dollar figure had been 
suggested to ~. Fart on, and presented in a hearing on the Kilgore measure 
him, by Louis Bean of the Budget Bureau, on the basis of studies made by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. These studies had indicated that the 
yearly proportion of past investment to gross national product had averaged 
1:5. It was estimated that a two hundred billion dollar gross national pro-
duct would produce the desired employment--hence the forty billion dollar 
figure. The amendment had been discussed with P~vin Hansen of Harvard, who 
agreed with the theory behind it, but felt that the forty billion dollar fig 
~-=-=-==~~-~~~-~~w~a~-~erbag~s=t~o~~hi~·g~h. ============================================~========== 
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termined, the Committee, through the President of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House, would notify the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of the a-
mount of loans to be made available to private industry and state and local 
governments in order to reach the forty billion dollar total investment 
figure required to produce full employment . If such loans were not applied 
for or utilized in sufficient quantity to bring about full employment~ Con-
gress would then appropriate for public works and other federal pro jects the 
amount of money necessary to accomplish the stated end. Senator ~urray, the 
chairman of the War Cont racts Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 11Iilita 
AffaFs,instructed his legislative assistant, Bertram Gros s , to draft a ful l 
employment bill, using the Patton proposal as a base. 15 The resultant draft 
was then published in the appendix of the year- end report of that body and 
circulated among members of Congr ess and agency heads for t heir comments and 
suggestions . 
Gross was aided in his task by several agency staff membe~and econ-
omists. Prominent among these were Louis Bean, Gerhard Colm~and V. o. Key o 
the Budget Bureau, Benoit-Smullyan of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Leon 
Keyserling of the National Housing Agency, and Alvin Hansen of Harvar d Univ-
. 16 
er s1ty. Special note should be taken of the participation of Gross and 
Keyserling i n the evolution of the Employment Act . Bertram Gross , six month 
after t he passage of the Act, was appointed assistant t o the Chairman of the 
Council, Dr. Edvdn G. Nour se . 17 Leon Keyserling, second place winner in the 
Pabst postwar employment essay contest, 18 became one of the three members of 
15 Ibid.' p . 44. 
17 Ibid ., p . 66. 
l 6 ~., P • 45 . 
18 KeyserlLng ' s entry, one of 35, 000 in the Pabst contest, which at-
tract,ed many leading economists and government officials , had emphasized tha 
the planning of economi c policies had to be a joint Executive-Legislative af 1 
fair . He had proposed the creation of an "American Economic Committee, 11 s· 
lar to the old Temporary National Economi c Committee (TNEC ), composed of re-
·-=-=-==-=-~==~~~sentat~ £~om ha_Housa ~ "ndustr a riculture and la •or . 
11 
12 
---- :=.......=:-=.-
the Pr esident's Council and succeeded Dr. Nourse in the Chairmanship. These 
men were close to the problems involved in creating a government economic 
planning agency from the very beginning. 
The Full ~nployment Bill was an attempt to do four things: (1) to 
establ ish the principle of the right to work and of the federal government's 
obligation to support this right; (2) to place defini Le responsibility on 
the President for a purposeful analysis of the e-conomy at regular intervals 
in order that Congress might be informed of economic trends and the Presiden 's 
program to meet them; (3) to commit the government to a series of measures · 
against serious economic difficulty in the face of economic storms indicated 
by analysis, with federal spending and investment as a last resort; and (4) 
to establish a Congressional mechanism to facilitate analyses and action and 
fix legislative responsibility f or carrying out full employment poiicy.19 
It was first conceived as an amendment t o the Budget and Accounting Act of 
1921. The Congressional tie-up was to operate thro;jgh a Joint Committee on 
the Budget and the analysis of the President was to be prepared by the Burea 
of the Budget. It was then thought best to place this responsibility on the 
Budget Bureau because of its highly "respectable" reputation in government , 
but the scheme was soon abandoned because of fear of arousing the jealousy 
of the Treasury Department against the Bureau.20 The first drafts also pro-
vi ded for Executive discretion in adjusting the rate of federal expencliture . 
Appendix A reproduces the full text of the Full Employment Act (8.3 8 
as it was finally introduced into the Senate on January 22, 1945. As orig-
inally intr oduced, the main features of the bill can be summarized as 
(1) A statement of policy that 11all Americans able t o work and seek 
ing work have a right to useful, remunerative, regular, and full-time em-
ployment, and (that) it is the policy of the United States to assure the ex-
19 Bailey, op. cit., pp . 13-14. 20 I bid., pp. 51-52. 
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istence at all times of sufficient employment opportunities2I to enable all 
Americans who have finished their schooling and who do not have full-time 
housekeeping responsibilities freely t o exercise this right ." Toward this 
end, the government undertakes responsibility to pursue economic pol icies 
and programs that will encourage private employment opportunities at the 
highest feasible levels, and 11to the extent that continuing full employment 
cannot otherwise be achieved • • • to provide such volume of Federal invest-
ment and expenditure as may be needed • • • 11 
(2) For the purpose of determing whether private i nvestment would be 
I 
adequate to maintain full employment opportunities without government inter- ~ 
vention the President was instructed to tr2.nsmi t to Congress at the beginnin 
of each regular session a · National Production and Employment Budget, sett, 
forth in detail the estimated size of the labor force , including self employ 
ed, the estimatei aggregate volume of investment and expenditure expected dur 
ing the ensuing fiscal year (o r other designated period), and the estimated 
investment required to produce a full employment volume of production. 
Should the anticipated investment figure be less than the figure required to 
produce full employment the President was instructed to set forth a general 
program for encouraging further investment to make up the deficiency, in-
eluding recommendations for legislation to implement such a program, and ex-
tending itself to programs for direct government expenditure should other 
means prove insufficient.22 If the amount of estimated investment should be 
21 The Subcommittee Print of December 18, 1944 had worded this even 
more strongly by saying that 11 i.t is the responsibility of the government to 
guarantee that right by assuring continued fUll employment. 11 
22 The December 18 Subcommittee Print had here indicated that pro-
grams for govermnent expenditure might include, but need not be limited to, . 
specific programs for aid to business enterprises, partic11larly small busines , 
public works tending to promote incr8ased investment by private enterprise, 
and useful public services such as health and education programs , slum 
clearance and urban rehabilitation, conservation and development of natural 
resources and rural electrification. 
13 
found t o be in excess of that amount needed to produce ful l employment, the 
President was instructed to submit a general program for preventing infla-
tionary economic dislocations or dimmi~hing the aggregate volume of invest-
ment and expenditure. Special attention was to be given to the effects ort 
monopolistic practices and the distribution of the national income of the 
progrruns set forth in his Budget in the President's reports . 
(3) The National Budget was to be prepared within the Executive Of-
fice of the President, under his supervision and in consultation with member 
of his Cabinet and other agency heads . The President was to designate such 
advisory boards or conunittees as he deemed necessary~ composed of representa 
tives from both private and public organizations . 
(4) A Joint Committee on the National Budget was established, com-
posed of the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Senate Appropria -
tions , Banking and Curr ency, Education and labor, and Finance Corrilldttees and 
the Appropriations, Banking and Currency, Labor, and Ways and Means Committe 
of the House, plus seven additional members from each House, appointed by th 
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House respectively. This Com 
mittee was to study the National Budget transmitted by the President and re-
port , not :Later than March lst of each year , its findings and recommendations 
with respect to it, >rith a joint resolution setting forth its general policy 
for to ensuing fiscal year to serve as a guide to the several committees of 
Congress dealing with legislation relating to the National 1udget . The Join 
Committee was empowered to hold hearings, subpena witnesses .and papers, hire 
a staff, and to make such expenditures for printing, etc. as were necessary. 
(5) The President was enjoined to review quarterly all Federal in-
vestment and expenditure in the light of their effects on the operation of 
the Act. The Bill concluded with an interpretive section, the most importan 
feature of which was an assurance that the carrying out of any program set 
forth in the National Budget was to be contingent upon authorization by Con-
15 
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The measure was referred to the important Banking and Currency Com-
mittee, of which Senator Wagner, a co- sponsor of the Bill, was the chairman. 
Here it underwent nine committee redrafts. Throughout these proceedings 
both Mr. Keyserling and Mr. Gross took a pr6.minent part as consultants . Mr. 
Keyserling had been appointed as unofficial staff adviser to Senator Murray . 
and to the Banking and Currency Committee staff . 24 
The minority opposition in the Senate Committee concentrated its ef-
forts on modifying the three features which it felt to be most objectionable. 
The opposition was in agreement that some type of govern~ent mechanism for 
studying the economy was to be desired, but they disliked all references t o 
11full employment~•.• government 11guaranteed11 employment , or an ultimate re-
l i ance · on "federal investment and expenditure. 1125 In spite of some slight 
modifications and efforts to put through amendments damaging to the above 
features, the Full Employment Bill emerged from Committee largely intact' . • 
Two inroads were made on the government spending provisions of the 
bill. These were the Hatch and Taft amendments .26 The Hatch amendment re-
placed section 2 (e) of the Bill with the words: 
to the extent that continuing full employment cannot other-
wise be attained, (the Federal Government shall) consistent with 
the needs and obligations of the Federal Government and othe_r __ _ 
essenrrai GOnS1derat1ons or-na-rlonal policy, prOV1cte-sffcfi Volume 
ol' F'ederal 1nvestment andexpend1ture as may be needed ••• 
(Emphasis the author t&) 
The Taft amendment specified that a program of federal investment and expend 
iture be accompanied by a tax program which would prevent any net increase 
in the public debt "over a reasonable period of years , 11 but the possible 
23 This qualification represented an 
committee drafts which 11 hereby authorized to 
may eliminate any deficiency in the National 
24 Bailey, op. cit., PP • 45, 110. 
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important cGange from the first 
be appropriated such sums as 
Budget . 11 
26 
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cripPBng effect of this was nullified by the addition of the words that thi s 
should be carried on 11wi thou t interfering with the goal of full employment. 11 . 
The measure passed the Senate with a favorable 71-10 vote, and was 
sent to the House, from whence it was to return completely transformed. 
The Metamorphosis 
The Full Employment Bill now found itself, because of its ancestral 
connection with the Budget Act , refer red to the relatively minor House Com-
mittee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments , a heavily conservative 
body. 27 A different committee referral might have led to the passage of an 
Act resembling far more the original bill . This Committee's alterations and 
recommendations with respect to the Bill set the entire tone of House debate 
and insured that few of the original spending features of the Bill would re-
1 main. 
During debate in Committee and on the House floor many objections we ,e 
raised. Principle among these were that the Bill as proposed was unworkable 
and un-P~erican for: (a) you cannot guarantee full employment in a free 
society; (b) paternalism kills initiative; (c ) government spending undermine 
business confidence; (d ) economic forecasting, as embodied in the National 
Budget calculations, is both impossible and unwise, since it would tend to 
28 
bring about the conditions forecast; and (e ) full employment and government 
spending would lead to inflation. 29 In short , the opponents of the measure, 
27 Ibid, P• 151. 
28 In this regard, Senator Ralph E. Flanders had said: 
A dangerous feature of this bill is the proposal that this in-
formation be used as the basis for determining what shall be done 
throughout the following fiscal year . It involves the element of 
prophecy. I certainly doubt if prophecy is possible . We cannot 
prophecy clearly enough to make these advance determinations . 
the Full Employment Bill see Al-
Money, Debt and Economic Activity ( N~n York: Prentice-Ha l 
• 
29 Bailey, op . cit . , pp . 130-132 and Harris, op . cit . , p . 38. 
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like President Harding , had 11 little enthusiasm for any proposed remedy which 
seeks either palliation or tonic from the Public Treasury.n30 The Committee 
on Expenditures promptly voted to reject the measure , and only by the inter-
vention of Representative Cochran, a House sponsor; was there achieved the 
formation of a subcorrmittee to draft a substitut e bill . This finally re-
sulted, i n December, 1945, in the introduction on the House floor of the sub 
committee measure, r etitled the 11 Empl oyment and Production Act of 1946. u3l 
The House substitute measure was completely purged of the right to 
work idea, any reliance on government spending, and the mandate for long-
range forecasting. Instead of the previous stater.1ent of policy and the Nati 
al Budget provisions it admonished the government to foster private enter-
prise and promote, by means consistent with this and other obligations , a 
high and stable level of employment , production, and purchasing power . (Em-
phasis the author ' s . ) Under it the idea of the finally resulting Economic 
Report of the President was largely evolved and a Joint Committee to review 
the President's program and report to both houses was established. The 
Joint Committee also might make reports and recommendations of its ovm from 
time t o time, and hold hearings , but the original provisions calling for the 
passage of a joint resolution and the subpena of documents and witnesses wer 
omitted. The most important feature of the new bill was its provision for a 
Council of Economic Advisers . 
During the discussions about the bill in the Senate Commi ttee and pr -
vious to this there had been some discussion among the supporters of the 
bill that the National Budget provisions would not work unless some provisio 
was made for a full-blovm planning staff , s i mil ar to the National Resources 
Planning Board, to aid the President in the preparation of his r eport . The 
Senate minority had offered the suggestion that an office of the Director of 
quotation opening this chapter . (Bailey, 
Ibid., pp. 166-67. 
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the National Budget be created in the Executive Office. This proposal was 
def eated in t he Senate version, the sponsors of the bill offering the follow 
ing reasons for their action: 
An amendment of this type would impair the bill . Before 
there has been any experience in the development of a national 
production and employment budget there can be no sound basis 
for establishing a speeific administrative framework within 
which the President should operate . The wise course is to allow 
the Pres~dent to work out this problem in consultation with his 
Cabinet. 2 
In the course of debat e on the form that such a council of adviser.s 
should assQm~four types of organization were suggested • . The first was a 
Cabinet committee. This suggestion was supported by Secretary of t he Treas-
ury, Fred Vinson~ Secondly, a Con~ission, serving both the President and 
Congress , was envisioned, being composed of President:ia.l appointees , members 
of Congress, and representatives of the public . A third suggestion was that 
an independent agency be established and that it be responsible to Congress . 
This proposa l was actively backed by the U. s. Chamber of Commerce in hear-
ings . Lastly, a quasi-public body, similar to the Federal Reserve Board, wa 
proposed. The Office of \ifar Mobilization and Reconversion proposal fo r a pe -
rranent coordinat ing and planning staff in the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent finally won out over all others.33 
Fr om the beginning t~ere had been little controversy over the need 
for some t ype of economic report, a joint committee to study that report , and 
some type of planning mechanism for its preparation . 34 These, then, were th l 
32 Ibl.·d . , pp 92 168 
. ' . 
33 Ibid . , p. 170 and Gross and Nourse, "The .Role of the Council of 
Economic AdV'J:Sers , " American Political Science Review, April, 1948, pp . 287- · 8. 
34 James E. 1furray, 11A Program to Prevent Boomo r Bust, 11 New York 
Times , December 29 , 1946, VI, p . 17 . See a l so Nourse, Keyserl ing anu---
rr.r.ar.K, Economic Reports of the President (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co . , 
1949 ), Iritroductl.on, pp . ~i=V:ri for references to the origin of the idea of 
comprehensive presidential messages on the State of the Union . 
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features which survived the joint conference sessions which attempted to re-
concile the Senate and House bills. Bertram Gross , active throughout the 
conference session, re-wrote both the sections on the Economic Report and 
the Council after the House version . These were subsequently adopted with-
out opposition . A big issue in the establishment of the Council was its re-
lationship to the President and to Congress. The Senate managers had in-
sisted that any provision which in any way served to make ambiguous the re-
lation of the Council to the President would not be acceptable . The House 
bill carried the statement: 11 The President is required to make available to 
the Joint Committee on the Economic Report , if it desires , t he var ious 
studies, reports, and recommendations of the Council which have been sub-
mi tted to the President ." Gross eliminated this provision in his final 
draft.35 
The conference sessiorswith regard to the declaration of poli cy and 
the specific content of the Pres i dent 1 s reports turned out to be little more 
t han battles of the thesaurus~ ·· .36 Supporters of the liberal version of t he 
bill worked on the assumption that 11advice by any other name 11 might produce 
the same results . By this strategy they succeeded in rescuing some of the 
pr ovisions of the old bill by inserting t he words 11needed levels" as goals to 
be r ecommended in the President 1s program for carrying out the policies of 
t he Ac t . The word 11maximwn 11 employment was substituted for the original 11ful 11 
or the House "high and stable" employment . House conferees wer e victorious n 
ins i sting that any reference to full employment in the title of the bill be 
eliminat ed. By i nserting the word "resources" into the Act supporter s hoped 
to overcome the objecti onab Je flavor .of the or'iginal spending provis ions and 
35 Bai ley, op. cit., p . 223 and p . 2 26. Note that , in effect, the 
ambiguous relati on mrs crga.in establi shed when, in 1948, the Council began 
publishi ng itS studieS separately from the President IS economiC reports • 
See Chapter III, pp. 47-50 and Chapter N, , pp. 74-75. 
36 Ibid., • 224. _ 
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yet imply federal spending. 
as follows: 
As Iinally passed, the Statement o£ Po;.;_cy re~d j 
Sec. 2. The Congr ess hereby declares that it is the con-
tinuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to 
use all practicable means consistent with its needs and obliga-
tions and other essential considerations of national policy, with 
the assistance and cooperation of i ndustry, agriculture, labor , 
and State and local governments, to coordinate and utilize all its 
pl ans, functions, ~~d resources for the purpose of creating and 
maintaining, i n a manner calculat ed to foster and promote free 
competitive enterprise and the general welfare, conditions under 
which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities, i n-
cluding self-employn1ent, for those able, willing, and seeking to 
work~ and to prQmote maximum employment, production, and pur-
chaslng power.Yf 
The Employment Act of 1946 
Responsibility for the Employment Act cannot be pinned on any par-
ticular person, party, or group)8 From the very first formative stages to 
the moment when t he final votes were taken many private individuccls, pres-
sur e groups ancl other organizations, government officials and agencies, of-
ficial and non-official advisers, Congressmen and others converged to leave 
t heir Lmpress on the Act. The outward course of events had much to do with 
the character of the final result . In 1945 the widespread concern about 
post-war unemplo~nent favored the introduction of a full employment bill, 
particularly in the Senate, whore membership is more responsive to the urban 
vote. This Senate sensitivity to urban conditions got S.380 through im-
mediat ely after the war, quring the transitional unemployment phase. The 
bill was drastically modified in the House by small town and rural represent 
atives in committee. It suffered there also from a lack of dramatic politic 1  
leadership.39 By the time that a compromise measure was ready for presenta-
37 Public Law 304, 79th Congress, 2d Session, Sec. 2. 
38 Bailey, op. cit., p. 240. 
- " - -
39 Many supporters felt that President Truman was particularly at fa lt 
for not insisting, at the crucial stages, that a stronger bill be produced. 1 
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tion, two years after the measure 's first appearance, it had become obvious 
-=--==~=== - =-- -~-===-= -
that widespread unemployment was not going to materialize immediately. This 
particular combination of circumstances helped to shape the final result.40 
The Act easily passed both Houses . In the House the vote was 320-84 
In the Senate no opposition was registered. The Employment Act became law 
on February 22, 1946. 
Appendix B contains the full text of the Employment Act of 1946 
(Public Law 304). Further exposition of its provisions will be forthcoming 
in succeeding chapters. The chart on the following page, prepared by the 
Council and published in its Second Annual Repor~ gives a bird•s-eye view 
of the structure and operation of the Act, as well as a clear idea of the re 
lation of the President's Council to the other participants in the scheme. 
In the words of Edwin G. Nourse, first Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers, the Employment Act was a "• •• declaration of residual 
public responsibility on a foundation of private enterprise." It 11 enriched 11 
the pattern of Presidential reports begun with the first State of the Union 
message, and augmented 11 t he facilities of advise and policy formulation unde 
the President.n4l 
The final version of the employment bill retained the Senate pro-
visions that the President's reports, and hence .the Council, should review 
the program of the federal government and consider the ef fects of alternativ 
policies on the national welfare. Thus the groundwhich might be covered by 
the analyses involved includes "almost every program with important effects 
on the economy, from taxation to industrial regulation. On the private side 
••• (it includes ) ••• every significant course of action by groups of 
40 Bailey, op. cit. p. 182. 
41 Edwin G. Nourse, llfublic Administration and Economic Stability, 11 
Public Administration Review, Spring, 1947, p. 86. 
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MECHANICS OF" THE 1946 
EMPLOYMENT ACT.--..· 
• 
PRESIDENT 
• 
MA"TERJAL.S FOI?, 71/E 
PR/5510E:/Vr.$ cCCNOHIC 
R.£'POI2T (REVIe~ OF" THE 
E'C()I'(O~IC .SITUATION) 
COUNCIL OF 
ECONOMIC ADVISORS 
1. Gathers information on 
economic conditions 
2. Appraises economic pro-
grame & activities of 
the Federal Government i 
J. Recommends national 
economic policies 
4. Makes economic studies 
at the President's reque 
FEDERAL AGENCIES 
PRIVATE RESEARCH AGE!qCIES 
INDUSTRY 
... -• AGRICULTURE 
LABOR 
CONS'm.fERS 
STATE & LOCAL GOVER~mNTS 
CONGRESS 
• JOINT COMMITTEE 
ON THE 
ECONOMIC REPORT-
Reports to Congress its 
findings and reconnnendatione 
with respect to the econ-
omics report 
jt SERV~OE FACILITIES, INFORMATION 
ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND 
CONSULTANTS 
SOURCE: Council of Economic Advisers, Second Annual R ort (Dec. 1947) p.5. ======!l=~====~==fie'VH'el • 
22 
workingmen, 
gave a wide 
businessmen, farmers and consumers ." 2 The words of the Act j 
birth for comprehensive analyses of almost every phase of nation l 
al life. 
Through the Annual Reports the Council of Economic Advisers has ex-
pressed itself as convinced that the Act was altogether a "well balanced and 
carefully drawn piece of legislation," putting them in a position to advise 
on administrative decisions as well as legislative proposals. The inclusion 
of the words "production and purchasing power" along with "employment," they 
point out, was a valuable contribution, in that full employment is a possibl 
condition in a poor, static economy as well as in a healthy one. 
by maximum production that an economic system can translate its resources 
and skills into the highest standard of living at any particular stage of 
economy. n43 
Nor has the Council seemed to feel that the loss of the formal Natio -
al Budget and government spending features of the Act was disastrous . In 
Keyserling's view: 
The Act was in essence much stronger than the original 
"Full Employment Bill. 11 For while that bill concentrated 
mainly upon using one device (compensatory public spending), 
the final law provided that all the resources and policies 
available to a free people sfloUld be utilized in combination.44 
Sec. 2 of the Employment Act still means that government accepts a com-
plimentary role in areas where, or in times when private enterprise fails to 
provide adequate productive use of the nation's resources, and the Act intro-
duces a distinctively new change from the old hapahazard ndxed private and 
public approach t ot he economic system through the concept of a national 
42 Council of Econonuc Advisers, Fifth Annual Report (December, 1950 
P• 2 
43 Council of Economic Advisers, First Annual Report (December, 1946 
pp. 3, 8 and Second Annual Report (December;-!947), p . 1. 
44 Leon H. Keyserling, 11 A Policy for Full Employment, 11 New Republic, 
October 24, 1949, p. 13. Also see Edwin G. Nourse, "Employment""ACt and the 
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goal embodied in the words "needed levels" and the attempt to gauge the 
amount by which actual performance falls short of that goal. L-5 
To many supporters and friends of t he or i ginal prosposals the Em-
ployment Act was a bitter disappoint1r,ent. I t represented onl y a. "much water ! 
ed down version of t he or i ginal, 11 providing for 11 diagnosis and prognosis " I 
ad infini tum, but with no real program . 46 Jacob Viner expressed the beli ef 
that 11 it wou l d be a mistake to read too much into the declaration of policy I 
as marking a change of economic philosophy. 11 Even Herbert Hoover woul d have 
subscribed to this j umbl e of hedged phrases , he asserts )(7 The inclusion of 
the phrase "tract icable means consistent with i ts needs and obligations and 
other essential considerations of national policy, " originating i n the Hatch j 
amendment, and the stress laid on the maintenance of "free competi tive enter 
prise, n i n the view of Seymour Harris , clearly limits the measures which the 
goverrunent might take in order to achieve the goals . 48 Paul Strayer r i ghtly 
points out the fact that no policy i ssues were r esolved by the Act , nor are 
any concrete measures to deal with economic fluctuation~ beyond the provisio 
for cont inuous study and report , embodied in i ts provisions . 
One signficant advance over the thirties is in the emphasis on the r 
l ation between suppl y and demand to be incl uded in the reports . 11 The Act al 
so shoul d have the wholesome effect of achieving a better int egration of re-
lated economic policies, a larger measure of cooperation bet ween Executive 
iitr (Cont.) Eoonomic Future," Vit al Speeches , January l , 1947, p. 
178 and Leland and Nourse, 11Stabilizing-:Elie Economy: A Discussion," American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1950, p. 184. 
L~$ Second Annual Report , op. cit . , p . 24 and Nourse , 11Public Ad-
ministrat ion and Econom1c Stabllizati0ri', 11 op . cit ., p . 87 . Reference is mad 
in Nourse's articl e and in the First Annuar-Report, p . 3, to the possible 
11 coercive 11 na ture of the ful l employment guarantee in the Murray Bill. 
~6 Harris , op . cit ., pp . 38, 68. 
47 Quoted by M. Bronfenbrenner , "Postwar Political Economy: 
-ident 's Reports, 11 The Journal of Politi cal Economy, October , 1948, 
====#====4B-Ha . "t 42 
rr1s , op . ~· ' p . • 
The Pres 
p . 374. 
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and Legislative and, possibly, a better timing of essential legislation.n49 
At least, says Alvin Hansei}, we are assured that the government "•rill con-
tinually take the pulse and temperature, so to speak,of the economy,u50 
49 Strayer, op. cit., p. 153. Strayer says the fusic weakness of the 
ent ire struggle was tnat:nD agreement was reached on institutional goals, 
hence no r eal steps could be taken in the direction of strengthening the 
economy. 
50 Alvin Hansen, Economic Policy ~ Full Employment (New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill Bo ok Company, 1947), p . 108. 
-r 
CHAPTER III 
OPERATION OF THE COUNCIL: ITS ROLE AND ACTIVITIES 
Sec. 4(c) of the Employment Act had specified the duties and 
functions of the Council: 
· (1) to assist and advise the President in the prepara-
tion of the Economic Report; 
(2) to gather timely and authoritative information con-
cerning economic developments and economic trends, both cur-
rent and prospective, to analyze and interpret such informa-
tion in the light of the policy declared in section 2 for the 
purpose of determining whether such developments and trends are 
interfering, or are likely to interfere, with the achievement 
of such policy, and to compile and submit to the President 
studies relating to such developments and trends; 
(3) to appraise the various programs and activities 
of the Federal Government in the light of the policy de-
clared in section 2 for the purpose of determing the extent 
to which such programs and activities are contributing, and 
the extent to which they are not contributing, to the achieve-
ment of such policy, and to make recommendations to the 
President with respect thereto; 
(4) to develop and recommend to the President nation-
al economic policies to foster and promote free competitive 
enterprise, to avoid economic fluctuations or to diminish the 
effects thereof , and to maintain employment, production, and 
purchasing power; 
(5) to make and furnish such studies, reports thereon, 
and recommendations with respect to matters of Federal econ-
omic policy and legislation as the President may request. 
The Act had further specified that, in making its annual reports to the 
President, and in carrying out its other functions: 
and that 
(1) the Council may constitute such advisory commit-
tees and may consult with such representatives of industry, 
agriculture, labor, consumer, State and local governments, 
and other groups, as it deems advisable; 
(2) the Council shall, to the fullest extent possible, 
utilize the services, facilities, and information (in-
cluding statistical information) of other Government 
agencies as well as of private research agencies, in 
order that duplication of effort and expense may be a-
voided.l 
In an article published jointly by Edwin G. Nourse and his admini-
strative assistant Bertram Gross in the American Political Science Review, 
the first chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers outlined five f ea-
tures of the Council which he considered it essential to maintain if the 
body was to truly reflect the intent of the Employment Act. These features 
were : 1) that it remain always a small organization; 2) that it be strict-
ly advisory, having no administrative responsibilities; 3) that its work be 
based on realities, not abstractions; 4) that the Council assists the Pres-
ident and the President alone; and 5) that its advice be in terms of econ-
omics, not of politics.2 This chapter will examine the first three of Dr. 
Nourse's requisites through a consideration of the organizational structure 
and program of the Council. In amplifying the remaining two requirements a 
rift was clearly revealed between the Chairman and other members of the 
Council. These differences will be set forth and discussed in the final 
two sections of the chapter. Two aspects of the Council's work were in-
volved. These might be considered the economic and political sides of 
Council operation. The first was a difference of interpretation as to what 
should be the precise character of the Council's analyses. The second 
schism involved the Council's relations with Congress. These conflicts 
clearly illustrate the differences of interpretation as to the economist's 
1 Public Law 304, Chap. 33, 79th Congress, 2d Session, Sec. 4(e). 
2 Gross and Nourse, 11The Role of ·the Council of Economic Advisers, 11 
American Political Science Review, April, 1948, pp. 283-295. 
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role in government. '11-====--
The Membership and Staff of the Council 
The Council operates under a statutory maximum of $345,000 to cover 
all salaries of members, officers, and employees.3 Members themselves re-
ceive compensation at the rate of $16,000 per annum.4 This necessarily 
, limits the size of the Council staff, making it one of the smallest agencies 
of government. This, far from being a drawback, conforms with the intent of 
t he Act that the Council remain only a small advisory group, having no ad-
ministrative powers or responsibilities that would necessitate a large and 
expanding staff. The basic research involved in the Council's work, more-
over, as specified by Sec. 4(e)(2) of the Act, is to be carried on by other 
agencies . 
That the Council's total available appropriation has, in most cases, 
failed to equal even the limitation specified in the Act on salaries alone 
can be seen from the following figures: 
Fiscal Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
Appropriation 
$ 275,000 
350,000 
300,000 
300)000 
300,0005 
3 Ibid., Sec. 4(f). Bailey reports that appropriations measures wer 
never hotly-aebated during the course of the bill's passage. (Stephen Kemp 
Bailey, Congress ~ ~ Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 2 7. 
4 Ibid., Sec. 4(a). The original Act specified $15,000. The New 
York Times;-iay 11, 1950, 24:4 reported member's salaries as $16,000. -rlie 
litter figure was confirmed by ~hecking the Official Register of the u. s., 
1950, although no record could be found in tfie files of tfie Bos-ton-PUDlic 
ti'Or'ary indicating by what Act Public Law 304 was so amended. Sec . 4(f ) ma 
also have been alter ed to conform with this change. 
5 Digest of Apbropriations For the Support of the Government of the 
u. £•, U. s. Treasury epartment, wasEiiigton, D. c.;-1947- 1951. 
The Council requested $400,000 as its 1948 appropriation, but this was cut 
by the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill to only $350,000. In 1949 the 
Council again requested the $400,000 figure, anticipating an average staff 
of forty-five members and approximately $32,000 to be made available for 
travel, printing,contract services, etc. This request was met with coolness 
by the House appropriations Committee. The final appropriation for the fis-
cal year 1949 was $390,000, $50,000 below the budget for the previous year 
and $100~below the President's budget estimates for that year and the a-
mount requested by the Council. The budget request for the fiscal year 1950 
was $350,000; the grant $300,000. The same was true in 1951.6 
The number of staff members has grovm from a top staff of ten econ-
6 Council of Economic Advisers, Second Annual Report (December, 1947 , 
p. 2 and Third Annual Report (December, l9L8), p. 10. Gross and Nourse QP• 
cit., p. 292. Iri recommending the 33 1/3% cut in appropriations for 1949~e 
House Committee expressed doubt as to the Council's value. 
This agency has been the subject of a searching inquiry 
on the part of the Committee, many of the members being dubious 
as to its value. 
• • • It appears that practically all the information 
which the Council has used has been developed by other agencies 
and could have· been made available in useful form directly to 
the President by the agency originating it • 
• • • There is little indication that, to date, the efforts 
of the Council in endeavoring to coordinate and interpret data 
have produced important results. However, this is a relatively 
new organization and the Committee has made provision for it for 
another year and expects to follow its activities closely. 
(~ York Times, January 3, 1948, 10:6.) 
At the same time, as can be seen below, the Joint Committee, designed to ex-
amine the work of the Council, has prospered. Their 1951 appropriation e-
qualed 179% of that of 1948, the Committee's first ' full year of operation. 
Fiscal Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
A:epropriation 
$ 2.5,000 
70,000 
70,000 
84,725 
125,585 
(Difest of Ap)ropriation~,op. ~., 1947- 1951.) The Act as originally pass-
ed sec. ?(e) specifie<ra maxJlllum of $50,000. 
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omists in Januar,r of 1947 to one of seventeen in January of 1951, exclusive 
of the Council members themselves.?. Of the seventeen economists and stat-
isticians employed, there were eight senior and nine junior ec~nomists.8 
These specialists are exempt from the Civil Service regulations under the 
ployed in accordance with Civil Service procedure.9 The clerical and ad-
ministrative staff has fluctuated according to the treatment accorded the 
Council by appropriations committees, reaching a maximum of twenty-two in 
January 1948 and falling to seventeen in the following year.l0 In the Dec-
ember, 1947 Annual Report the Council expressed the hope that a total staff, 
both professional and clerical, of approximately forty-five members would be 
the normal complirrent of workers. To date, the total number of staff members 
has never exceeded thirty-nine, and this was reduced in 1949 to thirty-four. 
Staffing the Council did not prove to be an easy matter, either in ·r -
gard to selecting the actual Council member~, or in finding qualified pro-
fessional assistance of the highest calibre. It was not until almost five 
months after Public Law 304 was signed that any of the Council members them-
selves were selected. The Law had specified that the members, who were to 
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, be pe 
sons who 11as a result of ••• training, experience, and attainments, (are) 
• • • exceptionally qualified to analyze and interpret economic developments, 
to appraise programs and activities of the Government in the light of the 
7 Council of Economic Advise~ First Annual Report (December, 1946), 
p. 6 and Fifth Annual Report (December, I9"50), p. 29. - · 
8 Grattan, "Truman's Three Wise ·Men," Harpers, June, 1949, p. 57. 
Senior economists are known as professional assistants. 
9 Public Law 304, Sec. 4(b). 
10 Third Annual Report, op. cit., p. 5 and Grattan, op. cit., p. 57. 
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policy declared · in section 2, and to formulate and recommend national econ-
omic policy to promote employment, production, and purchasing power under 
free competitive enterprise. 1111 In addition to these requirements, pressure 
was exerted from all sides on the President to have the members exhibit cer-
tain political, r egional, or professional characteristics that were felt to 
be necessary. The President was known to favor having a businessman, a labo 
representative and an economist as members. Farm groups were insistent that 
there should be someone to represent agriculture.l2 Conservatives wanted 
men of 11 business ability. 11 Liberals pressed for men who were wholeheartedly 
devoted to the principles of the bill.l3 
It is worthy of note that none of the men who figured prominently in 
the speculation preceding Council appointments were ultimately named as mem-
bers of that body.l4 There is no doubt that many persons were approached to 
take the positions, but few could be found who were both available and de-
sirous of undertaking the work . Truman, in a newspaper interview some weeks 
before the first appointments were announced, blamed the Senate and some of 
its committees as de~nts to appointments.15 Another reason given was the 
reluctance of some persons to administer a law of which they did not approve 6 
11 Public Law 304, Sec. 4(a). 
12 ~York Times, June 24, 1946, 19:2 and July 18, 1946, 10:4. 
13 Bailey, op. cit., p. 233. 
14 Jolm J. Corson, 11 Men Against Unemployment," Nation, August 10, 
1946, p. 151. Most prominently mentioned as a possibility was Prof. Alvin 
H. Hansen of Harvard. Another possible candidate was Leon Henderson. At th 
time of Dr. Nourse's resignation newspapers reported the impending naming of 
Winfield w. Riefler, Director of the National Bureau of Economic Research al 
Assistant to the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors. 
(~York Times, June 24, 1946, 19:2 and October 19, 1949, 3:1.) · 
15 New York Times, June 1, 1946, 30:3. 
16 Ibid., July 18, 1946, 10:4. It was felt Qy some that the law re-
presented sucn"sweeping compromises 11 that it would be futile to try to 
~e. 
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Appendix C contains brief summaries of the backgrounds and qualifica-
tions of Edwin G. Nourse, Leon H. Keyserling, John D. Clark and Roy Blough, 
the men who have t hus.far ser ved on the Council. This is not the place in 
which to attempt an evaluation of the work of these men. Their professional 
records demonstrate outstanding achievements previous to service with the 
Council.17 I t was generally felt that the President's first appointments in-
dicated an attempt to antagonize as few interests as possible and were "a 
nice balance between the conservative economic doctrines of the NAM and the 
progressive philosophy of the New Deal.ul8 
The Council has gathered around it a staff which, in the opinion of 
on~ writer , 11is not only unsurpassed in professional competence among the 
economic agencies of present day Washington, but • • • would have <bne credit 
to the Washington scene a dozen years ago, and ••• could form without assis -
ance a first-rate graduate department in any university in the country • 1119 
In the First, and again in the Third Annual Report, the Council expressed its I 
intention of forming a staff not to exceed ten top broadly trained economists, 
each having specialized knowledge of the problems, methods and analyses used, 
and materials and personnel available in some particular area .20 These were 
to work together with a secondary staff of economists and statisticians to 
gather together the latest insights of theoretical economics and the most re-
cent data available in an organized form for the use of the Council members 
themselves . 
17 Biographical material in the Appendix has been taken from Who ' s 
Who in America, 19.50-1951 (Chicago: The . ."A , N. Marquis Co., 1950) . 
18 Bailey, op. cit. , p. 23.5 and Cabill Williams, 11 How the President 
Does His Job, 11 New YOrk--rr-mes, January 4, 1948, VI, 26:4. 
19 M. Bronfenbrenner, "Postwar Political Economy: The President's Rel 
ports, 11 Journal of Political Economy, October, 1948, p. 377. . 
- ' 
cit. , 
20 First Annual Report, op. cit., p. 6 and Third Annual Report, op . 
p. 5-7. 
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The Council's Study Program 
As fields of inquiry, each to be delegated to the senior staff memberi 
best qualified to _examine it, the following areas were mapped out: 
(l) labor relations (5) price-wage-cost relationships 
(2) plant capacity (6) money and credit 
(3) agricultural problems (7) taxation 
(4) consumer demand (8) fiscal problems21 
Supervision of these research projects is then distributed among the Council 
members themselves, with provision being made to enable each member to keep 
in touch with the work being directed by any other and to be free to call on 
any one of the staff members for assistance. 
In order that the work might be drawn together into a comprehensive 
_and comprehendible whole, four major studies 11of basic importance to the long 
range development of our capacity to detect, measure, and appraise current 
situations and changing trends, to analyze the factors and relationships mak-
ing for stability or instability, to define maximum employment, production 
and purchasing power, and to recommend national economic policiesn22 are in 
continuous progress . Each is organized through a staff committee operating 
under the close direction of a Council member and inquiry in any one area is 
focused on the contribution it can make. to these continuing programs. The 
major study areas are as follows: 
21 Third Annual Report, loc. cit. 
p. 2 lists ~reas of work as fOllows: 
The Second Annual Report, op. cit , 
(1) labor force and labor (6) international economic relations 
relations (7) development of human and material 
(2:) plant capacity, invest-
ment and management 
(3) agriculture and food 
(4) flow of income, goods 
and services 
( 5) price relations and 
price policies 
resources 
(8) construction and public works 
(9) veterans, social security, and 
welfare (10) taxation, debt management, 
and banking 
22 Third Annual Report, o...E_. cit., pp. 5-6. 
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(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
the national requirements for capital formation 
{capital needs, investment policy, and sources of 
funds) 
wage-price-profit relationships and policies 
the Nation's Economic Budget -a tentative ten-year 
projection.23 
a comprehensive collection and study of proposed stabil-
ization devices to
4
be used in varying circumstances, and 
their application2 
Behind each of these categories lies a whole host of questions. Can 
we find adequate measures of past, current,· and anticipated levels of invest 
ment? Can we measure the direct results of past and current investment pro-
grams? Is there a way of appraising current and prospective investment rate 
and patterns? Are there, or can there be devised, productivity criteria ap-
plicable to wage settlements? On what evidence and by what criteria does a 
government agency determine that prices, wages, or profits are too high or 
too low and advise in what respects they should be adjusted?25 
While the staff committees are organized to bring together the per-
tinent data relating to the problems being studied, the Council members 
themselves, in the last analysis, are their own chief economists, directing 
the operations throughout and bringing their judgment to bear on the materia 
assembled. Staff committees may, however, with or without Council member 
participation, confer with outside economists and form or join in inter-de-
partmental committees of specialists dealing with particular phases of t heir 
23 The concept of the Nation's Economic Budget will be examined in d-
tail in Chapter v. 
24 Third Annual Report, op. cit., pp. 6-7 and Paul T. Homan, 11 Resea 
in Prices, Wages ana J!foi'J.ts, ii .American Economic Review, Papers and Pro- I 
ceedings, May, 1950, p. 440. Mr. Homan is a member of the staff of the C.E •• 
25 Homan, op. cit., pp. 443-44 and Edgar M. Hoover, "Research in the 
Area of Productive C apac1.ty and Investment, 11 American Economic Review, Paper 
and Proceedings, May, 1950, P• 444. Mr . Hoover is also a meiriber of the staf 
of the c. E. A. 
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work. 
In addition to its regular annual and semi-annual analyses and the 
contacts it maintains with public and private agencies, the Council, in ac-
cordance with Sec. 4(c), part (5), of the Employment Act, may be called upon 
to furnish special studies at the President ' s request. Five monographs have 
been c om.pleted in response to such requests, and additional v.Qrk has been 
done to contribute to studies produced by other agencies . With the excep-
tion of one report published under Council auspices in mimeographed farm, th 
studies of the Council have not been made available to the public. 
On June 22, 1947 the President sent a formal request to the Council 
that it undertake a study of 11The Impact of Foreign Aid Upon the Domestic 
Economy .n This study was made primarily for the benefit of the President 1 s 
Committee on Foreign Aid, commonly known as the Harriman Committee, a 11non-
partisan committee of distinquished citizens appointed to advise the Presi-
dent on the limits within which the U. s. might safely and wisely plan to ex 
tend economic assistance to foreign countries and on the relation which 
should exist between such assistance and our domestic economy • 11 The Council 
was only one of three agencies contributing to the over-all study. It loan-
ed a staff member to the citizens committee for a period of three months , an 
on October 28, 1947 submitted an eighty page monograph, accompanied by thirt 
two pages of statistical appendix.26 
Also in 1947 the Council was asked to extend a study begun by the 
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion on annual wage and employment 
guarantees. This work was still in progress thoughout 1948, and the writer 
was unable to find any reference to its completion or publication.27 
35 
26 Second Annual Report, op. cit., p. 5 and Third Annual Report, op. 
cit., p. 3. 'l'he Counc~Ps generarconclusion was that an . a~a program Of tte 
size proposed could be well sustained by the U. s. (See ~ Impact of Foreig!)J 
Aid Upon~ Domestic Economy, October 1947, pp. 71-80 for a summary.) I 
27 Second Annual Report, op. cit., p. 5 and Third Annual Report, op. ======~RC~~FVr9i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~======== 
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On March 10, 1948 the Council, in response to a request, submitted 
to the President a brief memorandum on the probabl~ consequence of certain 
steel price advances. A notice of this report was released to the press.28 
In April of 1948 a study requested by the President was begun on the 
problem of Federal Grants-in-Aid. For this work the Council planned exten-
sive consultation with state and local government representatives, the Coun-
cil of State Governors, the U. s. Conference of Mayors, and the Municipal 
Finance Officers' Association, in order to find the answers to such question 
as: 1) What is the effect on the economy of the programt 2) Are the right 
functions being aided? 3) How can the aid be used roost effectively? 
can the most equitable distribution of funds be assured? 5) Should the pre-
sent rigid specifications on the use of funds be relaxed?29 
A cr itique on the economic impact of budget ceilings being consider-
ed for the fiscal year 1951 was requested on July 1, 1949 by the President. 
In August this r eport was completed and submitted in two parts. It ~ the 
fir st formal Council document to contain a majority and a minority view, Dr. 
Nourse presenting a separate analysis because of a difference of opinion 
with other members concerning modern budget deficits.30 
In addition to these reports, under the auspices of the Joint Com-
mittee on the Economic Report, the Council began in May 1948 the collation 
and publication of the latest statistical data available in a monthly bul-
letin entit led Economic Indicators. This up to date compilation of charts 
and tables gathered from the various statistical agencies of Government (par 
28 Third Annual Report, loc. cit. 
29 Second Annual Report, £E· cit., p. 5 and New York Times, February 
15, 1948, 1:4. 
30 Nourse, uWhy I Had to Step Aside," Collier's, February 18, 1950, 
p. 56. Dr. Nourse broke with the practice of trying tO arrive at single un-
ified statements of the Council's views after the midyear Report of 1948, t~ r e-
after either submitting a separate document or appending a dissenting opinio9 
=db,;t:;.o hed$esielen _ cer~ona- - JaeliD.sa- :lbid,.,,_,=ih-=O~>=~= ==========#====== 
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ticularly the Departments of Commerce, Labor and Agriculture and the Federal 
Reserve Board) and organized -~ the Council can be secured by subscribers or 
in single issues through the Government Printing Office more quickly than th 
material can be obtained from regular publications of the cooperating agenci ~ . 
Continued attempts are being made to improve the techniques of compiling and 
presenting the material . The series offers a continuous description of the 
movements of critical economic indicators. A list of these indicators fol-
lows: 
(1) The Nation ' s Economic Budget 
(2) Gross National Product 
(3) Consumers ' Prices 
(4) Wholesale Prices 
( 5) Prices Received and Paid by 
Farmers 
(6) Stock Prices 
(7) Civilian Labor Force 
(8) Non-Agricultural Employment* 
(9) Average Weekly Hours* 
(10) Average Weekly Earnings* 
(11) Average Hourly Earnings* 
(12) Work Stoppages 
(13) Industrial Production 
(14) Weekly Production* 
!15) Production of Selected 
WJ81luf actur es 
(16) New Construction 
(17) New Housing Starts 
(18) Expenditure for New Plant 
and Equipment 
(19) New Corporate Security 
Issues 
(20) Inventories and Sales 
(21) Merchandise Exported 
and Imported 
(22) National Income 
(23) Corporate Profits 
(24) Personal Income 
(25) Consumer Income, Spend-
ing and Saving 
{26) Personal Consumption 
Expenditure 
(27) Per Capita Disposable 
Income 
{28) Farm Income 
(29) Consumer Credit 
(30) Bank -Loans and In-
vestments 
(31) Money Supply 
(32) Federal Cash Receipts 
From and Parments to 
the PublicJ 
31 Economic Indicators , ¥arch, 1951. The ~~·s indicate that data is 
for selected industr1es. 
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Council Relations With Governmenta l and Non-Governmental Agencies and with 
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the President --- ----
We now come to a consideration of the relations of the Council and 
its staff with other governmental and non-governmental agencies. The chart 
on page 22 of Chapter II clearly illustrates the Council's dependence on re-
presentatives of industry, agriculture, labor, consumers, state and local 
governments, federal agencies, and public and private research agencies. 
On the policy making level, the Council has made it possible for 
frank and cordial relations to exist and free exchange of information and 
consultation to take place between Cabinet members and heads of other govern 
mental agencies. In the early stages of preparation of materials for use in 
the President's Economic Reports the Council maintains close contact with th 
staffs of the several Government departments and agencies, and takes into ac 
count the views and experience of these agencies. Again, when drafts of 
material to be submitted to the President are in readiness, agency heads re-
ceive copies so that they may further comment before the material assumes it 
final form.3 2 
Often there have taken place special conferences between the Council 
and other agencies at the staff level for the purpose of examining special 
problems together, and there has occasionally been an exchange of staff mem-
bers between the various agencies . As examples of the second type of cooper 
ation the Fifth .~~ual Report33 tells of lending members of its small staff 
for periods ranging in duration from one week to six months to the Departmen 
of Defense, the Economic Stabilization Agency, the President ' s Water Resourc s 
Commission, and in connection with the Report of the President on Foreign 
Economic Policies . That the Council should not simply become a reviewing 
32 ~Annual Report, op. cit., p. 9. 
33 Fifth Annual Report, op. cit., p. 29 . 
body, staff and Council members have sat in on sessions with numerous 
agencies to formulate ideas on such questi ons , for instance, as the progress 
of a program for treating spot areas of unemployment, the relationship be-
tween agricultural adjustment and the general economy, the inter- relation be 
tween international and domestic economic pol icy, and others .34 
Two agencies of particular note must be mentioned here as working 
very closely with the Council. These both have their existence, as does the 
Council, in the Executive Office of the President . The first is the Bureau 
of the Budget, and the second the National Security Resources Board. 
The problem of adjusting recommended policies to the hard factsof the 
budget, and the reverse of this problem (the budget must ~djust to the hard 
facts of the nation ' s economy) means that the Council must maintain closer 
year-round contact with the Bureau of the Budget than with any other agency. 
In a sense, the Council may be looked upon as parallel ing the work of the 
Budget Bureau, only on a more comprehensive basis , in that the Bureau was 
established a quarter of a century ago to develop a coordinated financial 
program for the Federal government, whereas the Council now seeks to develop 
a coordinated national economic policy. 35 The Bureau performs a most useful 
service to the Council by providing library, procurement, and personnel ser-
vices on a reimbursement basis , thus relieving this group of the administra-
tive headache and financial burden of organizing these services for them-
selves.36 
34 Council of Economic Advisers , Fourth Annual Report (December, 
1949), p . 37. 
35 Ibid . , p. 38 and Edwin G. Nourse, 11 Public Administration and 
Economic StaoiTity, 11 Public Administration Review, Spring, 1947, p . 91. 
36 Ralph E. F'lande:JS, ~~Administering the Employment Act- the First 
Year," Public Administration Review, Autunm, 1947, P• 223 . The Budget Burea 
is a much larger organization than the Council , its 1951 appropriation being I 
somewhat more than ten times that allotted the Council . 
' 
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The National Security Resources Board was set up under the Security 
Act of 1947 to advise the President on .the coordination of military, indust-
rial, and civilian mobilization in a national emergency. In order that its 
functions might not compete with or duplicate those of the Council careful 
cooperation must be maintained between the two bodies. The Board 1s staff is 
ten times the size of the Council's, and it gives its attention largely to 
requirements arising from the military program. The Council can profit by 
its researches and in return supply it with projections or assumptions as to 
, national production, income distribution, investment outlook, market demand, 
and other matters of broad policy significance.37 
The Council has been exceedingly fortunate in obtaining the active 
cooperation of agencies both public and private than can provide -it ; with 
statistical services. In the case of government services, reduced appropria 
tions have often curtailed these, rut where an agency has been forced to dis 
continue some part ~f its work it has usually cooperated with the Council 
in determining which parts it was most essential to continue. They have al-
so attempted to provide the Council with more recent data than would ordin-
arily be available . 
The many experts in the Government agencies have be-
come very skillful in analyzing preliminary data, however 
meager, and in detecting the situation which will be fully 
disclosed when complete information has been collected. 
• • • Many technical staffs in the Government offices are 
engaged i n r esearch projects of direct interest tot he 
Council, and it is kept advised of the progress of these 
studies and is able to learn of important results before 
the whole project is completed and a report prepared for 
publication.3B 
37 Third Annual Report, op . cit., pp. 9-10. The Fifth Annual Report 
describes the grow1ng methods of-cooperation between the NatiOnal Secur1ty 
Resources Board, as well as With the National Security Council and the Natio -
al Production Authority of the Department of Commerce. (PP• 29-30.) 
38 Third }Jmual Report, Q£• cit., p. 8 and Fourth Annual Report, op. 
cit., PP• 31-2. 'l'wo helpful deveiopments have been the inst1tution of' wide 
samplings of business intentions and of the financial position and anticipat d 
purchases of consumers. 
40 
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In its relations with private, non-governmental agencies Chairman 
Nourse early resolved to maintain an 11open door policy on consultation." 
This has meant that, insofar as time permits, individuals and groups are en-
couraged to make their views known to the Council through correspondence o r 
personal interview. Nourse was convinced that the meeting of representative 
from leading groups, among them principal business organizations, major 
unions, national .farm organizations, consumer bodies, regional associations, 
state and local governments and professional associations would insure the 
essential condition for success: that the Council 1 s work be "based on 
realities, not abstracted from institutional or psychological conceptions. n3~ 
In the first years of operation a series of consultative meetings I 
were held around the Council's conference table to which representatives fro J 
the above mentioned sectors were invited. Toward the end of 1949 a more 
formalized arrangement was suggested and tried. Plans were made for quarter-
ly meetings at which one or two specific problems, designated beforehand, 
were to be discussed. Invited groups were urged to circulate among the 
participants special studies drawn up in advance as a basis for discussion. 
In this way, through advance preparation, the consultative meetings could 
prove more fruitful . 4° These meetings serve a two-fold purpose . Tliey are 
a source of information for the Council about business conditions, attitudes 
expectations, and purposes, and they in turn help to harmonize the thinking 
between the government and the rest of the economy by giving the partici-
pants a better idea of what they themselves can and should do . 41 
39 Gross and Nourse, op . cit. , pp. 291-92 . 
40 Second Annual Report , op . cit. , p. 4 and Fourth Annual Report, op 
cit., p. 36. 
4l Third Annual Report , op. cit. , pp. 1- 2, p . 9 and Second Annual Re 
port, op . cit., p. 28. I t may be seen that the Council, in fact , does more 
~ siiiiply advise the President . In its consultative function it actsas a 
staff arm to a number of federal administrative offices • . (Nourse, op . cit. 
ul 
-----
Paralleling the cooperation between the Council and government 
agency staff research services, the Council has endeavored to make research 
contracts with existing private research agencies or university groups es•·: 
pecially qualified to develop particular lines of inquiry. This has been 
particularly true of projects which, although already in progress by Govern-
ment agencies and outside organization~require extension, deepening, or the 
giving of a "somewhat new direction in the light of policies enunciated in 
the Employment Act, 11 and studies which need to be pushed furthar than the 
resources of the Council's limited staff permit.42 
It must be remembered that the Council of Economic Advisers exists 
primarily and solely for the purpose of advising the President. It must be 
judged on the basis of this phase of its oper ations, no matter how elaborate 
is the framework upon which it operates and the contacts which it maintains. 
A short circuit or sluggish performance at the point of oontact with the 
President-would render the apparatus useless.43 
There appears to have been a steady growth of intercourse between 
the President and the Council. The Second Annual Report mentions periodic 
attendence of Council members at Cabinet meetings to participate in round 
table discussions on material and conclusions being offered by that body for 
the President's use. In January of _l949 the Report refers to discussions 
between the President and the Council during the period when the President 
formulating his decisions as to what he desires to send to Congress, after 
ceiving the Council's draft of recommendations and estimates of the economic 
situation.44 However, Chaii~an Nourse indicated soon after his departure 
42 Second Annual Report, ~· cit., p. 4. 
43 Of course, Council impact upon the national economy as a whole de 
pends not on the Council, but on the extent to which the President accepts or 
rejects its advice and upon whether or not the Congress chooses to act on any 
of the President's recommendations. 
44 Ibid., p. 7 and Third Annual Report, op . cit., p. 9. 
42 
from the Council that there had to that tLme existed no close bond between 
Council and President . 
When we handed our final draft of analyses and suggestions 
to Mr. Truman, his almost unvarying fornru.la was : 11 I 1ll take 
this home with me (or on to Williamsburg) and read it With 
great care . Then we can discuss it further ." But never- -
from the first annual report of January 1947 to the third 
mid-year report of 1949- -did such a discussion materialize • 
• • • On no occasion did the council have so much as a 
single hour 1s time in which we could sit down with the 
President to answer any question that ar ose in his mind, 
clarify data, or examine alternative courses and probable 
consequences . We learned of his final policy decisions 
through an assistap~ or an assistant to an assistant on the 
White House staff . 47 
While the Fifth Annual Re~ort does not offer a clue as to whether 
---
more than this sort of 11arm 1s-length bargaining, " as Nourse called it, has 
developed, it does indicate that the Council, for its part , is offering to 
the President greatly increased services . In addition to the Annual Reviews 
of the Economic Situation which were prescribed by the Act , and the semi-
annual reports which developed immediately, the Council has, since 1949, fur 
nished the President with quarterly and monthly reports , sometimes written, 
sometimes oral,on the economic situation. In mid 1950 this service was fur-
ther expanded to include weekly reports, highlighting important developments 
The President,through the Council and the Joint Committee, also receives a 
copy of the monthly Economic Indicators . A special selection of about half 
of t he charts and tables in this publication, covering matters of most im-
mediate concern, is prepared for the President even more promptly than it cru 
be put through the Government Printing Office . The President keeps these 
constantly on hand on his desk in a loose- leaf book stamped nThe Economy in 
45 Edwin G. Nourse, 11Why I Had to Step Aside, 11 op. cit., p . 56 . 
46 These weekly reports have also been circulated to other important 
officers on the economic front in the Government, thus avoiding a duplicatio 
43 
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of similar activities formerly conducted by other agency staf fs . (See Fifth 
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ConflictinE Interpretations of the Council's Role 
In performing its two main supporting functibns--(a) to gather facts 
and ?PPraise their signifi cance and (b) to appraise policies already in ex-
istence--as set forth in Sec. 4(c), parts (2) and (3), the Council is more 
than a mere "fact finding agency, 11 as it was referred to by President Truman 
on the occasion of t he appointment of Dr . Nourse.48 "Facts" must be i n-
terpreted . This means both analytical and syntbetic study by the Council . 
Nourse , in a speech before the American Economic Associat ion i n January 1947J 
characterized the Co uncil as a "doorway throtlgh which the best thinking of 
systematic economics may be brought into clear and effective focus at the 
poi nt of executive dec i sion as to the nati onal economic policy and ·action . 11h 
Nourse repeatedly and emphatically made the point that t he Council ' s 
duty· was to present the consensus of profession opinion on vital economic 
problems . fuere there were important divergencies of opinion, the alterna-
t i ves must al so be presented, so that t he President would have knowledge of 
the differences among economists , business , labor, and agricultural l eaders, 
and the grotmds for the di sagreements , and could make his own choices in the 
light of these . The entire idea that the Council would, or could, act as a 
sort of Supreme Court of Economics was rejected .SO 
Especially was this true when the Council was called upon to test 
47 Third Annual Report, op . cit ., p . 5. A companion ser i es , 11 The 
Budget in Operation," 1s provJ.dectDy""""flle BUreau of t he Budget each month. 
48 John J. Corson, op. cit., p . 152. 
49 Edwin G. Nourse, "Economics in the Public Service, 11 
omic Review, Papers and Proceedings , May, 1947, p . 22 . 
American Econ I 
SO The important statements of Nourse 1 s feelings on t his sub j ect can 
be found in Nourse, 11 Economics in the Public Service, 11 op . cit., pp . 25-27 
and Nourse , uvVhy I Had t o Step Aside, 11 ·2£· cit., PP• 51=5'2.---rree also Roy 
Blough, "Political and Administrative Requis1tes for Achieving Economic Stab-; 
ility, 11 American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1950, p . 178 
, 44 
separate economic policies for their ef fec t s upon the economy. The selection 
of nati or"al purposes must be lef t to the people . However, once these purpose 
were accepted as facts, the Council could advise what kind of management of 
resources cmll d best .effectuate them .5l The recommendation~: must be on pure-
' ly economic grounds and be. restricted to pointing out the direction and 
strength of cause and resul t sequences . Nourse felt that there was neither 
excuse no_ need for the Council to become 11 in any wa,y involved i n the rival 
beliefs and struggl es of different political or economic factions . " 52 
Here we find the Council face to f ace with the task of analyzing its 
own responsibil ity, both to economics as a profession and t o t he requirements 
of its posi tion as a pol icy advisory agency. Because the economist working 
in the f i el d of policy determination and evaluation i nevitably runs into dif -
ferenc es about the ends to be pursued, as well as about the best means of at-
ltaining chosen ends , he comes constantly to be confronted wi th considerations 
which lie ou·tside the proper area of economic analysis . The general position 
of the scientific economist, as expressed by Lionel Robbi ns ,53 has been that 
economics is in itself neutral as between end~ but can help t o r esol ve dif-
ferences about the means of attaining sel ected ends and, by setti n£>; forth the 
full implications of our choices, can help us to select mutually consistent 
ends . 
The primary difficulty arises when the economist attempts , as he must 
to delimit his analys i s to those policy effects which are purely economic in 
50 (Cont . ) and Third Annual Report, op . cit ., p . 30 for agreerrent 
with the idea that the CounCll can not act asa Supreme Court . 
5l Fourth Annual Re·9ort , op . cit . , pp . 18-19 and Fifth Annual Report, 
op. c i t ., pp . 2-3. 
52 Nourse, "vThy I Had To Step Aside, 11 op . cit . , pp. 51-52 . 
53 Robbins, An Essay On the Nature and Si gnificance of Economic Scien<e 
(london : Macmillan and Co., limited, 1948), pp . 1h7-152. 
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character 2.s opposed to those which have sociological implicati ons • .54 The 
economist must properl y be on guard against invoking the sanctions of ethics 
or of disciplinffi outside his fielti in order to reinforce the conclusions of 
economics . Where his assumptions have recognized extra- economic consideratio 
on the theory that these were valid, the economist should indicate the nrlxed 
nature of his assumptions . 5.5 
I n two respects, Nourse char ged, other Council members failed to 
maintain the purity of 'its · analyses . First , they felt that the Council 
sho uld come to the President with a single , definite policy recorm.endation, 
arrived at by maj ority rule,· and then try to 11 sell" him on it . SeCOJ.d]y, the 
insisted that the political acceptability of its · recommendations must be 
coLs.idered , and . tha.t it was fruitless to draft analyses whose conclus i ons dif 
f ered markedly from previously expressed public statements by the President . 
'1'his would be, felt Nourse , to make political considerations, as well a s e co 
omic ones , an element in its · analyses . Such attitudes could only l ead to 
a pervers ion of the Council ' s functions . 
'l'hat it i s often aLmost impossible to make the distinction between 
economic considerations and t hose which are tinged with supplementary elemen s 
bec c:-mes i mmediately apparent . I s the economic adviser justified in offering 
advice about t he scope and nature of substantive programs, as distinguished 
from the effect of these programs on the economy?.56 Can the economists , wor 
ing under the Employment Act , choose to ignore the politi cal and administra-
t i ve problems of achieving its goal s? 
ccording to Paul Strayer, of Princeton University, the Cruncil must 
-----.51· Ibid., pp. 127-130 . An exampl e of the inclusi on of exogenous 
effects 1'roui.Cfbe, for instance , judgments about the political r eaction to a 
tax burden enterin.:; into the economjsts ' determination of the advisability of 
a proposed tax program • 
.5.5 I bid, pp . 149- 1.50 . 
56 See New York Times , 
============~~~II~g~,~Wficr=expi ess- u_ 
be "arbitra17 and articific i al. 11 
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' 
select and advocate policies and reconMendations in t he light of probabilitie ~ . 
Other~r.ri se , it is liable to find its advice completely ignored and to l ose the 
possibility of achieving any program'Nhatsoever for stabilizing the econony . 
This, says Strayer, i s what makes the Council's ta.sk far more difficult than 
j is generally .realized . 57 
I 
That the Council would inevi~ably degenerat e into a mere 11 mouthpiece" 
of t he President, it seems to this ·writer , is not a necessary consequence of 
an attempt to present the President with clear cut analyses and recommenda-
tions , arrived at in the light of the environment into ·which these ·rrould be 
pro j ected . I t is, however , go ing one step furt her to cl aim, as Nourse did, 
I 
that other Council members advocated a policy of never differing with the 
President's publicly expressed views . This claim can be better llilderst6od 
when we consider Nourse's view on the efficacy of having Council members ap-
pear before Congr essional Committees, c>.nd the Joint Committee in pe.rticular , 
to answer questions about t heir reports . Nourse f elt that while discussion 
was proper and necessary on the executive level, it could have no place in 
Council relations with the l egislative branch. 11 The role of the Council is t 
make an i deal policy of its ovm for purposes of d:Wcuss i on with the President 
and agency heads . I t is not i ts role to make and advocate extra- economic 
policy, to urge in the legislative arena, or to appear there as economic at-
/ torneys to argue for the President ' s policy.u58 
I In t he first two years of Council operation the probl em did not arise 
acutely because the reports published were explicitly Economic Reports of the 
President and appeared over his name. As such, it was not pos s i bl e to ascer-
tain which parts of the President 1 s report stemmed direct ly from the Council 1 
57 Paul J. St.:.-·ayer, 11 The Council of Economic Advisers: Political Eco -
omy on Trial, 11 American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, I/!ay, 1950, J 
p . 145 . Nourse disavowed anydesire to become a ttkept economist,n even in th 
Vfuite House . · 
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analyses, and which parts were modified by the President or were his own . 
In January of 1948 it was suggested that Council members testify before the 
Joint Com"Tlittee on the recommendations made by the President . The President 
himself took the s t and that members were free to testify or not, as they 
pleased. Nourse , however , felt that such a procedure was not proper and, 
encouraged in this view by Senator Taft , then Chairman of the Joint Comnittee 
he arranged that no members should accept the invitation to appear . 
I n mid-year of 1948, in order to aJ.lgy charges of 11politics 11 wi thin 
the Economic Reports , the President requested that the Council present its 
o>vn Review of t he Economic Situation, to be published i n conjunction with the 
President's Economic H.eport . Thus , the public might be i r:. a position to 
11 to develop and ai!lplify those major analyses and findings i n t he Annual Econ-
omic Review II . . . Messrs . Clark and Keyserl ing appeared before the Corn-
mittee . Nourse, who was out of tovm at the time, expressed his unwillingness 
to testify, even if it were possible.59 
F..is objections were t hree in number: 
(1) He felt that the Act had made the non-political role of the 
I 
Council as clear as possible, without actually forbidding legislative activit es 
by members , by setting up the Joint Connnittee and provi ding it with its own 
independent staff . The Council was constructed to advise the President , not 
Congress .60 That was the Joint Con~ittee's function. 
59 Nourse, 11Vfuy I Had to Step Aside, 11 op . cit., p . 55 . 
60 This view is shared by ~IT . Grattan in his Harpers article . Below 
~s a quotation from the articl e of a remark made by one of !fr . Grattan's frien . s 
Which-expresses the dilenm~ of too close a partners~ip between economic ideas 
~nd political policies . 
Since he knows that it is a political problem to give effect 
to his economic advice, t he economist is apt to become a bad 
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(2) Nourse could see onl y two choices open to the economist who 11 ex-
I 
' poses himself to merci l ess questioning in the polit i ca l and parti san a tmos-
phere of Capit ol Hill . " 
training and scruples. 
Both were intol erabl e to an economist of profes sional 
Either he must 11accept the rol e of economi~ attorney I 
and by rhetorical agility, make the most pl ausibl e case he can for someone he 
serves as a mouthpiece 11 • • • or he must state his conviction that a policy 
espoused by the President was , in his j udgement , economical l y unsound , in 
which case he woul d 11 embarrass and strain future relations between the Counci 
and the President 11 because the President 1 s political opponents wou.ld sei ze on 
this as evidence of stupidity or unwillingness to subordinate economic sotmd-
ness to ·political advantage on the President's part .6l Under either of these 
conditions the Council's advisory rel ationshi p with the President would be 
disastrously undermined. 
(3) If the Council became an appendage of Congress rather than a 
l in..'< between to~) executive pol:i cy and a quickel').ed program of rethinking econ-
omics , it woul d have no t i me to develop and carry out its :pr ogram .62 
As Arthur Krock, columnist for the New York Times , points out, had 
Congress not required the publication of the Economic Reports these difficult , es 
I 
J would not ari se . 63 Advice could be silentl y transmitted from Council to Pres ' 
I 
ident and the President woul d be free to give substance to it or not , as he 
chose, in the course of his executi ve l eadershi p . The Act , however, makes it 
60 (Cont . ) 
politician, and since the politician i ncreasingly vrants the 
cachet of economies for his pol itical policies , he is apt to 
become a bad economist . Resul t: all hands are done in . 
(Grattan, op . cit ., p . 60 . ) 
61 Nourse , 11\iThy I Had to Step Aside, 11 op . cit. , p . 55. In this con-
nection, Nourse also charged that the other CounciTrriembers assumed that the res-
i dent would accept the Council' s recommendations (in themselves not unan:L-nous l , 
and that the Council shoul d be prepared to accept the President ' s decisions . 
62 Leland and Nourse , op . cit. , p. 187. 
imperative that tbe President acknowledge, tbrough -hi s schedul ed Economic Re-
ports , definite responsibility for a unified economic program arrived at with 
the assistance of his Council. The publication of a separate Council analysi , 
as ha.s been done since mid-year 1948, only exaggerates the necessity that the 
Council itself in some way explain that which it has made public . Nourse op-
posed the separation of the Report in this way for this reason . 
That Nourse 1s first ob j ection was the vi e-vvpoint of the original span-
sors of the bi ll was repudiated in a letter vrritten to the Washington Post on 
November 5, 1949 by Senator Murray, and quoted by Roy Bl ough in hi s article 
npolitical and Administrative Requisites for Achieving Economic Stability . 11 
{The original spom:ors) . • • contempl ated that the members of the 
Council, l ike other public of ficial s , should assume the percent-
age of trusteeship for programs which the Presi dent sent to the 
Congress with their advice as is assumed by ot her agencies of 
government entrusted with specific functions under law. 
(Government coul d not funct i on effectively) ••• if those who 
under established law-advise the President in various fields shrink 
from the task of discuss i ng with the Congress and wi th the peopl e 
those pol icies which they have recommended and which the Presi-
dent has adopted . • • • "VYe ·~_ annat lift government above 1politicsJ, 
in the mean and di storted s ense of that term, / by havi ng publ ic 
servants rej ect the responsibil iti es ~r.herent i n the ki nd of 
pol itical system under which we l ive . 4 
Senator Fl anders , an active J oint Committee member si nce its inceptio , 
also pointed out that the Presi dent ' s Economic Reports and the Council 1 s Re-
views have been the onl y comprehensive stat ements transmitted by the Executiv 
branch to the Congress which have not been supported by the oral testimony of 
an executive agency. As an example of thi s he cites the test imony· given by 
the Budget Bureau on the federal budget . 65 Even t he possi bility that there 
might be conf l icts between the President 1 s pol i ci es and the Council ' s anal yse 
sho1J l d not deter the Council. I n some cases these are inevitable, since the 
64 Roy Blough, op . cit . , pp . 173- 74. 
65 Ralph E. Flanders , op . cit ., -pp . 223-24 . Senat or Byrd of Virginia 
also i nsi sted that Council members-slioul d be "requi red " to testify. (New York 
ll 18 121 and October 20 1 1. 1: 
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Council ' s recommendations are on economic grounds and cannot be expected to 
give full weight to the political, social, moral and other f actors which migh c, 
swing the balance away from their acceptance . If the Council's analysi s does 
not justify the President's recorr~endations , then it is up to the President 
to make cl ear the grounds for his decisions . 
Senator l1riurray 1 s letter to the Post , referred to above , further went 
on to say that 11 an economic adviser to the President who is a man of integrit 
finds his problem no different than that of any other man of inegrity in any 
other branch of public service who advises the President; if the Pr esident r e 
pudiates his advice beyond the point of toleration, he is free to resign • 
A Simil ar statement was made in W!ay, 1950, before the American Economic As-
sociation, by Roy Blough, one month before he was appointed to fi l l the vac-
ancy created by Nourse's resi gnation . 66 
Since the resignati on of Nourse the Council has been often seen on 
Capit a l Hill in anSlffer to requests by Congress for enlightenment as to some 
phase of its .. work. The appointment of Roy Blough, who had publ icly opposed 
Nourse's views on Council testimony, seems to have pretty much settled the 
future course of that body .in this regard . The Council itself , i n its Fourth 
Annual Report , signed by Keyser ling and Clark, asserted that the problem a-
rising from a cooperative servicing of Congress i onal Conm1ittees by the Counc i 1 
had been too much exaggerated: 
••• and in any event are not peculiar to economists; and 
it is l ess i mportant that the C01mcil be spared the se· ~'prob­
l ems" than that the Congress , at least as much as the econ- . 
omic groups with which we deal, have access to our opeg and 
full discussion of economic f act , outlook, and pol icy. 7 
66 Roy Blough, op . cit ., p . 173. 
6 7 Fourth .lumual Report , op . cit ., p . 3 8. 
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CHAPTER IV 
.SOME OBSERVATIONS FROM THE AmJUAL REPORTS 
It is the broad questions of economic policy that the .Annual Reports 
to the President by the Council of Economic Advisers have attempted to explor, • 
These docmnents, unlike the concrete analyses that are incl uded in the Pres-
ident 1s Economic Reports and the Council ' s Reviews of the Economic Situation, 
set forth the Council's thinking , in rel ation to the tasks assigned .it by 
the Employment Act , about the basic probl ems of modern industri al society. 
I
. Th: Reports also contain brief outlines of the Council's work during the yea 
ana indications as to ·. its · progress in working out staff arrangements , the 
s t udy program, and effective relationships with other governmental and non-
governmental groups . 
These report s a r e obviously intended for eyes other than the Presi-
dent•s . Their purpose is to give the general public, business , and concer ne 
organiz,ati cns a gl i mpse into the thinking and wor ki ng of the Council, in 
order t hat these groups may better understand this agency . They are short, 
averaging about thirty pages in l ength, and written in simpl e , non-technical 
language . 
The Council fe l t it necessary, i n ' its Third Annual Report, to defe tl 
these documents from the at t acks of those who charged that they were Hphil-
osophical essays," superfluous to their real assignment , or evidences of an 
"improper alignment of the Council with doctrinal positions .nl To the Counc~ , 
i nsof ar as the Reports provoke frank and incisive discussion and continued rJL 
examination of the doctrines of formal economics and the practic ~s of every-
day bus iness they are of value. 
Economic Advisers 
.• For criti cism 
The Reports are transmitted to the President in December of each 
year, and are sut sequently published and sold through the U. S. Government 
Printing Office. The first three reports appeared over the signatures of 
Messrs. Nourse , Keyserling, and Clark, while the fourth, in December of 1949, 
was issued by the remaining two Council members after Dr . Nourse's resigna-
tion. A fifth report was published in December of 1950, after Roy Blough hac 
joined the Council. Each year a major topic has been selected for study. 
Thus far these have been presented under the headings: 
I The Economic Philosophy of Sustained Employment 
II The Meaning of Maximum Production and the Means of 
Attaining It 
III The Environment Witrdn Vfuich the Council Operates 
IV Business and Government 
V Economics in the National Defense 
This chapter will examine a number of questions emphasized in these 
discussionsas they have been expressed and amplified by the Council in the 
Annual Reports . First, we may ask ourselves what the Council conceives as 
the basic tasks and goals of stabilization policy . Secondly, we shall ex-
plore the Council.' s conception of the government 1s role in stabilization. 
Lastly, it is pertinent that we should review what the Council has said con-
cerning what business and labor can do to aid in the achievement of the pur-
poses of the Employment Act . 
Since views on all of these topics may be found in each of the Re-
ports, the discussion has been drawn from all five of the Reports, rather tha [1 
from a . SU!Jl!!lar ization of the content of each Report separately. I t will be-~ 
come apparent that there is a primary difficulty in arriving at any one view 
of a subject inherent in the Council itself; that is, the split among its 
members. More than t his, quotations taken from context may not totally re-
present the thoughts being expressed. The Reports have been issued over a 
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period of four years . I n an effort to achieve a bal ance between many posi-
tions the Council may emphasize one point at one time and pages , or years ~ 
later turn to look at the other side of the coin . Intricate problems must 
be hedged with qualifications and carefully weighted to give f ull value to 
all compenents . As the Council itself ha s emphasized, 11 neat and precise re-
lationships • • • do not • • • obtain in the complex economic behavior of 
free human beings . u2 For these reasons, the Annu e.l Reports are chiefly of 
value in that they give a glimpse into the direct i on of Council thought , 
rather than that in them can be found definite answers to specific questions 
Cycle Theory and Stabilization C-oals 
The Council does not rely on any ·one t heory of 11 tl:ie11 business cycle , 3 
but r ecognizes that changing conditions require changing analyses and policiE!s, 
designed to check an excess or def i ciency at any one of t he many points whicl 
mi ght snowball into a boom or bust condition. The First Report devotes con-
s i derable attention to refuting the general idea, held by some, that a little 
depress ion is a good thing . "All the idleness and underconEumption which 
develops as business moves toward the midpo int and on to the bottom of the 
depression is net los s , not a true corrective movement . 114 
Writ t. £~n int. o t.he declaration of policy of the Employment Act wer e the 
s ignificant words "to promote maxi mum employment , production, and purchasing 
power. u In its Fifth Annual Report5the Council defined its understendi ng of 
2 Third Annual Report, lac. cit . 
3 Ibid.' p . 29 . 4 I bid., p . 7. 
5 Council of Economi c Advisers , Fifth P~nuai Report (December, 1950 ) , · 
p . 2. George Leland Bach, of the Carnegle Instl tu te of 1'echnol ogy, in his 
article 11 Economic Requisites for Economic Stability, 11 American Economic Revie,r, 
Papers and Proceedings , :fi.ay, 1950, pp . 156-61 enu.rnerates ·· two basJ.c conditions 
of stability; one dynamic_, t he other static . First, there must be growth of 
national r eal output at an optimum rate, dependent pri marily on the growth of 
the labor force and the increase in productivity. Secondly, t here must be cop-
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stability and its major objective as being the most eff icient use of resourc 
In terms of maximum employment this means uopportuni ty for useful service for 
as large a part of the labor force as is willing and able to work. Iviaxi mum 
production means utilizing this labor force effectively to turn out the larg 
1 
t 
practicable quantity of needed goods and services . Maximum purchasing power, 
properly defined, me?-ns the kind of income flow to various parts of the econ 
omy which will promote stability and gro-v.rth without inflation or deflation. u 
The Council position is best stated as one which seeks to discover 
and promote the proper economic balances. The word balance appears over and 
over again in the Reports . The problem is succinctly sun~arized by the 
Council as being: 
• • • to encourage sufficient funds and incentives for the 
growth of productive facilities which fully absorb our tech-
nology and manpower, while promoting sufficient flow of in-
come to ultimate consumers to clear tge markets of goods and 
thus avoid periodic 11overproduction .u 
In reference to purchasing power, in it~ discussion of production ob~ 
jectives the Council states that no longer is it a ·question of whether worke_ 
are deserving of a larger share in the national production, but a question o 
the economic survival of all. 11 The small number of well-to-do will not be 
abl e to absorb the pos ~ible output of con2umers 1 goods. Nor , can they go on 
indefinitely accumulating ownership of the surplus above their consQmption 
needs and investing it in ever-enlarging plant for f uture expansion of goods 
5 (Cont . ) stancy of some index of prices, or, more fundamentally, at 
least · a .price .l evel or national money income basis for busine ss and consumel 
expectations that will permit orderly business and individual planning on th 
basis of a reasonabl e static or dynamic stability of total money income and 
demand for goods and services . 
In order to bring about these two conditions B~ch feels that positivJ 
government action is necessary. This is especially trrue of the second requi 
site, where no strong automatic forces operate to bring about a condition of 
ei ther static or dynamic stability of total money i..11come and where administe 
ed prices, highly flexible upward , arise. Goverrunent monetary and fiscal 
actions are needed, or at least governmental bases for the formation of 
stabilization expectations. 
6 Council of Economic Advisers , Fourth Annual Report ( December , l949)r 
• 
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for some restricted part of the population."? We have never had a true 
overproduction. Instead there have been enlargements of productive capacity 
at costs which were disproportionate to the return which might have been ex-
pected within the existing income patterns and power of the total market to 
buy . The key difficulty, then, is an imbalance in the existing cost-price-
spending-investment structure. 
iifhile increased purchasing power is needed, the ultimate objective 
of any stabilization policy must center on the promotion of maximum producticr. 
There is a considerable range between goods with relatively stable demands, 
such as food, and more postponable goods , such as durable and l uxury items , 
whose demand fluctuates widely over the cycle . The crux of the depression 
problem lies in these more sensitive industries . The need is for an adjust-
men as quickly as possible of the production and capacities of these industr ·es 
to conform with reasonable levels of sustained demand based on a fairly long 
t erm prospective. I nsofar as an industry regulates its output and pricing 
policies not on the basis of a fair appraisal of i ts demand i n a future econ-
omy operating at maximum levels, but beceuse of a desire to i nsure itself a-
gainct what it regards as inevitable periodic lean years , it is helpi ng to 
bring on the very conditions it seeks to avoid . 8 
The ultimate goal of this balance between productive and consumptive 
facilit i es is the creation of not only a stable , but of an expanding economy. 
For, the Council points out, it may be quite possible to achieve some sort oi 
equilibrium at a low, or stagnation, leve1 which would not fulfill the ad-
monition of the Act to promote maximum levels of employment, production, and 
purchasing power . Realistic market decisions, based on the expectation of 
7 Council of Economic Advi E<ers , Second Annual Report (December, 1947 ~ 
pp . 12, 30 . In the First Report the Council looked toward the creation of a 
mass semi-lilll.<.lry marketto supercede the abnormal post-war demand for goods r pt 
available during the war years . 
8 Second Annual Report, op . cit., pp. 23- 24 . 
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I continued economic groi'i-th, would go far toward consolidating stability. The 
tentative conclusion is drawn that, i n the l ong rtm, the balance would r equi 
the expansion of consumption opportunities · at a. more rapid rate than an ex-
pansion of investment, although both shoulcl grow .9 
Stabilization as a by-product of an expanding economy is increasinglyj 
emphasized in the l ater reports . The Fourth Report asserts that government 
is coming more and more to a realization that "efforts to promote expansion 
of the total product and income of the economy are more significant than 
measures to 'redi stribute ' the current product . " Once it is made possible to 
provide a good standarc of living for all through the processes of healthy 
economic growth, the conflict between social equity and economic i ncentives , 
arising out of scarcity, ·wil l be reduced to 11manageable proportions . nlO 
An ideological split exists within the Council itself between those 
who hold that the j ob primarily requires measures to stabili z.e the exist i ng 
situation and those who believe that the government' s principal f unction J!lig 
better be to encom·age an ever expand i ng economy, and that t llis expansion, if 
based on realistic and heal thy calculations about future needs , will in it-
self bring about a better bal ance and make the economy less vulnerabl e to 
cyclical movements . The first view may be called the 11thermostaticn approac 
to stabilization and is expressed in the Committee Report of the American 
Economic Associ ation, !!The Pr oblem of Economic Instability, ir in the words : 
11The basic strategy of economic stabilization is to mitigate and offset the 
affect on total expenditure of changes , upward or downward, in particul ar 
sectors or compartments of the economy. nll The second, or " target ~ approach 
has been widel y espoused by Tvir . Keyser ling . I n his words : 11 The chal lenge we 
now face is less how to avert a depress i on than how affirmatively to advance 
9 Fourth Anm1al Report , op . cit., p . 9. 10 Ib " , 6 ~- ' p •• 
I 
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ll Despres , Hart, Friedman, etc., 11 The Probl em of Economic I nstabil 
=====¥-··~;r A=&~~ee=R-ep€>~~Ameaea..~e&l:€)m-ie=R~~J±I;.em~~J=¥;llJ,F~~kQ/"'=»====== 
prosperity . 11 12 l 
The probl &n may be summarized i n this fashion. wnereas progress cal 
for flexibility, security calls for stability. "The task is to l es sen the I 
instability while not stunting the steady growth of the weal th and welfare 
factors . ul3 
The Rol e of Government 
The Council has undertaken a t hree- pronged attack on the problem of 
the cycl e . It seeks to bring about stability through : 
(1 ) fiscal and monetary policy 
(2) institutional r eform, and 
(3) i mproved business practices:ili 
The Council's attitude toward government stabilization policy may be 
correctly summarized, as with its business cycle nhilosophy, as a need for 
proper action to promote balances. Furthermore, it believes that the Employ-
·ment Act calls for more than a ·random development of disconnected po1icies · 
I 
to deal with trouble after it appears . The followi ng quotation from the 
First Annual Report illustrates the underlying plan vdth which the Council 
began its task; 
Besides promoting a more adequate use of our natural re-
sources by private enterprise, several methods of stabilizing 
the economy lie within the han:is of the Government alone. I t 
must review, as a part of a total program, the l egal aids and 
financial subsidies that it has always given to particular 
12 Leon H. Keyserling, 11 A Policy for Full Employment , 11 New Republic, 
October 24, 1949. l\!T . Keyserl ing enumerates four general goalsror the econ-
omy: (1) an improved standard of living , more evenly distributed; (2) agri-
cultural output well adjusted to needs and providing increased farm income; 
(3) a better integration of foreign and domestic economic policy; and (4) an 
appraisal of our capacity and incentives to support a $300 billion economy 
within a few years . 
13 c. H. Grattan , "Truman 's Three Y.fise Men, 11 Harpers , June, 1949, p . f7• 
l4 Leland and Nourse, "Stabilizing the Economy: A Discussion," Arneric~n 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1950, p . 185. 
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branches or phases of transportation, manufacturing , and trade 
and finance, and, more recently, to agriculture and labor . I t 
must gauge carefully the amount and character of public inform-
ational, r egulatory .and service work the Goverrunent needs to 
perform as a means of preventing fraud , di scrimination, or 
wa ste, and securing maximum advance in efficiency of operation-
al participation among the very small business units , at a 
minimum of cost . It must consider carefully how much of the 
national income it shall allow to be ch&.nneled into military 
outlay in view of the nature of dangers and the possibility of 
physical protection i n the light of latest developments . It 
must decide whether changes in our .tra.ditional use of Govern-
ment agencies in the fi el ds of education, health, and con-
servation would most surely advance our total production and 
purchasing power . The timing, volume , and distribution of its 
own expenditures must be considered in relation to those of 
private business and State and local governments . The Govern-
ment must weigh the claim made by some citizens and business-
men that taxation (as such or after the rate has reached some 
point) is legalized robbery • • •• 
The agents of government must diligently study and vigor-
ously use a democratic and statesmanl i ke control of the public 
purse to put a brake at certain strategic f Oints where boom 
forces develop dangerous trends, and to stirnulate employment 
and production and support purchasing pm•ler when and where it 
becomes unduly depressed ••• • Calm judgment must be exercised 
not to rush in fussily, ministering to small and temporarydis-
turbcnces that woul d r i ght themselves sooner and better if left 
to themselves. On the other hand, carel essness or ignorance 
must not keep Government from detecting serious symptoms prompt-
ly and initiating correcting measures with skill and dec i sive-
ness . l5 
Government fiscal and monetary powers cover the fields of taxation, 
debt management , credit expansion or contraction, expenditures, budget con-
trol and the regu~ation of interest rates. The Council is careful to point 
l
out its limitations with respect to these problems , particularly when it 
comes to the budget and 'ebt management . The government bond support pro-
gram i s one illustration of data which the Cotmcil has considered as ugiven . " 6 
Efforts to reduce goverr1xnent expenditures and balance the budget annually 
meet vlith the hard political fact that government expenditures are ndeter-
mined by Government activities which are given overwhelming support by the 
15 Council of Econornic Advisers , First Annual Report (December , 1946 ) lpp. 17-18. 
16 See Chapter VI, p . 100 for further reference to this probl em. 
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Junerican peopl e . 1117 There ca.n be no basis for a stabilization pl an that as-
' -
sumes that there will be any substantial reduction in these requirements . 
· That Council reconrrnendations must be made within the framework of settled, 
existing government policies and cormi'Iittments has been the predominant vi ew 
of the Annual Reports. 
The Reports do not shed any light on the Council's recomwendations in 
regard to balancing the budget over the business cycle . However , the Council 
11 f t t ' l bi 1 t f carryl· no~ out al l points out the fo y o_ ·he governrnen s 1a tua prac ice o 
mo st all of its major policies and programs on a year or Y.ear and one half 
basis . The goal must be worked at gradually, but the Council feels that , j u s 
a s a large corporation budgets its future by the measurement of its competing 
needs and prospects , so should the governrrient. This would require (as the 
Hoover Report did for the organizational framevrork of p,overnment) t hat all 
government policies should be examined and brought into harmony and consist-
ency of purpose to provide a unifying framework within which each separate 
economic policy IPi ght be judged . Further, if "government moved gradually to-
ward placing somewhat more of its own activiti es (credit , spending, r egul a- -
; tory and tax policies) on a somewhat more stabl e and longer range basis , this 
mieht add greatly to the stability of the whole economy ••• (and ) ••• wou1 d 
also hold these programs truer to their intrinsic purposes . nl8 
The First Annual Report cauti ously advanced the idea that the govern-
ment must not only work to create an "institutional atmosphere" favorable to 
business , but that it is now "and must to a somewhat greater ext ent in the 
future, be an actual stimulative and guiding element in the economy. nl9 Sub-
sequent Reports expand this idea . ·The central nroblems of economic balance 
cannot be attacked merely by the application of t he regulatory or police pow-
17 Fourth Annual Re-oort, op . cit ., p . 27. 
l9 First Annual Report, op . cit. , p . 14. 
18 Ibid.' p . 19 
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ers of government , whi ch are undoubtedly of value in adjusting certain re-
gional or special ized ills, nor are specific controls the long run answer . 20 
While the government accepts a compensatory role at times and in 
areas where private enterpr i se fails t o r rovide adequate productive use of t 
nation's resources, compensatory expenditures a l one are not the answer shoul 
a recessi on develop . There are not enough useful projects available , the 
need for which could be governed purely on the basis of timing over the cycl , 
to offset any substantial drop in private i nvestment , even if coup~d wi t h 
tax reduction. Nor does compe.nsa tory theory <SIPProaCh the problem of the basi 
imbal ances in the system. Therefore , government depression policies shotcl d 
be aimed pri marily at stimul ating private investment , and the mai n concentra 
t ion of gover nment economic policy at all times, continues the Fourth Report, 
shoul d be the encouragement of stabl e growtb within the free enterprise sys-
tem itself. 2l 
Supplemental to the :::';overrunent 1 s f iscal and monetary activities are 
such accepted programs a s minimum wage l egisl ation, f arm price supports , soc 
ial securi ty, and devel opmental activities which afford t he economy a built-
in cushi on against the shock of the cycle. The deba te prec eeding passage of 
the Employment Act and t he history of previous fuuerican government policy 
support the Council' s contention that i t is within ~ its · province to pro-
pose comprehensi ve pr ograms of publ ic works , regi onal devel opment , and socia I 
welfare , as well a s measures of t he conventional tax, monetary, and fi scal 
20 Fourth Armual Report , op . cit ., pp . ll-12. 
21 I bid ., p . 13 . Here we see the target philosOf'hY of stabilization 
expressing 'i"ES"elf . ~IT . Keyser ling believes that the government economic 
policy shoul d be focused on 11creating an environment so favorabl e to sus-
tai ned private production and empl oyment at high l evel s that the compensator;) 
r ol e of government may be held to easily manageable proportions . He con-
ceives of t he Council task as being not one of creating a storehouse of ex-
treme programs t o deal v.-ith a futu:::-e i nevitable depressi on; but as one of ad 
vancitg policies now that will create the proper bal ances i n the body economi 
and stimul ate healthy groV'rth . Compensatory public sDending, even on a grand 
e' serlin op . cit . • 14 .) 
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types . Moreover, the Council was not furnished with a clean page upon which 
to write policies. Some national polici es whose immediate ends are not 
stabilization and growth have to be accepted as data . Specific programsthat 
fall into the category of economic facts are those such a,s housing, farm 
price supports , and social security. The Council has something to say about 
the criteria which should govern each of these programs. 
Housing is one of those factors having a short r un inflationary ef-
feet coupled with beneficial long-rtm implications. The government 's houein 
program, with its promotion of easy credit, must be accepted because of the 
seriousness of the housing shortage , even while anti-inflation 11easures are 
being pursued . Housing does , hovmver, provide a prime illustration of im-
balance in production decisions within an industry. The hi gh cost market in 
housing and apartment space is being met , and in some cases exceeded, by pri 
vate builders, while there remain: sutstantial unfilled needs for l ower cost 
housing facilit ies . A much keener market analysis and much more realistic 
pricing woul d do a great deal to sustain maxi mum production in this field.22 
The Council approves the general policy of supporting farm prices . 
It i nsures us against a complete collapse of the agricultural s~ent of the 
economy, as happened in 1920. "The fact that t his support machinery has not 
yet been perfected is not sufficient reason for abandoning it, 11 says the 
Council , nor woul d it be realistic to assume that farm supports will be a-
bandoned in the face of the strong public affirmation of the policy. 23 
The judgment of the Council about social security measures , as econ-
omists, is that these measures ,"wisely adjusted, add to productivity, and thu 
lower costs in the long run. 1124 They also provide some "built- in stability" 
effects. But the r eal test of thei r size should be a r ealistic appraisal of 
22 Second Annual Report , op . cit. , p. 2Li and Third A.nnu2,l Report, op . 
cit ., p . 26 . 
23 Third Annual Report , op . cit. , p . 26 . 24 Lac . cit . 
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how much of our resources we wish to devote to this humane purpose, taking 
into account ot£ter competing needs and purposes i n our economy. How much of 
the program can we afford? The Council ·seems to feel that our econ0my can 
sup}-ort a full social security program, but warns that the enactment of legiE ~ 
l ation now to expand the progrc~ shoul d be based on estimates as to the pro-
duction of the economy thirty years from now, when payments will fall due . 
It al so feels that an ultimate objective should be to make wi thdrawals from 
the economy for the purpose of social security roughl y balance the contempor-
ary cost of benefit payments, a l though some r eserves must be retained. They 
favor financing it through general revenue , rather than payroll taxes . .An 
~nportant point is that ·social security expansion now must make considerable 
allowance for continuing secular economic growth . "Almost all of ~ nation-
al policies in the long ~ depend upon the validity of this assumption. n25 
(Emphasis the author ' s .) 
Similarly, economics can suggest an orderly means of achi eving re-
sults if we can decide, for a period of years , how much of our national in-
come "~Fe wish to devote . t o purposes such as public improvements and education . 
We need to correl ate our welfare progrcuns and to recognize that there is no 
wi de gap in aims of a peopl e and a government interested i n encouraging the 
growth of our economic system, and thei r s imultaneous concern wi th welfare 
legislation . Education and heal th care are programs which would help us to 
release our productive capacities i n full, and, says the Council, 11 i t is 
high time to put these welfare goods into mass production .n26 
The Council points especially to a program of urban redevel opment as 
one which would give impetus to t he progress of private business . "The ap-
plication of some Government resources at all l evels to the preparatory stagE~ 
25 Fourth .Annual Report , op . cit ., p . 23 . 
26 Second Annual Report , op . cit. , p . 24 . 
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of urban redevelopment woul d have an extraordinary leverage effect upon op-
portunities for the private employment of men, money, and materials .rr27 
The primary purpose of public works should be to provide services which coul 
not otherwise be supplied and which would add to the resourcefulness, pro-
ductivity, and growth of the economy, and only secondarily should they be re 
garded as first aid programs for an·inf ected economic system . 
Finally, 11 on behalf of our national estate,u28 we need to reactivate 
again our public and private conservation prop,rams , or we will find the 
foundat ions of production crumbling . With due regard to needs and costs and 
with existant and prospective f c:ctors carefully weighed, we must discou..nt 
the future at a sociall y sound rate . 
These are not mat t ers vrhich s hould be left only to the concern of 
special interest groups and poli tica.l logrolling, but are c.some of. t-he . gravest 
fa ctors of our economic well-being, in the opinion of the Council. I n the 
fulfillment of the purposes of the Emplo:y1nent Act it cannot progress faster 
than a democracy will yield to the deliberate formulation and i ntegrati on of 
national policies in the interest of sustained prosperity . Nor can it 11offe 
professional advice more certain the.n economic knowledge permits 11 or with ut 
ter disregard for "social policies which are so tl10roughly accepted that it 
must be assumed that they 1'1ill not be abandoned . 1129 
Although the decisions which add up to or subtract from the essentia 
economic balances w-ill , according to the Council, be made in the private 
sector of the economy, the government is in a position to help that sector 
acquire a full prospective over the entire economy that woul c!. enable it to 
wisely coordinate its ~ efforts with others. Congress r eco r::ni zed this when 
it enjoined the President, with the help of the Council, to define 11 needed 
27 Ibid., p . 27. 28 Ibid . , p . 9 
29 Ibid., pp . 12-13. 
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levels" of employment, production and purchasing power .30 The Council has 
seen fit to carry this pro j ect one step farther and look at the economy from 
a. long- run point of view. It does this by means of hypothetical pro j ections 
of the Nation ' s Economic Budget . 31 The Counci l hastens to allay any f ears th t 
this means a "pl anned economy." The Council f eels that it is possible to 
maintain a f l exibl e and pragmatic soirit; that the government's role would 
be complimentary to that of private business and 11 should not , and need not , 
be either conflicting or confusing . u32 
The Council does not believe that the forces leading to the sev re 
swi ngs of the business cycle are i nherent in the system, nor that the Employ-
ment Act contains a fatal and inescapable self contr adiction . 33 National 
economic policy centers attention on the mutual inter-dependence and long-
range harmony of interest among various groups . The Council asserts that: 
Although many of our problems remain unsolved, our 
unique combination of free enterprise and f ree government 
has moved so rapidly toward rais i ng the general standard 
of living that the fair hope of more progress by the same 
methods immensel y outweighs the costs and risks , the divi-
sions and tensiops , and above all the uncertainties of 
radica.l change . 34 
The Role of labor 
The Council had planned to devote i t s Fifth Annual Report to a more 
thorough discussion of the rel ations of l abor and government , as it had de...: 
30 Second Annual Report , op . cit ., p . 28 and Third Annual Report, op . 
cit ., p . 15 . In tflls connect1on, tiansen warns that we must beware not to - I 
"confuse 1 balances 1 of the economy with mere ' stability. ' 11 (Hansen, Business 
Cycles and National I ncome (New York : W. vV. Norton 8: Company, 1951), p . 502. 
3l Chapter V will examine the compositi on of the yearly budget whj ch 
the Council prepares for the Economic Reports . 
32 First Annual Report , op . 
--
ci t . , P• 14 . 
33 Thi rd Annual Report , op .cit., p . 12. 
34 Fourth Annual Report, op . ci t ., p . 2. See also p . 9 . 
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voted its Fourth Report to 11 Business and Government , 11 but the grave dipl o-
matic and military situation arising in 1950 caused · it to abandon t his plan 
A f ew remarks f rom earlie:r reports do serve, however, to poi nt out the direc-
,, t ions of previous Council thought. 
'l'he Council condemns intentional restrictions on output on the part 
of labor as much as tho::e by management . I t r egards the eight hour day, five 
day week, and t wo week paid vacation as the setting for the productive eff ort 
of labor under normal circumstances. In a number of areas these hours have 
.not yet prevailed. L:>oking toward the future, it anticipates that "questions 
calling for decisions will be more in the na:t.ure of a balance between more 
goods and more l eisure .u35 
The Council is lLmited again in that it cannot control decisions of 
l abor and management as to the determination of the labor contract . I t is 
c:oncerned ~ t hat a matter so grave shoul d be settled by power struggles , in 
which each side f eels it must sit tight without compromise or lose face . Bot 
I j l abor and management have opposed any pl an · to have the terms of the labor con-
trc;.ct fixed by an extern;o l authority, and the Counci l holds that, except in 
times of great emergency, a forced government settlen1ent, in the absence of 
any fixed s t andards, is not the answer. The labor contract cannot be deter-
mined by j udicial process. I t suggests further conferences by management , 
l abor , government , and agriculture , concentrating on the areas of agreement 
among them, from which some standards might emerge which could be tested by 
time and experience . 36 
The C01mcil emphasizes the need for a -~Jroper psychological atmo sphere 
created by a greater sense of security. This woul d arise out of a belief i n 
the attainability and desirability of the a ims of the Empl oyment Act , and 
this can only come if tangible progrc:ms are formulated and put into operation 
35 Second Annual Report , op . cit ., p . 13. 
36 
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1 
which the masses of workers can see , fe el , and par ticipate in . 
The Role of Busi ness 
The probl em of business size enters the Cmmcil 1 s discussion when ef-
forts tmvard balanced production are discuesed . Tvm f actors may lead to an 
imbal ance in our productive capacity. These are the protective motive and 
the existance of administered price industries . A serious probl em arises 
when the protective moti ve becomes the go'lerning influence on capital saving 
and production. The desire to protect the i ndividual company and i ts share-
ho l ders l eads to 11 systems of cost accounting , of reserve accumul ation, of 
margin setving , and of · pricing that r esult in cessation of producti on and 
withdrawal from the market as the basic means of weathering economic storms . 11 7 
Such policies resul t in prolonged depressi on and widespread disaster to other 
firms . he growth of l arge corporate units has enabl ed this condition to be-
come more prevelant . 
The economic probl em is not so much l ack of capi tal a s i t is , in the 
case of the l arge firm, one of assuring willingness to sustain maxi mum pro-
duction even when the financial requi s ites are abundantly availaole . 38 I n-
dustry generally, even · i n prosperity periods , uses only about 80% of i ts 
pl ant capacity,39 and this percentage di ps in a recessi on to 60%, or even 
40% . Some of our excess capacity i s induced by war or by unrealistic com-
peti t i ve drives , but 11the truth is tha t • •• capital formation, even i n our 
most exuberant boom times, ha:s not really been too much for actual conswner 
desires which shoul d be satisfied i n a rich economy. 1140 
37 Second AD~ual Report , op . cit ., p . 17 . 38 I bi d ., pp . 10- 14. 
39 E. M. Bratt, Busi ness Cycles and Forecasting (Chicago: Richard 
D. I rwin, I nc ., 1948), p . 50. These figures are based on a Brookings In-
stitute study of 1929. 
)10 ~ Second .~nual Report, op . cit ., p . 12 . 
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In December , 1948 the Collncil went into some detail i n analyzing 
the grovrth of economic concentration and the dangers :oresented by the ad-
mi nis t ered price industry.4l These i ndustries differ from competi tive sec-
tors in the .economy in their policies relating to pl ant and production capaci·
1 
y , 
the vohune of employrn.ent , and · ·pricing. I t i s in times of r ecess ion 
that the effects of their actions 1nay. prove most disastrous to the economy as 
a whol e , economi sts believe, although for over ten years there has been no 
cha nce t o test this hypothesis . It is sharply disputed whether empl oyment 
and production will drop more quickly here than in competit i ve indust r i es . 
'l'he Council beli evesthat they wil l . Prices., however , will be more stabl e . 
The administered price i ndustry is a barrier to maximum production , 
which can only be obtained under rec:1.l pri ce cornpeti t ion, t he Council feel s . 
It operates on t he pri ncipl e of the highest price t he traffic will bear, 
rather than on the maxi m of the lowest price consistent with a f air return i n 
a stabl e , expandi ng economy. Over it the continual fear of "spoiling the 
market 11 and the price war hang · • . , Maximum production requires t hat none must 
have a 11more favorable distributive position 11 than would obtain under "com-
pl etely fluid competition . 11 42 Flexibl e pricing i s the goal. 
The concentration of i ndus try in large corporat ions i s responsible 
lfor t he "small business problem." Government programs , such as preferential 
!
contract treatment, allocation of pr ior i ties , exemption from anti- trust l aw, 
I t ax abatement , etc ., when they have existed, have been for the purpose of 
compensatin r; , or redressing the unfavorable power bal anc e between l arge and 
small firms . The Council contends that l ack of capital is not the crux of 
the problem for small busines~ rnau· of vmfuch are backed by more capital than 
they req·.lire to carr y on their normal operations. Tremendous concentrations 
4l Third Annual Report , op . cit. , pp . 16-20 . 
42 Second Annual Report, op . cit ., p . 31. 
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of capital might enable the small f irm to engage in nation-wide advertising 
and thus create a market for mass :Qroduced goods , but the cost of such a 
policy for a small indepenc1ent in an industry would be out of the question . 
Lack of capital has its major effect in the attempts of small business to 
survive depres s.ion periods. 
Big business has transformed the investment structure . The role of 
the wealthy independent i nvestor has been taken over by that of business 
savings and indirect institutional investment of the funds of the individual 
small saver . This creates a di fficulty in securing suff icient venture capi-
tal in the newcomers market . The Council suggests that "means by which the 
savings of security minded small savers may be made available for business 
investment without excessively burdening risky enterprises with debt" need 
to be devised. 1+3 This might require new types of financi al institutions, 
with or without government backing, spread all over the country for the 
special purpose of providing a variety of managerial services and equity 
capi tal for small and growing businesses . 
The whole problem of business size needs re-examination, and the 
Co uncil has set this as one of their projects . Yfuile there is agreement amon ~ 
many economists that there is a point beyond which, in most i ndustries, the J 
advantages of increased size become nil or negative , f r om the view of securi ~ 
all the benefits of .technolgical progress , no agreement exists on plans to 
break up or restrain expansion of existing modern giants. By developing 
analyses of how the economy as a whole func tions , the Council may hope to 
enlist t he support ofbusiness itself in bringing its practices more i nto 
harmony with the Emplo~nent Act.44 
Our entire anti-trust policy needs scrutiny. The Council observes 
43 Ibid., p. 17 and Fourth Annual Report , 01' · cit., p . 32 . 
Ld-~ Third Annual Report, op . cit . , pp . 19-20 . 
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that the "philosophy of the Sherman Act appears to be yiel di ng to a policy 
of 1 ethical competition 1 which does not cliff erentiate between stability of 
the individual firm a nd the stability of the whole economy. nL~5 Yet, any re-
thinking shoul d acknowl edge the possibility that our chang ing industrial 
framework may have made some of our traditional attitudes about bus:iness siz 
no l onger applicable . The Fourth Renort contends t hat there is room for bot , 
well conducted big business and small busines s , and that any anal ysis should 
proceed with an objective approach to both these sectors . 46 I nvolved in any 
re- examinat ion of policy would be the question of whether stabil;i l y or 
equal jty is the cent ral probl em here . 
No matter what measures the government may take i n the fiscal, mone-
tary, regul atory, or developmental fields , the continuous ad justment of pri c 
vvages , ancJ profits must l argely be l eft to the act ion of managers and worker 
within the business system itsel f. Busi..11ess must reali ze that the govermuen 
cannot make up for all its deficiencies by merel y pumping money i n and out OJ: 
the system "without regard to what employers and workers , far mers and trader 
wer e doi ng i n the col.l ntl esE specific price and wage and profi t rel a t i onshi ps 
that make up the oody of thei r business life . u47 Adjustments must be made a 
the poi nt s where bus :i ness i s actually done, 1narkets found, and j obs created . 
If busines s understands t his and attempts t o do i ts best, even though -its 
decisions may not always add up to a perfectly satisfactory and sustained 
total, the problem wi l l h.:we been gr ec tly reduced for government . 
Several things are requisite if business is to f ulfill i ts part: 
(l) Business must realize that public sentiment is against unemploy 
45 I bi d ., p . 15 . 
46 Fourth Animal Report , op . cit ., pp . l O-ll. 
47 First Annual Report , op . cit ., p . 13 . 
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ment . Tf' another .recession even co!:lparable to the one we had in the 1930's 
sholll d develop we could scarcely hope to come out of it operating under our 
present system. Unl es s business can accept its responsibilities, the re-
sultant disaster and public resentment will make any desirabl e , gra'ualist 
solution impossible.48 
( 2 ) Busi nes smen need to study the problems of the ent i re economy an 
to co operate in ·working with government toward mutual understandine and con-
structive suggestions. 11 The i mpress of facts and of acute and disinterested 
analysis must be widel y felt. • • • The problems must be vvidel y knov;m, tech-
nical foundations of policy must be wi del y understood; and the disinterested 
and professional character of the w1derlying anal ysi s must be establ ished . 11 4 
Above all_, business must understand the underlying motivati on of such analys 
(3) We need 11 i mproved i nstitutiona l arrangements " to i nsure massive 
private action . The Council is not specific here . It merel y suggests that 
this is one of the most important areas for expl orati on .SO 
The most important po:int made by the Council, and one emphasized ove 
and over again, i s that 11 management must a cc ept the attainability of the 
purposes of the Emp l oynent Act • 11 51 It must a ccept the goal of continuous 
maximum employment and production . This i s not to say that the task will be 
easy, or that we shall a l ways be entirely successful, but as l ong as manage-
ment cont inues to operate with a 11 ride the cycleu psychology it will be 
48 Fourth Annual Re:port, op . ·Cit. , p . 26. The application of 11moder 
ation, corrmronllse ana reconcil ement' inaefinjng respective rights anc weapon 
of fr ee enterpris e and fre e government under a popular democracy 11 woulr go a 
long way t oward solving our domestic problems . (See I bid ., p . 2.) 
49 I bi d ., pp . 8, 3) . 
50 I bid ., p . 28 . Their ideas seem to suggest something on the order 
of another NRA, especially in view of the remarks made concerning the need 
for cooperat i on among government, labor, management, a.nd agricul ture i n work 
ing out standards for the l abor contract . 
51 D . 18. 
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generating its ovm downfall.52 Periodic downturns in economic activity are 
the price we pay for freedom and flexibj_lity, but these may be greatly moder-
ated as our system develops strong underlying elements . According to the 
Cm:ncil , the dilemma is t his: 
Businessmen individually and separately may react to the 
beginning of a downturn, or even to lts prediction, in suf-
ficient numbers cumulatively to accentuate the downturn . But 
no sufficiently satisfactory way has yet been f ound for bus-
iness individually and separatel y to respond to the beginning 
or prospect of a downturn 211 a manner which cumulati vel y holds 
the economy stabl e or propel s it upward . This i s the real 
meaning of the importance of 1bu.siness psychology 1 • • • If 
businessmen under such conditions could follow i n sufficient 
numbers policies contributing toward stability or growth, or 
at least act in a man_n.er consistent wi th the propos i tion that 
the long- range trend of the economy is upward, this mi ght pro-
vide a key to the dileruna .53 (Emphasis in the original .) 
52 Fo~rth Annual Report , op . ci t ., p . 25 . 
5J I bid., p . 27. See also simil ar observations made by Alvin H. 
Hansen , Ecori'Oirii"c Policy and Full Employment (New York: McGraw-Hil l Book Co ., 
1947), P • 132 . 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PRESIDENT'S ECONO:MIC REPORTS AND THE COUNCIL'S 
ANALYSES OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION 
••• It is no exaggerati on to say that the President's 
Economic Report i s the most important economic document 
of our times. All over the wor l d it is read with 
anxiety and close attention, · since t he American economy 
represents so l arge a part of world production that 
fluctuations in it transmit powerful impulses throughout 
the trading worl d . l 
With a constantly growing circulation, exceeding 50,000 copies an-
nually, the annual and midyear economic revi ews of the Council serve as a 
foca l point around which public discussions and criticisms can be crystalliz 
ed . 
Sec. 3(a) of the Employment Act specifies that the annual reports , 
and such supplementary reports as the President chooses to transmit , shall 
cont ain estimates as to : 
w. w. 
(1) the l evels of employment , producticn, and pur-
chasing power obtaining in the United States and such 
levels needed to carry out the policy declared in section 2; 
(2) current and foreseeable trends in the l evel s of 
employment , producti on, and purchasing power ; 
(3) a review of the economic program of the Federal 
Government and a review of the economic conditions affecting 
employment i n the United States or any considerable portion 
thereof during the preceding year and their effect upon 
empl oyment , production, and purchasing power; and 
(4 ) a program for carrying out thepolicy declared in 
section 2, together with such recomrnen~ations fo r legislation 
as he may deem necessary or desirabl e . 
1 Al vin H. Hansen, Business Cycl es and Nati onal I ncome (New York: 
Norton & Co., 1951), p. 529. 
I 
2 Public Law Oh • 33, 79th Cono~ress, 2nd Session, Sec . 2(b ). -·-=-~rr=-==~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~f==== 
We are concerned in this chapter with the difficulties faced by the 
Council in performing the above functions. Are the tools of economic analysi 
sufficiently well developed to yield accurate anmvers to the questions posed 
by the Act? How valid are the generalizations of economic science and the 
'I 
I 
judgments of economists when applied to complex, real situations . An examina-
tion of the concept of the Nation's Economjc Budget, used extensively by the 
Council in its estbnations of current economic activity, of the problem of 
forecasting, and of the adequacy of statistical data available gives an in-
sight into the kinds of technical problems faced by Council economists. 
General Content of the Reports 
The President's reports, as can be seen from the description in the 
Act, in addition to reviewing the course of the nation's business over the 
intervals between acoounts and discussing the weaknesses and strengths of 
our position and the principles around -which our policies are formulated, 
culminate in a series of specific legislative recommendations for the con-
sideration of Congress . Until the July 1948 Report they also contained the 
I details of statistical description and economic analysis underlying his re-
co~mendations. This material was clearly the contribution of his Council of 
Economic Advisers, although the Economic Report may be said to reflect more 
than the conclusions and recommendations of the Council. With the advent of 
the July 1948 Report the section signed by the President was considerably 
shortened and the statistical analyses and more technical discussions of th 
observations and policies flowing from such analyses were contained in the 
Annual Economic Reviews and the Reviews of the Economic Situation at Midyear, 
presented over the signat:u.r'es of the Council members themselves. These Re-
views present the conclusions of professional economists and are not, as is 
the President's Report, policy speeches designed to galvanize Congress behin 
an administration program. The President's Economic Reports and the Councils 
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analyses are published together and distributed through the U. s. Government 
Printing Office . 3 
The Council's analyses represent a synthesis of the most adequate 
and reliable statistical data available with the ~nowledge gained from the 
objective record of intentions and attitudes of those groups and agencies 
which, in fact , determine what the economy is doing and can do . This sum-
mary of how the Council opera tes in combi!1ing the many strands of informa-
tion it collects gives a picture of the background of the final printed word 
The Cm.m.cil looks at the unfolding record of income pay-
ments e.nd inte:rprets the foreseeable trend of future markets for 
various goods . It learns all it can of the investment plans of 
business firms and the schedule of public works--Federal, state 
and local; thereupon it estiillates future demand for equipment 
and construction. It follows the course of public revenues and 
expenditures and the use of credit. It watches changes in the 
cost of living and observes the strength of the several parts of 
the labor market. On such data and the policies and attitudes 
expressed by the spokesmen of labor and management, it judges 
what is likely to develop in wage negotiations. It studies 
technological change and managerial improvement to gauge t he 
trend of production costs, and feeds into that situation the 
:prospective changes in wages . With this analysis, and taking care-
f ul account of crop '. prospects , it pro j ects a moving pi cture of 
prices and price prospects . Adding up these many empiric~al ob-
servations and applying relatively simple principles of economic 
influence and consequences, the Council is prepared to make its 
recommendations of preventive or cprrective measures to lessen 
the disastrous swings of business .4 
This process is not one which can be completed, stunmarized, and for-
gotten . It must be carried on continually, from report to report , and con-
stantly revised at each point to keep up with day to day developments . Not 
only must the Council be continually in touch with current economic circum-
stances, but . . i t _-c must be prepared to take the lonp; view and analyze the 
trends revealed over extended periodsand, as Nourse frequently insisted, it 
must, at intervals between reports, be prepared to keep the President im-
3 Council of Econonuc Advisers , First An~ual Report (December, 1946), 
p . 8 and Third Annual Report (December, I'948), pp . 2-3. -
4 Third Annual Report, op . cit., p. 29. 
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mediately informed of changing conditions and to revise earlier interpreta-
tions which are no longer pertinent.5 
The final released version of the Council ' s analyses necessarily 
cont ains many compromises, omission,s,and even 11fudgings 11 of difficult issues 
in order'to minimize minor and major conf.llcts among Council members, but on I 
the whole the Council appears to have achieved a good deal of unanimity in 
reports and recommendations. 6 Conflicts are more apt t o occur in the section 
offering policy suggestions, rather than in the analytical and reportorial 
portions. 
The analyses may be roug~~y divided into three general parts . First 
the Council examines the developments and trends of the previous six months 
to a year by referring to certain crucial movements, and indicates the sig-
nificance of these developments . Secondly it discusses goals for the follow 
ing months, stressing the balances and needed adjustments to be a~ned with ' 
in the system, favorable and unfavorable factors in the situation, and hoped 
for levels of activity. Lastly, the Council sets forth needed policies, not 
so much in the sense of specific legislative recommendations but as basic 
objectives for the .American economy, and the steps necessary to attain them. 
This is the Council's long-run program, in contrast to the more short run 
considerations of the second section. 
The Reviews of the Economic Situation at 1lidyear are shorter than th 
Annual Reviews and are . usually conf i ned to a discussion of recent economic 
developments and their effects on the situation oulined previo.usly, with per 
5 Leland and Nourse , 11Stabilizing the Economy: A Discussion, 11 Ameri-
can Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1950, pp . 182-83. 
6 On · . tl:l.i~ subject Nourse wrote: 
Since actual agreement was impossible and formal agreement was 
demanded, both omission and verbal subterfuges were resorted to 
in order to produce documents to meet deadlines . Subsequently, 
a member could claim that his pet idea was ~till there by im-
plication. 
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, scene. No specific recommendations are included . 
It would be both impossible and inadvisable to summarize here the 
content of each of the (eight) reports under considerati on . The length of 
the annual messages approaches an average of two hundred pages each, while 
the midyear reviews are from one hundred and fifteen to one hundred and sixt 
pages long, incl uding statistical appendixes . I t is the purpose of this 
chapter merely to discuss the basic outlines of Council work, rather than to 
minutely examine all the hypotheses and proposals set forth in the reports . 
That the Council ' s analyses range over the entire area of publ ic and private 
economic activity can be seen from an examination o f the Table of Contents 
of any one of the reviews . Increasing emphasis has been placed on the need 
for continued economic growth and the discrepacies between the work now bein 
done i n fields such as housing, schools , health, comrrunity facilitie s , trans 
portation, conservation, and resource development and the needs of a growing 
economy.? Discussionof basic and l ong-run obj ectives for the American econl 
omy de l ves into the fields of production and investment objectives , develop-
ment of physical and human resources, promotion of consumption and a balanced 
living standard for all, social security, prices, fiscal and farm policies, I 
and international economic relations . The Council has interpreted the in-
struction in the Act that the President ' s Reports define 11needed levels 11 of 
employment, production, and purchasing power as being authorization for a 
t ask "more far-r eaching in scope and bolder in ·purpose than any previously 
undertaken with a Congressional mandate . 118 
6 (Cont . ) 
ruary 18, 1950, P• 
See Nourse, "Why I Had to Step Aside," Collier's, Feb-
53. 
7 Alvin Hansen, op. cit., pp . 539-42 . See also Council of Economic 
Advisers, The Annual Economic-Review January 1949, p. 77. 
8 Third P~nual Report, op . cit ., p . 15. 
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The Nation's Economic Budget 
In Chapter II we saw that the concept of a National Budget was the 
heart of the original Full-Employment Bill. A forecast of the nation's 
forthcoming expenditures was to be matched against the nation's capacity t o 
produce. If the sum of all types of expenditure fell short of a full em-
ployment gross nat ional product, the Bill provided that the government shoul . 
step in with a policy that woul d make up the difference.9 No specific men- I 
tion wa s made of a National Budget in the Employment Act as passed, although 
it is implied in the directionsto the President for the preparation of his 
Reports . The concept has been incorporated in the President's annual and 
midyear reports and the Council's Reviews since the first document issued 
in J anuary 1947 . It is the core of the Council's analyses, appearing at the 
end of t he first section of each report . 
The National Budget concept was developed by the Fiscal Bureau of 
the Budget early in the 1940 1s . 10 I n a sense, the Full-Employment Act was 
an effort to give recognition and encouragement to this pioneering work. Th 
concept was a l ogical offspring of President Roosevelt's statement in Jan-
uary 1941 that 11the Budget of the U. S. presents our national program. It 
is a preview of our work plan, a forecast of things to come . It charts the 
course of the nation .u11 A product of the development of Keynesian thinking 
the Nat ional Budget represents a new development in national accounting and 
has been a major contribution to economic science . According to Alvin Hanse ' : I 
It is no longer possi ble for any President of the 
United States to consider the 11 state of the nation , 11 or 
to present the budget of the federal government, or in-
deed to weigh the impact of . any governmental policy upon 
9 See the Full Employment Bill, Sec. 3 and Albert Gailord Hart, 
Money, Debt , and Economic Activity (New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1948 ), 
pp:-Ti70='7L -
10 stephen Kemp Bail ey, Congress Makes A Law (New· .York: Columbia 
University Press, 1950 ), p. 15 f .n . -- - -
11 uoted in Ibid~, n . 25. 
I· 
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the economy of the country as a whole , without comi ng to 
grips with the nation 1 s economic budget . 12 I 
' The following three pages present a view of the Budgets as they ap-
pear in the Council 1 s Reviews. The graphic form is the one used each month // 
in the publj.cation Economic Indicators and allows for significant comparison, !, 
while the table gives the picture in terms of dollars. All the material .I 
therein contained is substantiated and supplemented in the Appendix of each 
report . 
The Nation 1 s Economic Budget, as currently used, is designed to de-
pict the flow of funds in the national economy and is concerned with per-
forrnance in the recent past rather than with future expectations . I t con-
I 
sists of a composite of four budgets: the expenditures and receipts of con- , 
I 
sumers, of business,13 of the government , and the balance of international j 
trade; plus net additions and absorption of savings by these groups, and 
the gross national income and product. Statistics, drawn from various sourc~s, 
I 
are made as comparable as possible. The "National income and products" ac- I 
counts of the Department of Commerce are the bas i s for the figures relating 
to the private sectors oft he economy, while the Bureau of the Budget in its I 
11 Cash receipts from the public 11 and "Cash payments to the publ ic 11 compila- 11 
tions gives the basis for the Government account . 
Gross national product or income represents only receipts and pay-
1 
ments arising from current production, other types being represented as trans-
!! fer payments . In order to portray the role of Government payments in the 
economy the Budget includes the main flows of transfer payments, and it in- il 
dicates the distinction by italics (or, in this case , asteri sks) . Only the 
current production f i gures are totaled in arriving at GNP. 
Some adjustments must be made in order to show equivalence of in- I 
I 
12 I 
Hansen, op. cit., p . 106. j 
11 13 Government accounts (federal, state, and local) are kept on a curJ. 
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-ren cash-b£ts.i.s_,- rli.the_ ~than-_oiL_an....ac c:cuC!.L..ba.sis_.__Fo.r_an_e ~ation QJ th, l 
entire concept see Ibid., pp . 107-llL.. -- - ---==== 
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THE NATION'S ECONOMIC BUDGET 
1948 (Billions of dollars) 
TOTAL 
Gross 
National 
.Product 
Con~ers 
Business 
International 
Government 
-Federal,d State an . 
Locail 
:l!.xcess of 
E~pendit~re t- ) Receipts( 
Transfer P 
*Transfer payments a re 
included in receipts or 
expenditures of the separate 
accounts bu.t not in the t otal Groo~~ 
National Product. 
~Transfer Payments* 
+ 
Consumer 
Saving-
Excet!!s of 
Investm.ent 
Exceett of 
Invetttmen 
Caeh 
Surplus 
1:1±.2 {Billione of dollars) 
The most significant developmen~ · in the 
Nation's Economic Budget betwee 1948-
'49 was a decline of about $8 b
11
llion 
in business investment and a change from 
TOTAL 
Gross 
National 
.Product 
Consumers 
Business 
Government 
-Federal, 
State and 
Local 
Source: Council of Economic Advisers, 1950) P• 64 !h! Annual Economic Review (January 
Scale 
Governmen~ BUrplus 
to defici~ . 
Excess of 
Investmen 
Excess of 
Receipt I! 
Cash 
Defd.cit 
Billions of Dollars 
=- =--=.- ==--=-=- ~=--== 
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THE NATION'S ECONOMIC BUDGET 
Calendar year 1948 
Economic group 
CONSUMERS 
Disposable income relating to current 
production 
Government transfers and net interest 
payments* 
Disposable personal income* 
Expenditures for goods and services 
Personal savings (+)* 
BUSINESS 
Retained business receipts from cur-
r ent production 
Gross private domestic investment 
Excess of receipts (+) or investment (- )* 
INTERNATIONAL 
Government loan transfers abroad* 
Net foreign investment 
Excess of receipts (+ ) or investment (-)* 
GOVERNMENT (Federal, state, local) 
Tax payments or liabilities 
Adjustment to cash basis~r 
Cash receipts from the public* 
Purchases of goods and services 
Government transfers* 
Cash payments to the ~ublic* 
Excess of receipts (+) or payments (- )* 
ADJUSTMENTS 
For receipts relating to gross national 
product 
Other adjustments-tr 
Total Gross National Product 
Re-
ceipts 
175. 8 
14. 9* 
190.8* 
26.8 
60.2 
- . 3* 
59.9* 
Ex-
pendi-
tures 
178. 8 
45.0 
1.9 
262 . 4 
Excess of 
receipts 
( ) or 
deficit 
(-) 
-18 . 2* 
0 
*Items relating to current production of goods and services are shown in 
ordinary type. Transfer payments and receipts and subtotals including them 
are indicated by asterisks; they are not included in the gross national pro ct. 
-~~~================~============================~~====== 
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Calendar year 19h91 
Economic group 
CONSUMERS 
Disposable income relating to current 
production 
Government transfers and net interest 
payments* 
Disposable personal income* 
Expenditures for goods and services 
Personal savings (+)* 
BUSINESS 
Retained business receipts from cur-
rent production 
Gross private domestic investment 
Excess of receipts (+) or investment (-)* 
INTERNATIONAL 
Government locan transfers abroad* 
Net foreign investment 
Excess of receipts (+) or investment (-)* 
GOVERNMENT (Federal, state, local) 
Tax payments or liabilities 
Adjustment to cash basis* 
Cash receipts from the public* 
Purchases of goods and services 
Government transfers* 
Cash payments to the public* 
Excess of receipts (+) or pa~nents (-)* 
ADJUSTMENTS 
For receipts relating to gross national 
product 
Other adjustments* 
Total Gross National Product 
Re-
ceipts 
177.0 
15.9* 
192. 9* 
27. 6 
258.7 
Ex- Excess of 
pendi- receipts 
tures ( ) or 
deficit (-) 
178. 5 
14. 4* 
36. 8 
-9.2* 
0 
258.7 0 
1 Estimates based on incomplete data. Note : Detail will not necessarily ad 
to totals because of rounding . 
Source: Council of Economic Advisers, The Annual Economic Review {Jan-
uary, 1950), P• 65 . 
~-==----=------ -- ==-- -
come derived from current production. and GNP, or expenditure . Subsidies, 
less the surplus on current account of Government enterprises are included 
in national income, but not in GNP, and hence must be deducted from income. 
An adjustment for statistical discrepancy arising because of largely in-
dependent estimates of income and product must be made . These t wo factors 
are accotmted for in the first line of the adj ustments column of the tables . 
Remaining Government payments not included anJTivhere in receipts, such as net 
loans to business, purchases of existing assets, etc ., are netted against ad 
justments on the receipts side of the account in the next line. AdjlJ_st:inents .'· 
are also required in receipts because of a lack of comparability in the meth d 
of estimating Government and private receipts , mostly because of the differe t 
bases of the tax estimates and the l ag of tax receipts behind their calcula- l 
tion as liabilities . l4 
The Nation's Economic Budget is an indispensable aid in understandin 
the manner in which the economy functions, and is especially helpful in theJ 
development of practical economic policy. By indicating sources of supply d 
I 
demand and the contributions of government, business, and consumers to re-
cei pts, spending, and saving it suggests danger points in the economy to the 
trained eye .15 
These studies, and those based on an even further fragmentation of 
the budget, combined with forecasts of future receipts and expenditures, can 
indicate what remains to be done in order to assure adequate demand . Al bert 
Gailord Hart offers the observation that "if we are going to consider drop-
ping the balance of the government ' s budget as a standard of policy, we are 
bound to look for alter native standards. The natural focus for discussion 
14 Appendix A, pp. 127~38 of the Council of Economic Advisers, The 
Annual Economic Review (January, 1950) i ndicates in detail the derivation of 
all the data i ncluded in the graph and table reproduced here . 
15 Hansen, op . cit., p. 106 and Seymour Harris, Economic Planning 
(New York: Alfred A. :Knopf, 1949 ), pp . 99-100. 
I 
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Two specif ic formulas--employ-is • . . . 
ment guarantees and consumption-expenditure guarantees-- can be tied rather 
directly to the Budget. And even if these formulas are rejected, the Nation s 
Budget approach may be shaped into proposals for 'compensatory financing ' of 
government .ul6 The expenditures s i de will always balance with the income 
side . The questions are whether the balance will be at full employment, at 
inflationa:!:'y or deflationary l evels , and what parts of the total wil l be 
found in specific items. 
Similar budgets, with somewhat different formal methods of computa-
tion, have been published recently in other countries--notably Great Britain 
France, Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway.l7 They differ mainly in that 
they are based more largely on imperative items ba l anced against estimations 
of what is and has been forthcoming , while the American budget is primarily 
aimed at providing prospective for public and pri_vate decisions . It is only 
a secondary purpose of our budget to provi de also yardsticks by which to 
measure success or failure of public and private performance . 18 
However, as was indicated in Chapter Iri, one of the c bief elements 
in the study program of the Council is a tentative, ten year pro j ecti on of 
the Nation's Economic Budget. Whilethere is merit to the assumption that 
"if things can be kept going well in'the short run, the long run wil l take 
care of i tself 11 the Council has felt it 11 i mportant that explorations be made 
in quantitative term~ into the production potential of t he economy as time 
goes on, and into some of the interior adjustment wi thin the economy which 
16 Albert Gailord Hart , op. cit., pp . 468-470 . 
~ --- ' 
l7 For an ~p~tion of the work being done in these countr ies, see 
Seymour Harris, op . c i t ., and Alvin Hansen, Economic Policy and Full Employ-
ment (New York: MacGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1947), pp . 57-13(.'" ---
18 Theo Suranyi-Unger, Private Enterprise and Governmental Planni ng : 
An I ntegration (New York: McGraw-Hl11 Book Co., I~, 1950), p . 121. 
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that development will entail. 11 19 Leon Keyserling calls these formulations 
the National Prosperity Budget. Although there has been much criticism from 
certain quarters that t he Prosperity Budget exceeds the government province 
for informational service and contai ns too much of a 11 should 11 or !!might " 
flavor , 20 Alvin Hansen wr ote , in May 19h7, that a failure to project the 
Nation's Economic Budget figures forward would represent an evasion of re-
. 21 
sponsibility under the Employment Act. 
Four purposes are served by t his process., which does not set up goal 
in t he sense of the blueprints and plans of regulated economies. I t (l) af-
fords an instrument by which the conditions of progress can be more carefull 
studied, (2) allows for a closer inspection of the logic of public programs 
of a developmental character, (3) provides bench marks of progress and, 
perhaps most important , (h) by 'dramatizing' the American potential it can 
generate the enthusiasm and ambition of those who will plan the future and 
invest in it. 22 Far from being attempts at prediction, the Cuuncil regards 
these studies as offering "concrete objectives for economic growth, and 
particularly as standards for a better balance between production and con-
sumption, income and investment, and prices, profits, and wages which will b 
conducive to sustained economic progress ." 23 
They aid in measuring our economic capacity and offer thoughtful com-
parisons between the economy's performance and its potentialities. Combined 
l9 Council of Economic Advisers , Fourth Annual Report (December, 194 ), 
p . 33 . 
20 See the discussion between Keyser ling and the Editors, . 11The Slump--
and Yfuat to do About It," Fortune, June, 1949 , p. 78. 
21 Alvin H. Hansenin the Review of Economic Statistics, ~my, 1947, 
p. 73, quoted by Bronfenbrenner, hPostwarPol1tical Economy: The President 's 
Reports, 11 The Journal of Political Economy, October, 19L18, p . 386 . 
22 Fourth Annual Report, op . cit., p . 34. 
23 The Economic Report of the President (January, 1949), p . 8. 
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with other studies being jointly carried on, the Prosperity Budget approach 
helps t o indicate some of the basic objectives for balanced economic growth. 
However, the Council is careful to point out that such projections are not: 
••• forecasts of what would be likely to happen without special 
effort. They depend upon success in accompl ishing the objectives 
of the Employment Act . We present them as an attempt to inte-
grate goverrunental and private 2ahinking in a way that is essential for making rati onal decisions . 
Chairman Nourse , at the beginning of the Council' s work, referred to 
the Budget as a t ool to be t ested and developed . 25 The Council is constantl 
seeking an awareness of its limj tations and for ways in which to improve its -
validity and usefulness . 
Economic Analysis and the Problem of Forecasting 
The Council's analyses can be no better than the tools of economics. 
If there i s no basis for agreement on a body of principl es or little reason 
for cor~idence i n the methods of formal economics , then the Council i s doon1e i 
in its t2sk from the beginning . The problem becomes more difficult when we 
. . 
realize , as the Council has acknowledged , that economics is a social science 
not a natural one .26 Neverthless, the Council points out that areas of dis-
agreement among professi onal economists are not as vdde as we have been led 
to believe. There is no l ack of a systematic body of principles and most 
economists can be found grouped around a rather limited center area where di -
ferences upon basic principles are few. 
The explanation for the vigorous arguments and general confusion 
which seems to exist arises from the fact that when economic theory i s turne · 
2L1 Council of Economic Advisers , Annual Economic Revi ew (January, 
1949), P• 50. 
25 Edwin G. Nourse, 11Economics in the Public Service, " American Econ 
omic Review, Papers and Proceedings , May, 1947, p . 28 . 
26 Third Annual Report , op . cit ., p . 57. See Lionel Robbins , An Es-
~ ~the Natlir'e and Significance or-Economic Science (London: l\IIacmiiTan 
anu_Cci. _ _':.=r; m·i ted K ;Lfor s' 1lar b ervations. 
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into judgments upon specific polic i es there i s a l ack of agreement about the 
situation to which the judgment applies . 27 One economist ·will feel that a 
particular insti tuti onal background and certain public policies shoul d be 
taken for granted, while anot her will f eel that these elements should be 
l eft out or mOdified . At times disagreement will arise becaus e the partici-
pants are looking at separate segments of the same problem in c onsidering the 
probable responses to economic forces . There is no questi on but that we need 
"more adequate economic science and greater unanimity a1nong economists about 
their science ."
28 
Because economics operate s within a social and psychologi I 
cal environment wher e many non-measurable, intangibl e , and non-economic forces 
are at work, unanimi ty cannot always be e~·ected. However , areas of common 
ground are growing l arger and differences a~not i nsurmountable . 
Opi nion seems to be well crystallized on measur es fo r halting infla-
tion and counteracting depression, as well as on the econonuc theory of taxa 
tion.29 Hansen, in his book Business Cycles and National I ncome enumerates 
three types of compensatory measures and :::everal suggested programs combi n-
i ng both conscious and automatic management of cycle forces . 30 I n Septem-
ber of 1950 the ~merican Economic Association publ ished a Committee Report , 
sett jng fo rth substantial areas of agreement on stabilizat ion policy, that 
was very encouraging. The Committee was agreed that, al though we may not nom 
27 Third Annual Report , op . _c it., pn . 28-30. Of pure -theory Lionel 
Robbins , ~· cit ., p. 105 says: 
• · •• The concern of the economist is the :Interpretation of 
reality. The business of discovery consists not merely in the 
el ucidation o f given premises but in the perception of t he 
facts which are the basis of the premises. 
See also pp. 147-151 for a discuss ion of the types of factors which the econ l 
omist can legitimately accept as given data . 
28 Roy Blough,"Political and Administrative Requisites for Achieving 
Econonnc Stabibty, 11 American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings , May, 
1950, p . 170. 
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be able to prevent mild recessions or inflations, we do know enough to de-
, sign policies that can keep them from developing into prolonged periods of 
mass unemployment or violent price movements)1 
About no activity engaged in by economists is there more controversy 
than that of forecasting. In a verbal exchange between Simeon E. Leland and 
Edwin G. Nourse at the Annual Meeting of the A~erican Economic Association · 
December 1949 Leland held, in contradiction to the positions of both Nourse 
and of Paul Stayer, 32 that the Council ' s task 1nevitably involves forecast-
ing. Nourse stated that it did not and shoul d not. In hj_s view, offering 
advice as to 11 economic trends, both current and prospective 11 was quite dif-
ferent from being called upon to make specific forecasts , compl ete to the 
last quantitative detail s of amplitude, magnitude , and duration. He stoutly 
affirmed that the Council had not indulged in forecasting and contradicted 
an assertion that it had 11 predicted 11 a collapse in 1947.33 It is interestin 
to note that . the British Government, in. layjng down some fundamental facts 
of economic planning, disclaimed even any possibility of forecasting in the 
above sense . 11 ••• no economic planning body can be aware (or indeed ever 
coul d be aware ) of more than the very general trends of future economic de-
velopments . n34 
Economists seem agreed that forecast~ng, as long as we have a donlin-
antly free price system with investment largel y a function of market expecta 
tions, although its techniques are being constantly improved, cannot be thor 
3l Despres, Hart, Friedman~ etc. , 11The Problem of Economic Instabili y : 
A Committee Re:oort , 11 American Economic Review, September, 1950, pp . 501-39 . 
32 See the article by Strayer, 11 The Council of Economic Advi sers : 
Political Economy on Trial, 11 American Economic Revie~"f, Papers and Proceeding , 
May, 1950, pp. 144-154. 
33 Leland and Nourse , ££• cit ., pp ~ 179-81. 
34 Cooperation, Cmd . 7572) 
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oughly relied upon as a guide t o national policy.-35 The American Economic 
Association Committee r eport says that our inability even to identify the 
phases of the cycl e as they happen, or soon afterward, makes the treatment 
of i nstabi.lity soley by means of preventive medicine imposs i ble. Combi ned 
with the limitations of forecasting, we have not yet complete enough under-
standing of t he causes of the cycle to abolish i t .36 
This does not mean that we should abandon our efforts at more ad-
equate forecasting . At the very least, we must work f or alert and up-to-dat 
statistical appraisal s of the current situation to guide us in identifying 
reversals more promptly . 
• • • Expert attention to the course of events can give an 
informed opinion of where they are tending. On this basis, 
preparation can be made for meeting developments which---lie 
within the range of probability.37 
The Adequacy of Statistics 
That the Council cannot await the perfecting of economic analysis is 
obvious . :t:Iore study, more exchange of views, and f urther i mprovements in th 
tools of economics and political science must be carried on simultaneously 
35 Despres, etc., op. cit ., p . 510 and Hansen, op. cit., p . 593 . 
Grattan, ££• cit ., pp . 59-!IT quotes these r ematks by Prot. Arthur Burns of 
t he Bureau of ~conomic Research: 
Today's forecasts have enormous advantages over their 
predecessors: keener analytic t ools, longer and better stat-
istical recor ds, sounder analysis of past experience •••• 
But two seri ous difficulties are likely to remain in the fore-
caster's path: first, the imperfect tendency of history to re-
peat itself; s econd , the forecas t er's o>vn hopes and fears a-
bout the future, which tend to insinuate themselves into his 
predictions, no m~tter how elaborate their statistical and 
mathematical scaffolding. 
36 Despres, loc. cit . 
. --
37 Four th Annual Report , op. cit. , p . 31. See also Hansen, op . cit., 
p . 593. 
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to rea lize these facts and come to the aid of the Council. It has taken up 
an active program in the halls of Congress to get appropriations made that 
vdll facilitate the gathering of new and more adequate statistical data by 
I 
the departments of government that supply the Council with its source materia • 
I 
Progress has been slow. There have generall y been reduced appropriations, · 
anything, for this type of work and there is a difficulty of fully dramatiz-
ing the needs to the uninformed . However, this activity has brought the 
Council and the Joint Committee members and staffs into closer harmony and 
cooperation than any other undertaken. 
I In discussing the limitations of economic science in the Third Annua~ 
Report, the Co uncil outlined three important areas where a paucity of in-
formation makes their work most difficult:39 
(l) There is a lack of adequate quantitative analyses that determin 
a sustainable relationship between the increase in productive capacity and 
the increase in consumers' markets . 
(2) "It is important to know whether the continued good health of 
our free economy requires capital investment at a rate which bears some as-
sertainable relation to national income or to some other economic landmark .u 
(3) Most important, criteria need to be developed by which can be 
determined the relationships among prices , wages , and profits which are 
workable, in the sense that they contribute in the largest possible degree 
to economic stability. (It is quite poss ible here that no single categorica 
conclusion can ever be worked out, but progress can be made by combining bot 
empirical observation and economic analysis .) 
It is not the detailed facts, but the molds or schemesof relation-
38 Second. Annual Report , op . cit., p . 28 and Third Annual Report , op 
cit., p . 32 . 
39 Third Annual Report, op. cit ., p. 31. 
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ships into which facts should be assembled that make economic analysis use-
ful. 40 First the data must be made available. Then it must be organized i -
to meaningful and manageable categories . l astly, through this process econ-
omists work to trace the int eraction of forces and to identify strategic 
points in the determination of economic activity. 
I n 1949 the Joint Committee pubhshed a docu.rnent indicating the 
11 Statistical Gaps 11 in our present knowledge and setting forth a list of in-
dicators , or :L'nprovements of older indexes, which should be undertaken by 
the Government. A resume of its listing follows: 
(1) Periodic surveys of constuner purchasing power and 
demand sufficient to show--
(a) the distribution of income and saving avail-
able for expenditure by geographic areas and among 
various consumer groups and income brackets, and 
(b) current and -prospective patterns of con-
sumption and expenditures. 
(2) Collection of information on wage earnings of em-
ployees in activities not covered by our social security system. 
(3) Improvement of the information on returns to capi-
tal and management of unincorporated businesses . 
(4) Collection of more information on emplo~nent and 
unemployment , adequate to reveal geographical differences 
i n employrnent trends and unemplo~nent rates , and to provide 
data on occupational and other characteristics of the un-
employed . 
tion 
data 
tion 
(5) Development of more complete and cur rent informa-
on financial trends i n business, providing industry totals, 
on business operations by size of businesses, and informa-
on business concentration. 
(6) Taking of an up-to-date census of wholesale and re-
tail trade and services by means of which the current stat-
istics on business and distribution may be i mproved and made 
more reliable. 
(7) Development of adequat~ concepts for measuring 
productivity and the collection of data to supply informa-
tion on the course of changes. 
40 Fourth Annual Report , op • . cit., pp . 29-30. 
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( 8) Development of data on costs of construction and 
improvement of data on the volume of new housing and non-
residential construction. 
(9) I mprovement of inventory statistics by covering a 
larger and more re liabl e sample which would permit a break-
down of inventories at the various stages in the industrial 
process . 
(10) Collection of detai led information on the relation-
ship of requirements for Jnaterials, capital equipment1 and 
energy to the volume of production, to permit evaluation of 
the industrial consequences of production programs . 
(11) Collection of fuller information on the business 
. intentions with regard to capi tal expenditure and related 
data. 
(12) Collection of more current and detail ed informa-
tion on expenditures of state and l ocal governments, for~.~se 
in preparing estimates for the Nation ' s Economic Budget . ~ 
Subsequent Joint Committee reports on the Economic Reports have outlined the 
!lrogress made during the year in having some of the work undertaken, and 
have enumerated additional needs . The January 1949 Report indicated a need 
for current monthly or quarterl y statistics on personal incomes r eceived in 
each state, supplementing the present annual estimates in this area.42 
On behalf of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report , Senator 
Ralph E. Flanders, one of the most ardent supporter s of this work, presented 
the following summary of the "Lines of Economic Research Needed to Carry I 
I 
Out Objectives of the Employment Act" to the U. s . Senate Appropriations Com 1 
I mittee late in 1948: 
Eeonem'i 
The Operation of the Economy : 
(1) 'I'he measurement of productivity 
(2) Seasonal unemployment in specific industries 
(3) Changes in savings habits 
(4) -Sources of venture capital 
41 Jte produced in the Fourth Annual Report , loc. cit . 
42 Economic Report , Report on the January 194 
8_6_ - --
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The Operation of the Economy (Continued): 
(5) Changes in the attitudes of business management 
(6) Effects of inflation on business enterprise 
(7) Effects of i nflat ion on fixed-income groups 
(8) Speculation on co:mmodit i es exchanges 
The Needs of the Economy: 
(9) Long-range investment needs 
(10) Regional development needs and possibilities 
(11) Profi ts in relation to capital formation 
Economic Programs: 
(12) Economic philosophy of the independent regulatory 
agencies 
(13) The effect of state and local fiscal policy upon 
economic stability 
(14) Programs for depressed areas 
(15) State and federal laws restr i ct i ng competi tionl..~3 
These formulations of the research needs for the Council's work 
backed requests for appr opriations to support the gathering of statistics 
fundamental to such work. Senator Flanders also urged the need fo~ suf-
ficient funds for the Council's operations so that it could afford to en-
gage outside research agencies to undertake some of the projects most urgent 
ly needed . 
43 Quoted by Ensley, 11 Suggested Lines of Economic Research Needed to 
Carry Out the Objectives of the Employment Act, 11 American Economic Review, 
Papers and Proceedings , May, 1949, p. 455. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CRITICISMS A.!\lD RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is the province of this chapter to discuss some of the leading 
criticisms that have been made of the Council's work, to date, and the pro-
posal s which have come out of these criticisms.1 The chapter will conSine 
itself to discussing the comments of two important groups of critics ; econ-
omists and members of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report. Material 
has been gathered from an examination of the leading economic journals and 
the Joint Committee's own reports and covers a period since the passage of 
the Act to the first nionths of 1950. 
main categories: 
(1) Faulty analysis 
Criticisms are roughly divided into fo , 
I' 
I 
( 2) Lack of an adequate stabilization program 
(3) Too much attention to social programs I 
(4) Too political I 
---------1--N-o-t --all of the criticisms made of the Council can be considered I 
valid, and a good many of the most common ones , appearing in popular magazi es 
or financial columns, may be readily di smissed as merel y reflections of the I 
writers' prejudices. But , even the hysterical predictions of doom, such as / 
the remarks by Newsweek's Henry Hazlitt that the Council is nothing but a 
11Marxist mouthp;Ie"ce of Truman, 11 (Henry Hazlitt, "Who Advises the Advisers? 11 , 
Newsweek, March 1, 191_~8, p . 62 o) have their counterparts in serious economic 
lT'Lerature. Some of the opponents of the Employment Act and all its works r -
main in opposition because they see the spectre of Keynesian economic though 1 
still lurking within the measure . Senator Byrd, an exampl e of this viewpoin 1, 
in requesting a Congressional investigation of the agency, spoke of the Coundil 
l as "cloistered in the White House" trying to sell t o the American people the 
deficit spending schemes of Lord Keynes o The editors of Forttme Ivia¥azine 
hold that the Employment Act "marked the high point of popular conl'ldence in 
Keynesian policies, 11 but that Keynes has now largely been discredited and th 
symbolism of national aggregates fotmd to be unrealistic . (New York Times, 
July 18, 1949, 1:7 and 11 The Slu.mp--and What to do About It, 'f'r'Forttme, June, 
1949, pp. 59-61.) -
I n some cases where defense arguments have also been noted these will be in-
cluded. Although the chapter is by no means an eJ<..hau.stive treatment, it wil l 
give an i dea of the foremost judments about the merits and demeri ts of the 
Council's work that have thusfar been made. 
The Joint Committee was not yet organized sufficiently to produce 
more than a three page report in 1947, outlining its responsibilities under 
the Act . However , it has issued full reports on the 1948, 19h9, and 1950 
Economic Reports of the President . In all cases the Committee, which, accor ~ -
- - - - ---- -· - ·-·-
ing to the Act 2 shall "ref lect the r elat ive membership of the majority and 
minority parties in the Senate and House of Representatives, 11 split rather 
faithfully al ong party lines to produce both a ma jority and a minority re-
port. In 1948 the ma jor ity report was largely crit ical of the President's 
Report . I n 1949 and 1950 the ma jority· reports were favorable and separate, 
vigorousl y critical, minority reports were filed . 
The following quotation, taken from the .Minority Report ~the Jan-
uary 1949 Economic Report is sufficiently illustr ative of the objections whi i. h 
have repeatedly been raisedby some Joint Committee members that it caD serve 
as a model of the main issues present , with some slight variations, in all o 
the Joint Committee writings • . More detailed explanations of Joint Committee] 
criticisms wil l appear under the headings enumerated above . 
We reject the basic philosphy of the President's Econ-
omic Report which, in effect, r ecommends that we set up in this 
country a planned and controlled economy and j.ncrease taxation 
for that purpose . The President's report ignores the broad 
power E already existing in the hands of the President, • • • 
and carries on a crusade for more Executive power , which we con-
sider unjustified and dangerous . 
The report of the majority of this comrnittee accept s with-
out criticism or reservation the philosophy of the President ' s 
report and his legisl ati ve proposals . We feel that under the 
Employment Act of 1946, our committee should have subjected the 
President's report to a detailed and discriminating criticism. 
2 PVbli c Law 304, Chapt . 33, 79th Congress , 2nd Session, Sec . 5(a) . 
See Appendix D for further awplification of the work of the Joint Committ ee. 
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The President's Economic Reports threaten to become 
political propaganda rather than scientific analysis. They 
deal in generalities and lay down economic principles without 
recognizing the possibility of sincere differences of opinion. 
• • • We believe the principal attention of this particular com-
mittee should be devoted primarily to solving the problem of 
full and continuous employment and not be diverted too much by 
social and political issues ••••• 
We believe existing powers of controlling credit and 
Government fiscal policy are the best methods of preventing de-
pression, but even these must be cautiously used only when 
dangerous trends have clearly devel oped becaus e of the dif-
ficulty of forecasting economic conditiens . The record of the 
President 1 s Council of Economic Advisers in making predictions 
is no better than that of other Government economists . 
We disagree vdth the President 's report in one of its 
basic conclusions, namely, that the gros-s national product is 
divided in such a manner as to invite a depression because con-
sumer expenditures are too low, corporate profits too high, and 
private capital expenditures too high •••• In fact, we feel 
that the greatest threat to the stability of our economy and the 
prosperity of the United States lies in the constantly increas-
ing burden of Government taxation and the difficulty of securing 
capital for· the steady maintenance of employment in the capital 
goods industries so there may be a continued increase in con-
sumption.3 
Faulty Analysis 
The first criticism leveled against the Council was that it has fail-
1 ed even to tell us correctly where we are. Such economists as J. M. Clark, 
Jacob Viner, Paul J. Str ayer, and Henry H. Villard4 have pointed this out, 
and, as a consequence, suggested that the Council should not att empt to pre-
3 Joint Committee on the Economic Report , Minority Views on the Jan-
uary 1949 Econqmic Report of the President (April, I949), pp.T-='2-. - -
4 Paul J. Strayer, 11 The Council of Economic Advisers: Political Econ-
omy on Trial, 11 lunerican Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings , May, 1950, p 
14o. See Alfred Sherrard, 11The Economlcs of the Mirror, 11 New Rekublic , 1ay 
23, 1949, pp . 14-15 for references to comments by Viner ancr-c-lar , and Henry 
H. Villard , 11The Council of Econo- ic Advisers and Depression Policy, 11 Ameri-
can Economic Review, September, 1950, pp. 602-603 . Villard wrote: 
Certainly the record of the Council compares unfavorably 
with that of the Federal Reserve Board . Hence, I think the con-
clusion is amply justified that the Council could substantially 
strengthen its position if it devoted r elatively less attention 
to short fluctuations in general and inventory cycles in particu-
lar and far more attention to ma jor depressions where the probl em 
lJ to be Jess i m 
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diet developments in the immediate future , but shoul d aim . its r ecommendatio 
and analyses at .clearly defined l onger-run movements, after they have defin-
i tely been established. Crit ics wi thin the Joint Committee expr ess this gen 
eral point of vi ew in t his manner: 
••• With due respect to the President's economic advisers, we 
believe that most minor maladjustments in t he economy tend to 
correct themsel ves , that economists are much more likely to make 
mistakes than the natural forces of economic adjustment, that 
Government economists are often moved by political considerations 
which af fect their economic judgment , that economic forces are 
so uncertain that it is diff icult to predict them long in ad-
vance, that Government action had better be along broad general 
l ines and taken only when the economic trend is clear . ? 
I n particular, the Council is alleged to have badly f ailed to call 
turn in J anuary of 1947, when they were much concerned over deflation in a 
predominantly inflationary situation, and in J anuary 1949, when they were ad 
vacating a strong anti-inf l ati on program in the face of a business rec ession. 
These errors, it i s fe l t , di d much to discredit the Council in the public eyJ 
and to mak.e for suspicion of its future wor\<:, and mi ght well have l ed to in 
appropriate and harmful action by the government had not Congress been un-
receptive to the Presiden~requests and the 1949 recession of short duration. 
An almost universal complaint centers around the Council's treatment 
of the problem of inflation. Not until J anuary 1948, writes Seymour Harris, 
did the Council give adequate treatment to the problem of i nf lation or sug-
gest any comprehensi ve program to combat it . 7 In 1947 the Council reports 
5 Joint Committee on the Economic Report , Minority Views ••• 1949 , 
~· cit., PP • 5-6. 
6 Strayer, op . cit., p . 147 . In respbnse to the asserti on that the 
Council refused to call--nie turn in 1949 until eight months after the s l ump, 
Mr· . Keyserling wrote that he coul d not see where much harm had been done , an 
that, on the contrary, the reformation and appraisal of the progr~m in July 
1949 only served t o demonstrate that t he government was flexible and not ada 
mant about altering i ts program 11when conditicns have defini tel y changed. " 
Villard's comment was that the Council had had to wait until the Presi dent 
foimd it politically possible to withdraw his request for tax increases befo 
i t coul d change its estimate of the situation. (Fortune , op . cit ., p . 78 and 
Villard , op . cit . , p . 603.) - --
7 Se our Harris Economic Plannin New York: Alfred A. Kno 
.. 
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had been more concerned .with the possibility of a post-war depression . In 
I
I the First Annual Report the Council had written: 11 • •• the outlook for pro-
duction and jobs • should be more than ordinarily favorable for a period 
of some years ahead . In spite of certain conditions which make for a di p in 
1947, we believe that courageous and sensibl e action by those responsible 
• • • 
can at least hold such a recession to moderate proportions if not avert 
it . u8 The Employment Act was conceived mainly to deal with the problems of 
an underemployed economy. Stabilization was thought of mainly in terms of 
adjustment upward, and the Council undertook its labors with the spectre of 
deflation constantly in mind . Indeed, it seemed to some that it regarded in- ,1 
flati on only as a danger because it might lead to deflation, 9 and made the 
erroneous assumption that the 1946 conditions were like those of the early 
l930' s . 10 
Four analytical errors were responsible , says Prof. Fetter, for the 
Council misjudgment of the 1947-1948 situation . They were not as much error~ 
of neglect as of emphasis . Mr . Fetter feels that the reports , from the be-
ginning, did contain much excellent a!'l..alysis and did stress inflationary 
dangers , laudably pleading for the unpopular policy of maintaining high taxe~ . ll 
However, he feels , they mis judged the true causes of the inf l ationary danger 
They assigned only a minor role to an increase in the money supply, charging 
unreasonable action by busi ness and labor as the chief roots of inflation. 
8 Council of Economic Advisers, First Annual Report (December, 1946) 
p . 21. 
9 M. Bronfenbrenner, 11 Postwar Political Economy: The President's Re 
ports, 11 The Journal of Political Economy, October, 1948, p . 399 and Frank I 
Whitson F'e:E"ter, 11 The-"'E'conomic Reports of the President and the Problem of In 
flation, 11 Quarterl y Journal of Economics, i•fay, 1949, pp . 279-80. 
10 Fetter , ££· cit . , ~ · 281. 
11 Fetter, op . cit. , p . 280 . See also New York Times , January 31, 
1948, 10:6, Seymour-narriS, on . cit ., p . 81 for:favorabl e comment on the 
Council's tax stand . Paul S~ayer commends the Council's recognition of the 
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The Council 's thin:jdng was permeated with the idea that real disposable in-
comes of consumers must r ise regardless of other developments , and that the 
impact of demand changes is almost exclusively upon production and employment 
rather th~n upon prices. Consequently, they failed to ascribe the proper 
weight to increased foreign and domestic investment and a rise in the pro-
pensity to consume as major elements in the price situation, and assumed tha 
the volume of product i on and employment has approximately a 100% correlata-
tion with money payments , even at practically full employment . The Council' 
fear of slackening demand in the three areas to which Fetter ascribes the in 
flationary pressure , born of a feeling that depression will result, he says 
will retard adjustments needed i n these lines. 
Stated in another way, many economists have felt that the Council 
placed far too much emphasis upon productivity and distribution factors, and 
paid t oo little attention to monetary factors in their treatment of infla-
tion. I n contrast to the plans of other nations, Seymour Harris points out , 
al most the only weapons in the American anti-inflation campaign were to be 
I persuasion and mild fiscal policy in the form of repayment of the public deb 
In May_, 1947, Eclwin Nourse commented in a speech delivered to the 
International Union Convention of the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship 
Clerks, that he thought that i nflation would soon be conquered, and he stres 
ed increased production as the answer . 13 Yfhi l e Harris point out that the 
United States has tended to place much l ess stress on productivity· in its 
economic planning than have other nations,l4 we have, he says, overemphasized 
it as a solution to inflation. Bronfenbrenner asserts that maldistribution 
11 (Cont.) need for a buC.get surplus to check inflation, but claims 
that i t i s not "willing to give wholehearted support to proposals calling fo 
increased budget flexibility over the cycle. 11 (Strayer, op . cit., p. 148 . ) 
12 Seymour Harris, op . cit., pp . 275-280, p . 84. 
l3 Edwin G. Nourse, "Organized Labor and Economic Stabi lity," Vital 
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· Harris, op. cit., pp. 51, 161 . 
theory, i n crude form, is advocated by the Council and held as the cause of 
any number of economic ills , including inflation. 15 
Albert Gailord Hart, Bronfenbrenner, and Paul Strayer all were criti-
cal of the Council's neglect of monetary-fiscal powers . 16 As of December, 
1949 , there was no full time staff member of the Council dealing with moneta! 'f 
problems, says Strayer, and thie lack may somewr.12.t account for the Council's 
apparent i ndifference . However , a more logical explanation seems to lie witt 
the Administration's unwillingness to pay the price of effective control via 
taking a stand with the Federal Reserve Board in its controversy wi t h the 
Treasury. The Council has con0istently in Hs r eports and reviews upheld the 
need for stability in the government bond market as against the Federal Re-
· t· 17 serve pos~ ~on . 
It is clear that there has been some disagreement within the Council 
i tself over the need for inflation controls and the strength of the measures 
to be recommended . Nourse , on the whole, pressed for caution both i n apprai:: 1-
ing the situation as inflationary and in calling for action . In his article 
in Collier~ Magazi ne he held that neither the mid- year 1948 nor the January 
1949 Reviews warranted the President ' s requests for a strong anti-inflation-
ary control program. In January of 1949 the Council's Revi ew "limited itself 
to observing that 'attention should be given to the possibility ' that alloca-
tion controls mi ght be needed and that 'selective price controls also call 
for consideration, 1 as well as special measures (that ) may be needed to stimu 
late the increase of capacity and production .nl8 In 1949 (when the economy 
15 Bronfenbrenner , ££· cit., pp . 383-85 . 
16 F~rt , ££• cit., p. 516, Bronfenbrenner, ££· cit., p. 380, and 
Strayer , ££• cit., p .-r[?. 
17 Council of Economic Advi sers, Third Annual Report (December, 1948 )
1 p . 28 and Annual Economic Review January 'I"9L'9, pp . 41-43. The Economic Reporu 
of the President (January, 1948), pp . 85-bo~ 
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was undergoing a mild deflationary phase) Nourse favored some allocation 
authority, but not price controls. The Messrs . Keyserling and Clark, howeve , 
were testifying before the Joint Comnittee in favor of the President ' s progr 
and even lenttheir support to the Sp~nce Bill, which would have implemented 
the prograJT.l.l9 
The principal quarrel of the minority members of the Joint Co~mitt e 
with the January 1949 Report and Review was with the Council's predominantly 
inflationary view. 20 However , they went on to say: 
To suggest, as do es the President 's report, that the 
Government may find it necessary to an~ anti-Lnflation 
weapons and anti-deflation weapons concurrently certainly 
adds nothing to the clarity of economic understanding which 
ought to be the first responsibility of the Economic Report. 21 
.About this condition, which the lifdnority Report found so difficult to accept, 
Prof . Hart has perhaps the most pertinent observation . He waf discouraged 
also \'!ith the Council 1s fumblirgapproach to the inflationary situation, 11 par 
ticularly since the difficulty in laying out a pol icy came because we were i 
prosperity and a downturn seemed a lively possibility. This is exacty the 
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posi ticn we are apt to be in much of the time if stal::·ilization policy succee Jr22 
19 New York Times , }!larch 30, 1949, 4:6; March 31, 1949, 37:3 . The 
Spence Bill W:IT1"""68diS"CUSsed later in this chapter . The January 19b8 Econ-
omic Report had stressed the need for stand-by price controls anc: ratiolliii:g 
tOS"tem irii'lation, but it is not clear whether these proposals were a direct 
consequence of the Council's analysis , since there was no separation of clocu 
rents at that time . (New York Times , January 31, 1948, 10:6.) 
said: 
p . 8. 
20 The President's Economic Report (January, 1949), p . 9 had actual 
• • • curbing inflation is the first step towar d preventing de-
pression •• •• .And att;i.mes like the present, vvhen the economic 
situation has mixed elements, the GoverTh~ent needs bo t h anti-
inflation weapons and anti-deflation weapons so that it will be 
ready fo r either emergency. It may be necessary to employ both 
types concurrently in some combination, for some prices or i n-
comes could rise too rapicllywhjle others could be falling danger-
ously. 
21 Jol·nt c •tt. th TO • R t ·~ · · t v· •t omn1 · ee on _e ~conoffilc epor , ~nnor1 y .lews , op . ~., 
22 Hart, op . cit . p. SiS . 
Although it is generally agreed that the Comcil has done an excel-
l ent job in presenting the statistical material underlying its analyses, 
s everal economists have expressed fear that data being used may not present 
a true picture, will be put into use prematurely, or will be interpreted witl-
out recognition of its limitations, thus contributing f uv ther to the possib-
ility of faulty analyses . 
R. B. Heflebower and Joseph J . Spengler, in a Round Tabl e Discu.ssion 
on Economic Resear ch before the American Economic Association in December, 
l9Lf8 developed t hese points . Spengler was concerned that the basic research 
undertaken and relied upon by the Council might become so specialized that it 
could nOtbe readily understood or communicated t o the professi on or be made a 
source of guidance for the entrepreneur and statesman, and that it woul d fa i 
to be integrated into a unified body of economic doctrine . 23 Since we canno4 
possibly finance and do all the research needed, it is necessary that we con 
centrate on the basic things . Further, this research must be exhaust i ve or 
otherwise the knowledge which we think we have gained by short cut methods 
may be erroneous and lead to mis-interpretations . We may be establishing 
tenuous relat i onshi ps and building patterns which wil l be taken too seriousl~, 
and our data may fail to warn us of the ceteris pari bus and static features 
of the analysis . Heflebovver warns of these features of the Council ' s work 
and says that we should not pl unge ahead blindly, either , using the data a-
vailable, just because we cannot develop adequate measures . 24 I t i s Dnport-
ant that the Cmmcil keep a l ways in mind the limitations of its data . Bron-
fenbrenner takes the Counci l to task for fail ing to attach warning l abl es to 
i~newer statistical series , telling the methods by which the materi al was 
gathered and i t s pos sible shor tcomings . 25 
23 Heflebower , Neal, and Spengl er, 11Round Tabl e on Economic Research: 
A Discussion, 11 Ameri can Economic Review, Papers and 'Proceedings , May, 1949, 
p . 464 . 
24 I bid ., pp . 469-71 . 25 Bronfenbrenner, op . cit ., p . 386. 
1(2 
The Jo i nt Committee minority report ·echoes these fears in relation tc 
the Nation 1s Economic Budget when it expresses dubiousness that the 11 a.ggre-
gate shares of gross national product as used in the Econonric Report are sig-
nificant indexes of balance or l ack of balance in the economy," and Frank 
Fetter concludes that one of the basic reasons for the erro:s he detects in tl e 
Co u.ncil 1s analyses is because they have failed to recognize the limits of 
I pure Keynesian analysis . 26 
Lack of an Adequate Stabili zation Program 
The title of this section could well be changed to imply that the 
Counc i l has been said to have no real stabil ization program at all . The 
Coo nc il cannot justly be criticized if in the past four years it has not 
achieved the goal of stabilization. But it shoul d be taken to task if, in 
this period of time , it has not made full use of existing knowledge in at-
tempting to solve the problem of periodic fluctuations , and embodied this 
knowledge in concrete recommendations for the guidance of the President and 
Congress . 27 
Paul Strayer, Henry Villard and, most part icularly, Alvin Hansen 
have largely come to an unfavorable conclusi on in this matter . In answering 
a United Nations questi onnaire on the maintenance of full empl oyment sent to 
the Council in July, 1949 Villard charges that the Council had to admit that 
no anti-depression legislation had been devised. 28 Strayer notes that f rom , 1 
t he generalizvtion that each situation is unique, the Council has . seemed to I 
draw the conclusion that ther e are no general stabil ization devices that will 
ope~ate more or less automatical ly, or that such devices do not merit con-
sideration. 29 11We are still pretty much on a 124 hour ' basis, i mprovisi ng 
p . 14 
26 Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Ivlinority Views, op . cit., 
and Fetter, op . cit., p . 281 . 
- -
27 Strayer , .o~ . cit., p . 145. 
29 Q+ ,.....,~r- ~.,_up_.__ci:IL.. n lit? 
28 Vi l lard, op . cit ., pp 6ol, 604 
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when necessity compels action, 11 concl udes Hansen.3° 
A car ef ul reading of the Economic Reports and Reviews will indicate 
that ther e was not a complete absence of attention t o stabilizati on devi ces . 
This can also be readily seen when we examine the wave of protest that arose 
from certain quarters,,after the publicati on of these reports,. that requests 
and grants of government powers were being ovr:"r-extended. I n 1949, for in-
stance, the President had requested s tand- by controls to curb i nflation and 
Mr. Keyserling had testified on behalf of thi s request before the Joint Com-
mittee . The Minority Report had this to say about the request: 
The establishment of s t and-by controls is so serious a 
thing that it sho·uld be left for national emergencies such as 
would warrant the President ' s call ing Congress into special 
session . To grant them in an offhand manner is to accept the 
pr inciples of a managed economy in a totalitarian state . 31 
Yet it · is · just. this type of stand-by measure which could give the government 
program a flex i bility that would enable C-it ,·· t o meet inflati on or deflation 
before it becomes well establ ished . 32 
A further word here about the f l exibil ity of stabilization measures 
is in order . Heflebow·er, in speaking of a well roundec~ government stabiliza 
tion program, says that it would be po ssible and desirable to develop such 
flexible measures that i t would not make much difference whether the short-
lOl~ 
r un estimates of the situation were right or not , or even whether they were m de.33 
30 Alvin H. Hans eiJ,, Eus i ness Cycles and National Income (New York: w. 
w. Norton & Co . , 1951 ) , p. 542 . 
31 Joint Conrrnittee on t he Economic Report, Mi nority Views , op . cit., 
p. 21 and New York Times, March 30, 19Lf9, L1:6 . 
32 In this connect ion, a contradiction in the view of Paul Strayer 
comes to m:i nd . At one place in his article , "The Council of Economic Adviser : 
Political Economy on Trial, " he criticizes the Co1.IDcil for attempting to t rea ' 
short-run movements, and suggests that they devote their attention only to co w-
dit ions which are definitely developed and ascertainable . However, at another . 
point he deplores the Council's ettitude of want ing to v.:a.i t until deflation olr 
in.flation is well established before acting. (Strayer, op . cit . , pp . 146-49 . ) 
33 Even aside f rom combinations of built- in f l exibility and automatic 
compensatory counter measur es, as explained by Hansen in his book Busines s 
Strayer charges that the Council has retarded the acceptance of the vi ew by 
the public that stabilization measures must be flexible and reversi ble by the 
types of control it has advocated and by its ovm slovmess in adjust ing to 
~ . •t t • 34 cuanglng Sl ua l Ons . 
The real point of concern, however, has been that the Council, while 
making scattered attempts at stabi lizat ion procedur e , has failed to develop a 
, coordinated program. As we have noted in Chapter TV , the Council pl anned a 
three pronged attack on instability: (1) fiscal and monetary policy, (2) Ln-
stit utional r eform, and (3) improved busi ness practices. 
The first method of attack, it has been alleged, was pursued all too 
feebly, and i t 'Nas evident that strong cleavages in opi nion existed wi t hin 
the Council as to the type and purpoE.'e of control plans. Traditional com-
pensatory policy was i n some pl aces advocated, while at other points the 
Counci l gave pri, acy to control s to produce needed 11 balances. 11 Keyser ling 
v.:as seen to advocate preventive acti~n, and to prefer selective control 
measures to bring about proner relationships, as in the case of the relation 
of pr i ces to each other. Vfhile Nourse also stressed balances , he emphasized 
absolute quantity relatior: ships and cal led for direct controls. Such divisi o s 
hardly served to instill in the public confidence that the right choice would 
be made. Nor was the choice made clear to t he public.35 
The Council has made muc h of the need for balance between prices, 
wages, and profits and has pointed to the achievement of this bal ance, l arge-
ly through independent action of the private sectors of the economy, as a 
33 (Cont . ) C?cles and National Income , a managed compensatory pro-
gram could minimize i us rig~aspects if t he range of action were fixed in 
advance by Congress and if the Chief Executive or other designated administra 
tor were prepared to reverse judgment and put into effect measures counter to 
those previously used if events indicated them to be wrong . (Hansen, op . cit , 
pp . 544-46, p . 593 . ) 
3L~ Strayer, op . cit., p . 149 . (Emphasis the author 's.) 
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35 Har old Loeb, "No Depression If--," The Nation, June 25, 1949, pp . 
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major step in achieving stability. However, Strayer points out wryly that 
the Council's "• •• failure to est ablish standards for wage-price-profit re 
lationships that can be translated i nto specific guides for action at the 
level of the individual firm or labor union is sufficient eviden6ethat de-
pendence upon this route of stabilization is doomed to failure in the im-
mediat e future.36 He feels there must either be direct price and wage con-
t rols or a r eturn to a free price system in which the incidence of aQ~niste 
ed prices has been brought to a minimum. Villard attacks the Council for 
its belief that a change of a few percentage points in the distribution of 
nat i onal income might make a substantial contribution to stabilizing the 
economy (as well as to curbing inflation, as we have already mentioned) . If 
this were all that were needed, says Villard, he could be even more optimist ' 
than the already too optimistic Council. Here again, no standards ar e es-
tablished, nor is it made clear how individual business decisions will bring 
about t he desired results.37 
The second avenue of a~tadk, institutional reform, has been pursued 
cautiously by the Council. Although a continuous study is in progr ess, 
Nourse stated in late 1949 that the Council was adverse to making premat ure 
pronouncements of findings . 38 Strayer , however, criticizes the Council for 
failing to point out fundamental changes in the structure of the economy 
which must be made in order that stability be achieved. This lack of a 
t horough consideration of the institutional implications of alternative 
stabilizing devices is in large part responsible, Strayer feels, for the 
Council's tendency to suggest specific or selective controls for undesirable 
36 Strayer, 6p . cit . p. 149. Hansen has a ch§ipter on "Wage-Price-
Profit Policy" which1ndicates the complexity of the problem. (Hansen, ££• 
cit . , Chapter 29, pp~ 557-579 . ) 
37 This attitude may be seen 
Council for January 1949, PP• 61{ 71 
(Villard, op. cit., pp. 601-602.; 
in the Annual Economic Reviews of the 
and for January 1950, pp . 83-85 . 
38- --
_ on . cit,. 
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conditions . 39 
The fostering of improved business practices as a means of stabiliza 
tion is whol ly dependent on the voluntary acceptance by private agencies of 
the advice offered them by the President and his Council. This approach has 
l ed to some of the sharpest criticism of Council policy on record. The main 
content of the reports has seemed to some to be merely glorious exhortation 
and sweetness and light . The famed give and take of the Council' s conference 
I table has too often resul ted in either the formulation of a least common de-
nominator of platitude or a procession of phrases and qualifications whose 
final i mport is obvious t o no one.LO This is especially true of the Annual I 
I 
Reports , which are filled with nebulous popular views for popular consumptiod . 
The often 11 pompous stance to deliver the vacant phrase" reflects , nd:. ref orms, 
America 1 s methods of doing business . 41 Villard comrares the Council's ex-
hortations to the Chamber of Co1mnerce slogan posted on billboards throughout 
America immediately before the Great Depression-- 11Forv1ard America ! Nothing 
Can Stop You1n42 
The Council apparently fell under its own spell when it became con-
v inced that it was because 11many businessmen realized that we were worki ng 
our way t oward a better •balance', and that if they maintained steady nerves 
through a short but perilous phase the fundamental strength of the economy 
woul d turn us again upward 11 that we emerged from the 1949 recession relative 
ly unscathed . Villard finds it hard to conclude that businessmen's improved 
knowl edge of what constitutes balance had much to do with the mildness of th 
39 Strayer, op . cit ., pp . 148-49. 
40 See New York Times , December 30, 1949, 3:4 and ~>fay 26, 1950, 22:6 
(Letters to the ""Miter , aCoillir,unication from l:!.award Ames, Economics Departm3 ~ ' 
Amherst), and Bronfenbrenner, ~· cit ., pp . 376-77. 
41. Alfred Sherrard, "The Economics of the Mirror, 11 New Republic, May 
23, 1949 , pp . 13-16. 
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recession, or t hat its mildness was a cause for much optimism. The Council 
has said that the recovery only proved the fundamental strength of the Ameri- ~ 
can economy. Villard classified the dip as an inventory cycle and commented . 
that Congress 1 failure to heed the President 1 s econOJnic advice probably had 
much more to do ~~th its ·mildness .43 
It may be said that business , on the whole , has failed to respond to 
the Council' s good cheer . Busines sman, by and l arge , through their trade 
j ournals and other publications , have indicated that they feel that they tbem l 
sel ves are the best judges of where they want t o go and how to get there. Th 
11 group 11 approach to the economy has not yet produced many results . Some ob-
j ect that any at t empt al ong these lines to defi ne acceptable codes of con-
I 
duct for government, labor, management , and agriculture resembles the old NRA I 
methods and will have the same results.~4 
I n defense of the Counc i l i t has been said, most prominentl y by Sey- ! . 
mour Harris ,45 that though the r eports have become successively more forth-
/ right, i n the light of the comments which preceeded the Employment Act they 
! 
'
' could har dly have been expected to produce much . Controls were generally not 
jto be used to obtain objectives , and, in fact, no policies unfavorabl e to the 
!continued good health of "free private enterprise , 11 nor any significant re-
liance on public spending, were to be countenanced by those who succeeded in 
transforming the original nrray Bill into the Employment Act of 1946 . 
Too L~uch Attention to Social Programs 
We are somewhat. concerned about the scope of the President 1 s 
report. , covering as it. does nearly every domestic policy other 
,\ 
I 
I 
i 
I 
43 Council of Economic Advisers, Fourth Annual Report (December , 
P• 9 and PP • 25-27. 
[ 
1941) , 
44 Fortune , ££· cit., p . 78 . 
45 Seymour Ii..arris, op. cit . , pp . 23, 99ff . See also 11 I s There a 
Middle Way?", The Nation , December 28, 1946, p . 744 . 
than questions of nati onal def ense . I n both reports the President 
has dealt with the 'development of human resources and productiv-
ity. 1 Vlbil e the l anguage used in the Empl oyment Act of 1946 is 
very broad, we conceive that its pri ncipal pur pose i q t o mai ntain 
ful l empl oyment in the United States and to avoi d the recurrent 
economic depressions whi ch have brought unemployment , hardship, 
and suffering to i ts people . Thi0 task is sufficientl y difficult , 
and we do not think that work under the Act shoul d be diverted 
from it by. the study of all the important and compl icated pro b-
l ems of social welfare, health, and education, nor should i t be 
diverted to matters which cannot have an extensive effect on the 
over-all economy •••• • 
• • • The report lists a multiplicity of good things to do; i t 
does not help us to decide to what extent, in an economy f ully 
employed , resources could or should be diverted from present 
uses t o these uses, nor what is the priority between them. In 
the 1930's social projects mi ght be endorsed al most reckles~ ly, 
on the theory that they were a net addition to output in an econ-
omy filled with idle r esources . But now, and in the full employ-
ment economy visual ized in the renort for the future, one project 
can be carried through only by fi6owding out another . Financial 
costs are once more rea l costs. 
These remarks by the Joint Committee ar c~ am ·1ly supported by other 
critics of the Council. Alvin Hansen , i n particnlar, has attacked the at-
tempts of the economic reports to "formulate desirable policy al l over the 
map. 11 L? This strategy iE" r apidl y causing them to lose a l l meaning and use-
ful purpose . Furthennore, these efforts can not be regarded as long-range 
programs sufficiently well developed to be integrated into an effective cycl 
policy. They are largely only proposals and suggestions . 48 
The inclus ion of such vast areas of discussion in the reports also 
tends to overlap the President's other ma jor messages on the budget and the 
State of the Union and to destroy the peculiar character which it was pl a i nl 
intended that the Economic Reports shou l d have , as distinct from other Pre-
sidential documents . Where the political and social aspects greatly outweig_ 
46 Joint Committee on the Econorn:i.c ReDort , 
Economic .R.erort of the President, p . 2, pp . 32- 33 . 
also Minority Views , op . cit. , p.7 . · 
Report on the January 
For similar comment s 
47 Bronfenbrenner, op . cit ., p . 375 f . n . , quotes from statements 
by Prof. Hansen in the :i:day,-"I94(1"[eview of Economic Statistics , p . 73. 
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the effects on the operation of the economic machi ne , the Joint Commi ttee ha 
fe l t that comment shol1l d be r eserved for the Stat e of the Union me ssage.49 
The Council' s i nclusion of soci e. l and welfare measures has had, in 
the opinion of many, fame very unfortunate effects . I n the first place, wi t 
the reports of such a nature , it was almost inevitable t hat the Joint Com-
mittee on the Economic Report woul d split violently in appraising them . The 
resul tant practice of producing both minority and majority reports has weak-
ened that body 's i nf l uence in Congress and with the public and given gr eat 
support to the f eeling that littl e would be gained and much lost if Counc il 
members were to appear on Capital Hill to answer· for their analyses . 
ly, such discussions did little to help the i mmediate problems of e conomic 
stabilization and may have done much harm t o the anti-inflation and ot her pr 
grams that were presented. The emphasis upon the total economic program of 
the government, and a corresponding neglect of monetary and fi scal policy, 
has been ineffective in promoting either specific stabilization proposals or 
in gui ding private groups towar d independent action likely to increase stab-
ility. Lastly, there has been a feeling that the Council was advocat ing c on 
110 
trols when the needs were not clear only because they wanted to progress wit 
social reforms regardles s of the relation between federal revenues and recei s . SO 
Another major effect of the Counc i l'::: emphasis on social programs ha 
been to awaken f ears t hat we were being urged toward a "planned economy." 
Prof . Ames of Amherst has pointed out in his Letter to the Editor of the New 
York Times that the annoyance has worked both ways. 11 By drawing up a long-
run plan for the country, the Council has anger ed the fo es of the planned 
economy; by simultaneously negl ecting to s how how the pl an i s to be achieved, 
it can only draw the anger of the friends of planning. 115l Seymour Harris 
O!JliC 
49 Bronfenbrenner , op . cit., p. 374 and Joint Committee on the 
Report, RetJort ~the January 1948 Report, 2£• cit .,, p . 2. 
SO Strayer , op . cit., pp . 147-150 and Loeb, op . ~., p. 706 . 
Econ- · 
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denies that the reports in any way can be regarded as b l ueprints for a plan-
ned economy . The reports may ttpropose numerous short-run measures and long-
run policies , but these do not differ substantially from the proposals that 
might have been expected from a relatively planl ess society i n the '30 1s . n52 
Edwin Nourse has defended the Council against those who charge that 
its emphases on welfare aspects are only ttsuperficial salves and local fomen 
tat i ons ." In di scussing the relative merits of the Council's approach as op 
posed to those who advocate federal fiscal policy and stabilization of the 
monetar y unit : as the roads to a desirable equilibrium, he says t hat he him-
self believes that both means of att c..ck are necessary and complimentary, but 
that he feels the Council approach is the primary one. His basic objection 
to the rilurr ay Bill was that it placed exclusive reliance on one stabilizatio 
53 
means. Mr . Keyserljng asserts that the economy's strength is based upon 
the parts of t he program- -such as farm price supports, social security, i m-
proved banking and financjal practices, a sounder wage structure and "tetter 
pric ing and inventory policies on the part of business--which we have alread 
adopted, and that any weakness in our system results from tbose portions whi 
we have thusfar failed to adopt. In the words of the Fourth Annual Report: 
••• A still better understanding between business and govern-
ment woul d result if the excessive separation were l es8ened be-
tween ' economic ' and ' social ' programs--between a government in-
terest in encm1raging the growth of the economic system and a 
govermnent i nterested in 'welfare . 1 5h 
Too Political 
Under the above heading have been placed the cb.arge that the Council 
has become increasi ngly involved in purely pol iti cal issues and appears as a 
52 Seymour Harris, op . ~., pp . 99-101 . 
53 Leland and Nourse, 2£• cit ., p . 184. 
what he calls the other Councir members ' desire 
particul ar pet r·eforms. 
Nourse does , however, deplo e 
to 11 carry a tor'ch 11 f o~ their 
54 Council of Economic Advisers , Fourth Annual Report , op. cit. , p . 21. 
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mere adjunct of the lihite House, a discussion of the Council's wiseness in 
attempting to influence the public through its highly visible reports and 
public appearances, and an examination of the Council 's role with regard to 
concern for specific legislative proposals. 
The dissatisfactions expressed by Nourse , and discussed in Chapter 
III i n the section on conflicting interpretations of the Council's role, nav 
been echoed by the Joint Committee : 
We see no reason why the report should not be confined to 
economic discussion without entering into contro~ersial political 
fields, or why it should not state the arguments on both sid55 
where economic issues are inextricably involved in politics. 
I t will be remembed that Nourse accused other Council members of a dvocating 
the expression of only one view, arr ived at by majority rule , and subsequent 
ly 11 sold 11 to the President. That the President apparently relied heavily on 
the Cour1cil 1 s advice in matters of economic policy has been generally con-
c eded. However, Nourse points out that the President frequently placed the 
Council i n a bad light by advocating stronger measures than the Council' s 
analyses warranted or undul y amplifying asDects of the Reviews which were 
mere hints or passing observations. Illustration of such instances is pr9-
v i ded by the President's scooping of his own mid-year report in 1948 by pre-
senting, a few days before its publication, in a speech at the Democratic 
National Convention, a strong eight point program to combat inflation. His 
continued pressure for this prograll,even after the January 1949 report, was , 
says Nourse , not justified by what the CoLmcil had written . In the Fall of 
1949 Nourse also felt that President Truman put to improper use the material 
lq,id before him in the Council's memorandum on proposed budget ceilings, 
using this report, with the minority views appended to it by Dr. Nourse , as 
the base for an extended speech denouncing "special interests 11 wh:idl have trie 
I 
I 
SS Joint Conunittee on the Economic Re:nort, ivlinority Views , op. cit. , I 
p. 7. 
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to t urn the term deficit spending 
The basic difficulty with the Council, according to Prof. Ames,S7 is 
not that it should be purified to become thoroughly 11 independent 11 and 11non-
political,11 but that it has become a public relations officer rather than an 
adviser on policy formation. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
Council's Annual Reports (See Chapter IV), which have become more or l ess 
treatises on economic philosophy in journalistic form, full of "seasonal 
good cheer and good humor" and offering "a little something for everybody.n58l 
It was the original intent that the Annual Reports should be an administra-
t ive report, similar to those made by most operating agencies , incl uding a 
review of the Council's progress over the preceding year and plans for work 
to be undertaken in the future , according to Senator Flanders of the Joint 
Committee . It was not to be a preview of materials to be i ncluded in the 
President's Report. The form of the first report, and even more of subsequen 
efforts , came as a surprise .59 The Counc j l frankly admits that its Annual 
Reports are aiDied at the general public. It concluded its Fifth Annual Re-
port with the words: 
To gain public support for stern policies requires that 
the public underst~nd the reason why. Towar d this end, this 
report is ViTitten . bO 
Roy Bl<;mgh has posed the problem in this manner. The· con"lict in-
56 Edwin G. Nourse, 111i1Jhy I Had to Step Aside, 11 op . cit., pp . 53.,56. 
See also Ral ph E. Flanders, "Administering the Employment Act--the First 
Year," Public Administration Review, Autumn, 1947, p . 223, New York Times , 
November 2, 1949, 23:2. --- ----
57 New York Times, i&y 26, 1950, 22:6. 
5B Bronfenbrenner, op. cit., p . 375 and 11 Is There a 1iiddl e Way?", 
The Nation, op •. cit., p. 74D. 
59 Flanders , op . cit., p. 221 and "Time Bomb," New Republic, Decem-
ber 23 , 19~.6, p . 848.--
60 Fifth Annual Report, op . cjt ., p . 31 and Third Annual Report, op . 
cit., P• 4. 
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valves a determj nat i on of whether the Council shall be independent and highl 
visible or whether it shall be purely advisory and hidden from view. I n the 
1 1 first ca se the Council would publish its reports SBparat ely, a s it is now 
do j ng , and encour age distr i "Lution of the material t o all interested persons . 
In this man.ner it could have an i r.1pact of its ovm on the course of events , 
if the public and Congres s came to look to it for information and guidance . 
It would, however, by the same token, run the risk of losing its influence 
through rifts wi th the Chief Executive and 1Nith Congress , who might find it 
expedient t0 silence t he body by cutting off appropriations . In the second 
instance, the Council may be visualized as a purely behind the scenes agency 
having close rel ations only with the President . The charge of 11 politi cst: 
woul d be as apt to arise in t his case as in the first, and the Council waQl d 
lo se its valuable publicity funct ions.6l 
The President obviously needs a Council with both high prestige and 
a l arge amount of independence and freedom of statement . It i s quite possib e 
that the goal of service to the Pres ident might conflict at times with the 
independence of the agency . Bl ough f avors a Council ·which v'li_ll be as inde-
pendent in this situation as possibl e . Still, the question remains , as pose 
by Dr . Nourse , as t o whet her t bis agency can afford the time to engage in 
either public education or propaganda activity in the legislat ive area.62 
This brings us to the question of whether Counci l reports shoul d 
present precise and specific recommendations , and whether Council members 
shoul d all ovY ther!lselves to be drawn into discussion on particular l egisla-
t i ve .measures . The Hoover Re~ort on t he administrative r eorgani zation of 
government was definite in recommending that the Council not involve i tself 
6l Roy Blough , 11 Political and Administrative Requisites for Achiev-
ing :Economic Stability," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings , 
1ffiy, 1950, pp . 175~177 . 
ll4 
62 Lel and and Nourse, ££· cit ., p . 187 and Gross and Nourse , 11 '1'he Ro1 e 
of the Cocmcil of Economic Advlsers;rr American Political Science Review, Apri l, 
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in -=el:tl~e; the formulation 0;-=~ordin~-ti~~ of programs of specific act=oi=oo-n-c=.==-ll--o=----===-o= 
In this matter Prof . Leland also expressed himself as in complete agreement 
with Dr . Nourse . The Hoover Report had said! 
Just as the Budget is the res :-·onsibility of the President 
and not the Office of the Budget , the annual economic report 
is the responsi bility of the President , not the Council . Like 
the Office of the Budget, the Council shoul d advise the Pres-
ident as a professional staff agency, and shoul d6not take public leadershi p on isEues of policy i n its ovm right . 3 
Even recommendations involving the use of quantitative estimates are frowned 
upon by Prof . Villard . He points to the 1949 recommendation of a tax in-
crease of at l east four billi on dollars as being t oo precise and too po l itic 1 . 
The use of such detail in its Reviews , he says , pl aces the Council far too 
deeply in day to day party politics . 64 
I n the foll owing section we wil l examine two legislative measures in 
traduced in Congress in 1949 to implement t he purposes of the Employment Act 
These are the Economic Expansion Act of 1949 and the so- called Spence Bil l . 
In both cases , certain Council mernbers wer e sharpl y cr i t i cized f or i dentify-
ing themselves , and by Lmplication the Council, both in their preparation an 
in advocating them before Congress and in public utterances, wi th the measur s . 
The New York Times published a sharp edi tori a l against the Council, and lf~~ 
Keyserling in parti cular, for appearing to l end support to the Economic Ex-
pans i on Act . Chairman Nours~was particularly bitter about the support given 
11 unofficially and somewhat surreptitiousl y, 11 by "certain members of the 
Council and its staff 11 to the Spence bill . 65 
63Ibi d., p . 179 . The Hoover Report i s quoted by Edward H. Col~ins, 
11 Economic Cotmcil at the Cro ssroads , 11 New York Times , October 31 , 1949, 31: 4 
Roy Blough, in d±scussing the shortcomngs--or-government machinery in re spec~ 
to allovdng f or an integrati on of policy pointed to this same i nabili ty of t~e 
Director of the Bur eau of the Budget t o wi eld infl uence in his own right in 
a c onflict between the executive and l egi slative branches as a weakness . 
(Bl ough, ££• cit . ,p . 168.) 
64 Vi llar d, ££• c i t ., p . 603 . 
65 New York Times , October 19, 1949, 28:3 and Nourse , 11"1JI'hy I Had to 
Step Asi de ,rr;-op . cit ., p . 53 . Senator Byrd, however, may be counted as 
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The 8l st Congress , lst Session, saw the introduction of both the 
Economic Expans i on Act and the Sp ence Bill into the House of Representat i ves 
These bi lls were des igned t o, i n the words of H.R. 2756, 11 impl ement the es-
tabl ished national policy of pr omoting maximum empl oyment , producti on, and 
purchasing power . n66 To some observers t he bills , e spec ially the Economi c 
Expansion Act , were attempts t o bri ng back the obj ec t i onabl e f eatures of the 
ol d Murray Bill. 67 Both had uni forml y dismal legis l at i ve hist or ies . Re-
ferred to the banking and Currency Committee of t he House they never were re 
ported out of Commi ttee, nor were hearings hel d . They wer e not re- intro-
duced in the following session . Nourse suggested that they were intended 
prlinaril y as Admini stration trial balloons , to be abandoned when that seemed 
expedient . 68 
There foll ows a brief outline of each measure , in order that the 
reader may see what type of proposals have been advocated to strengthen the 
Council's hand and define its task more c l early . 
66 H. R. 2756, 8l st Congress , l st Session, Statement of Pol icy. 
67 New York Times , July 19 , 1949, 28:2 and Joint Committee on the 
Economic Re·,)ort, Mi nority Views, op . ci..!:_., p . 7. 
68 Nourse , 111f uy l Had to Step .Aside , 11 op . c i t ., p . 53. 
-- ~-.;.:-_ 
- -- ===-==-=="-·====--(1) This bill woul d have established a National Economic Cooperatio 
Board, appointed by the Presi dent from representatives of i ndustry, l abor, 
agricul ture , consumers, state and local governments, and regional development 
organizations , to meet and consul t wi th the President at his request and to I 
meet regularly wit h the Council of Economic Advi sers and make recorrnnendation • 
( 2) The Board , working i n connect i on with the Council, was to be th 
machinery f or "vo luntary cooperation, to promote better nation-wide understa d-
ing and better vol untary ap pl ication of general price, wage, and profit poli 
cies . 11 Together , they were to analyze and review facts reported by the Pres-
i dent on how levels of production, employment,and purcha sing power were affe - -
ing the economy and t o arrange annual conferences . 
(3) The Bill provided t hat studies be undertaken to determine level 
I The gove of investment and production required and federal policies needed. 
ment was t o make provision to advance t echnical and r esearch as sistance to 
l ocal development organi zations and enterprises for this purpose, and the 
Federal Trade Commission was to make a continuing study of monopoly. Sp ecia I 
I 
government aids, such as procurement services, rehabilitat ion of war pl ants , 
and government pl ant cons tructi on and lease were to be advanced for the de~ 
velopment of crU.cial economic areas (i. e . steel). 
(L.) Long-range advance planning and regularization of public works 
and resource development was to be undertaken, providing a fifteen billion 
dollar s helf of projects . Ten year advance construction pl ans wer e to be re 
quired of every federal agency, as well as semi-annual i nventories by the I 
Fede!'a l Vlorks Agency of needed l evels , machi nery and financial r esources a-
vailabl e , and the need for acceleration. 
(5) All resources of the government were to be focused in any area f 
the nation where unemployment had r eached serious proportions. One of the 
mea ns of accomplishing t his was to be through R. F. C. loans, including loans 
to workers who might be required t o move to find new employment . 69 
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nA Plan to Maintain Prosperity," New Republic, July 11, 19L~9, pp . 12-llt . 
H. R. 2756, to be known as the Economic Stability Act of 1949, In-
troduced by ~~ . Spence, February 15, 1949. 
(1) The bill provi ded for the promotion of maxi m1w production and 
supply by making i t the responsibility of the Pres i dent to submit quarterly 
report s to the Joint Corrilldttee designat~ng critical material shortages and 
needed goals. A graduated system of aid to encourage production was provide . , 
measures to be selected in accordance with the urgency and circu1nstances of 
the particular situation, includi ng research and development grants, procure-
ment services, loans for capacity expansion, and government construction for 
capacity expansion . Smai l business was to be given every preference in the 
awarding of government contracts. 
( 2) Measures to improve the distributi on of essential material and 
facilities , as the needs were reported by the President, were to include 
voluntary priority and allocation pl ans and, as a l ast resort, mandatory 
prioriti es and allocations . The act specifically ex~'Ilpted rationing at the 
retail level from these provisions. 
(3) Attempts to discourage and prevent price movements which inflic 
ser ious hardships or impede economic stability, as reported to the Joint Com 
mittee by the President , were to include the requirement t hat designated pro \ 
ducts must post notice with the gover nment of intended price increases , tha t 
under certain conditions the government might establi sh maximum prices to be 
char ged, that a gricul tural prices were to be established in accord with pre-
vi ously worked out parity concepts , and that there be created a Temporary 
Wage Board to pass on certain wage increase requests .7° I 
I I t can be seen that the Economic Expansion Act sought to give greate 
1 weight to the Council's consultative work with other private and public 
cit. , 
70 H. R. 2756, 
P• 53. 
op. cit . , ~nd Nourse, 11Why I Had to Step Aside, 11 op . 
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agencies by formalizing and institutionalizing the meetings and duties of 
these groups , and mjght have led, as the Council had hoped in its Third and 
Fourth Annual ReDorts71 to the establishment of some c oncrete standards by 
I 
which to judge price-wage-profit r elationships . The Expansion Act also broug t 
back the i dea embodied in the Full Employment Act of 1945 that the I' government ! 
should establish the amount of investment needed to produce full empl oyment 
and make pl ans for government projects to make up for expected deficiencies . 
The Spence Bill was an enabling act , giving the President power to 
invoke product i on and supply priorities and allocations, institute price con-
trol and decontrol, and promote the adjustment of wages , salaries , aDd other 
benefits through collective bargaining upon his finding that certain cri tical 
economi c materials or areas were out of line wi th requirements or the needs o i 
economic stability . With such a wide range of contr~l measures at hi s fingeJ 
t i ps , the Council, upon whose a.dvice the Presi dent would rely in submi tting 
his findings , woul d be assured that action caul - be taken vrithout l ong legis-
lative del ays . The Spence bill also provided for a system of hearings and ap-, 
peals for those who felt that regulations imposed under it were not j ustified 
One modification of Council structure has been repeatedl y reconmend-
ed by economists and other s . This i s that the agency have a single head in-
stead of the pr esent t hree man board . 72 The advantage originally claimed fo 
a multi-headed agency~that advice would be better balanced if em~nating fro II 
a t hree man group- 23 i s regarded ty-"sooe as outweighed by the di sadvantage of 
having Counci l members at odds with one anot her, to the detriment of their 
prestige both wi th Congres s and with the public. The Hoover Commiss ion Re-
port early requested that the change be made . 
71Third Annual ~ort, op . cit. ·~ I?P • 20- 26 and Fourth Annual Report, 
op . cit ., p . 28. 
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72 Strayer , op . cit ., pp . 148, 152 and Bl ough, o~ . cit ., p . 175. 
73 Gross and Nourse ; op . cit ., p . 289 . 
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The Council has properly proceeded with considerable 
caution in develo~ing its role . No one can j udge its strength 
or Yveakness at this early stage of its existence . But i t seems 
clear that , at least potentiall y, it is handicapped by being a 
multi-headed body with the requirement that i ts members be con-
firmed by the Sena~ tEffi-phasls the author' s:) -- ---
To put a f ull-ti me board at the head of a staff agency is 
to run the risk of inviting public disagreement among its mem-
bers and of transplanting with the President 1 s office the dis -
agreements on policy that grow up in the executive depar t ments 
or in Congress . I t also :makes cooperation with rel ated state 
agencies more difficult . 
The Commission recommends that the Council of Economic Ad-
vi sers be replaced by ap Office of Economic Advisers and that 
it have a sing l e head.74 
Both Strayer and b lough make the observation that our form of govern l 
ment is not well adapted to ~ive full effectiveness to an agency like the 
Council. Strayer advocates an approach to the Cabinet form of government 
and points out the need for greater party discipl inQJ5 He has five other 
recomn~endations to make, as f ollows: 
(1) That the Employment Act be amended to establish a single headed 
stabilization staff to the Presi dent . 
(2) That the annual economic report of the President be restricted 
in scope to focus on the i mmediate issues of stabilizat ion--past record and 
current status--(i . e. no predictions , social reform, or references to inter-
national affairs should be contained therein unless directly pertinent ). 
(3) That the President submi t to Congress plans suggesting the re-
vision and extension of government powers necessary to meet changing econ-
omic conditions rapidly in the f uture . 
(4) That the Council concentrate on stabilization plans using exist 
ing money, credit, and tax po,rers of government and requesting extensions 
of government powers only when needed. 
74 Quoted by Collins in the New York ~' October 31, 1949 , 31:4 . 
75 Strayer , op . cit., p . 148 and Blough, op . cit . , PP • 166-170. 
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(.5) Finally, he would take care of the long-range institutional as-
pects of stabilization policy by asking that t here be created a National Eco -
omic Commission, not i n the Council of Economic Advisers, to direct i~nediat I 
attention t o i nstitutional reforms necessary to strengthen the market system 
and that this body be composed of a Council member, representatives from the 
Cabinet , and member s of Congress and t he general public . 76 
Only as • • • an agreement on institutional goals is worked 
out can adequate s t abilization devices be suggested. • • • The 
reason why the Employment Act of 1946 was written in such vague 
language is that this issue could not be resolved . Va~e action 
or no action will continue until a decision is reached.77 
7.5 (Cont .) Blough lists two ma jor politicEl and administrative re-
quisites for success : (1) flexibility of government action, and (2) i nte-
gration of government policy. The first of these i s handicapped by the s low 
ness of action by Congress and · its _· unwillingness to del egate powers, the 
irreversibility of some types of government action, and administrative de-
l ays . The second encom1ters the hurdl es of private group interests , the com 
plex mechanics of integration, government machinery not well adapted to that 
end, and t he fac t that stabilization i s only one government objective among 
many. He a l so lists confidence in economjsts and economics and a greater 
economic sophistocation on the part of Cone;ress and public as requisites. 
76 Strayer, op . cit . , pp . 1.52-53. (Emphasis t he author 1 s . ) 
77 I bid . , p . 153 . 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The Council of Economic Advisers has alreaqyproved its worth. I ts 
reports have served as focal points around which much valuable public dis-
cussion and criticism have crystallized. l In its favor has been the quality 
of the basic statistics and research underlying its analyses and the fact tha· 
the factual informati on contained in the reports has been n1uch more current 
than we have been accustomed to receive i n other govern~ent documents . 2 To 
r ead t he Council's Reviews is to be impress ed with the scope and general in-
tegri ty of the work . MUch of t he publi c criticism of t he Council appears to 
have come from those who have relied primarily on the President's Economic 
Reports and the Council's Annual Reports for their knowledge of its work . 
The Council is i n a unique and dif'ficult position . Its members are 
not only t heorists, but economists in . the public s ervice . As C. Hartley 
Grattan expressed it : 11The Council's pr oblem is to find a defensible ground 
between the ivory tower and the political market place . 11 3 This makes the 
job of pl anning to achieve the goal of maximum employment, production, and 
purchasi ng power much more difficult than is generally recognized by profes-
sionals and ot erswho 11 choose to ignore the political and administrative as-
l Alvin H. Hansen, Bus i ness Cycl es and National Income (New York: 
W. -· Norton & Co . , 1951) , p . 593. 
2 Ral ph E. Flanders, 11 Administering the Employment Act-The First 
Year,n Public Administration Review·, Autumn, 19!,.7, p . 223 and Paul J . Strayer 
11 The Council of &ononuc Advisers: Political Economy on Trial, 11 American 
Economic Revi ew, Papers and Proceedings , May, 1950, p . 160 . 
3 C. Hartley Grattan, 11 Truman 1s Three Wise Men, 11 Harpe r s , June, 1949, 
I n ~F\ 
pects of the problem. 114 In the first place, it means that the Council is con 
tinually open to the charge of acting beyond its rightful province and of 
muddying its analyses by including political and other considerations in its 
thinki ng . I n the second pl ace , the Council must constantly be making choices 
between the ideal and the practical in ma.king its recommendations . I t must 
weigh the merits of attaining limited success if its advice meets vri th favor 
or no success at all if it proposes measures which are beyond the understand-
ing or economic maturity of t hose who might be the beneficiaries . Thirdly, 
the Council needs the active cooperation of the President i n allowing it as 
independent an existence as it needs to produce honest analyses . Failing to 
meet with this, or encountering a hostile Congress , the Council is ir1 danger 
of being cut off from the necessary funds to carry em; or, even more import-
ant , from the possibility of calml y working out its programs with thot=:e who 
are i n a position to implement them by action . 
To meet the first difficulty, it is true that the primary emphasis 
must be on ·economi.cs, not politics . However , economic study and analysis 
never in themselves dictate the 
The purity of economic analysis 
desirability or undesirability of any policy / 
may be l argely maintained durine: the process j 
of gauging the effects of alternative policies tmder e:A}Jected conditions, 
but social and other considerations can hardly be ignored when the next step 
of weighing competing group i nterests--whether tbey be regional, income , in-
dustrial, or occupational--and dete:rrn:inil'lg,. through choice and compromise, the 
pattern of objectives to be promoted, is undertaken. Furthermore , although 
there is much need for basic economic research, an even more urgent need is 
f or increasing the effectiveness of government stabilization devices. The 
political economist must be willing to give equal consideration to the ad-
ministrative and political aspects of his methods of control--especially the r 
long-run effects , difficulty of operation, and flexibility, although realiz-
4 Strayer, op . cit., p. 145. 
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ing that the character of the economic situation i s the basic determinant . 5 
This writer finds herself in basic sympathy with the Council's position in th · s 
matter, quoted below: 
(The CouncH, in its attempts to be objective ) ••• would be 
subjective indeed if (it ) failed to recognize that the Employ-
ment Act is an endeavor in political science no l ess than in 
economics ; that the whole range of questions touching why econ-
omic man acts as he does f alls necessarily within the scope of 
(its ) study; and that the raw materials which (it has ) to pro-
cess and synthesize in formulati ng "national economic policies " 
must pay attentign to all three of these words and not only the 
word 11 economic 11 • 
If the Act imposed upon the Council a responsibility to give as sane I 
and balanced guidance in its work as i s humanly possibl e , i t also implied ! 
that our nati on was prepared to meet the facts and decisions which might con- I 
front it as a resul t of these efforts. This presupposed a greater degree of j 
economic sophistocation in and out of Congress than, in fact , prevails . A j 
ma.jor difficulty has been lack of real public interest , or even of' active 
public res istance . The Council has been eager to turn out reports which will 
be of interest to laymen as well as of f ic ial s and administrators . If it is 
t.o recomn,end what others might well do, it can be ·useful only insofar as its 
findin~meet with public acceptance and informed intelligence on the part of 
all economic classes .7 I t , i n turn, must feel the impress of publi c aspira-
tions and sentiment i n maki ng i ts s tudies . The possibility of leadership in 
bringing the Council' s activities to the attention of the public lies i n the 
hands of the educated and progressive elements in American politics . These 
elements have the douule duty of both prodding and cri t icizing the Council 
5 Roy Blough, "Political and Administrative Requisites for Achi eving 
Economic Stabilitf, 11 American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedi ngs , [ay, 
1950, pp . 165, 174 and Strayer, op . Clt ., pp . 144-45 . . 
6 Council of Economic Advisers , Third Annual Report (December , 1948), 
p . 28 . 
7 Council of Economic Advisers , Fifth Annual Report (December , 1950), 
p . 1 and Senator James E. Murray, "A Plai1""t()!Jlalnt aln Prosperity, 11 New Re-
publ ic , JulJt ... 11 , 1949> p . lli • -- --
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for its weaknesses and spreading lmowledge of its works in simple terms to 
those who woul d not ordinarily find the time to study the volmninous Reports 
of the President and Reviews of the Council . S 
Paul J. Strayer c hi des the Council both for failing to adequately 
strengthen its kit of policy: tools and for n eglecting to bring the public int~ 
more understanding and ac ceptance of them than it has done . 9 Thes e two sug- I 
gesti ons , coupled together as they are , point up what seems to this wr iter to 
be one of the basic p i t f a lls of Counci l strategy. It has engaged in the 
popul ari zati on of economics--particularl y and to the most annoying degree in 
its .Annual Reports--but its efforts in trying to 11dramatize nl0 the American 
economy have added neither to the clarity of economic tmderstanding nor the 
strength of stabilization measures . Rather, they have dravm the fire of the 
greater part of the public press , whil e leading the Council into such a belie 
in the efficacy of exhortations to business and glad tidings of our economic I 
potential that a disproportionate amount of em:1Jhasis has been placed on these 
programs rather than on f acing the realities of the moment and making them 
lmown . The Council should not ,allow itself to be -distr<:Lcted by efforts to 
sel l itself through popular appeal rather than through sotmd and seri ous 
anal ysis . 
The Council is bound to draw criticism whether it remains aloof or 
highly visible . The Naticr.a l Resources Planning Board ·met vrit h defeat in 
spite of its cloistered nature , or , Bailey suggests , perhaps even because of 
8.of interest in this connection i s the renort from hrr . Grattan that 
the Council i s findi ng its greatest difficulty, in- consultation with private 
agenci e s and individuals , in talking with many of the ol der economists, in-
cluding many from busj_ness and journalism. They nsimply ·will not, or cannot, 
accept itsup to date t erms of discourse , even as a basis for the interchange 
of ideas • 11 I n t his respect , managing businessmen have proved to be more :iri 
tune with the terms of t he new ·world of macro-economic thought . Bus i nessmen 
are changing many of their attitudes through assuming a greater responsibilit 
in puLlic affairs. This may be one of the valuable services which the Counci 
can· perform through its regular c onsultation::< with private groups . ( Grat t an, 
~· cit ., and Council of l!:conomic Advisers , Fourth Annua l Report (December , 
·.L 9L~9;;-:.o . 27 .) 
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7 Strayer , O j_) . cit ., p . r;,r. lG Fourth Annual Report , O}' • c i -v *, p. Jli . 
•t 11 l • Prof. Leland poi nts out that "only the President can protect the 
Co·,mc i l i n its impartial exercise of its duti es • 11 The Council vrill inevi tab-
ly be cast in an unpopul ar ro l e . For one thing, its advice must always be 
counter cyclical. Further, unless the Council calls attention to the dis-
tortion of economic forces by ~-: olitical action it is of l i ttl e use, ev en to 
the govern~ent . Suc h forthri ghtness , however, is destined to bring reper-
cussions and t he possibility that t he political position of the Council 1n.ay 
be weakened and its appropriat i ons cut off . 1 2 
iviuch depends on how independent a Counci l the President wants , and 
how f ar he is prepared to go i n defending its integrity, even at the risk of 
damage to hi s ovm posit i on . I t will take time f or President s to learn how 
to use this agency most effectivel y •13 A .. Dd it wi ll take a strong President 
to give the Counci l the support i t needs while still al lowing it an i n-
dependent existence . Otherwise , the Counci l wil l become , at bottom, only an 
instrument for rationalizing the F-.ces i dent 1 s polic i es .14 
The writer takes i ssue with Chai rman Nourse ' s parting shot: 11 The 
real difficul ty • •• ( is ) that in this admLTJ.istr ation the actual positi on of 
the Council has undergone s uch progressive • • • deba.sement that i t bids fair 
to b e negl igi bl e . 1115 The points of criticism rajsed by Dr . Nourf'e are seriou 
onesand shoul d be anal yzed seriousl y . However , there exi st on both sides 
sincere a nd valid arguments whi ch do not l eave t he i ssue as c l earl y b l ack a nd 
white as Dr . Nourse has paint ed it . He expressed a fear both of embarrassing 
11 Stephen Kem:12 Bail ey, Congress flakes a Law (New York : Co l umbi a 
Univer sity Press, 1950 ), p . 28 . --
1 2 Lel and and Nourse, ns tabil izi ng the Economy : A Di s cus sion , " Ameri 
~Economic hevi ew, Papers and Pr oc eedings , May, 1950, pp . 1 79-80 . 
l3 Edwin G. Nourse , 11Why I Had t o Step Aside , 11 Collier 1s , Feb r uar y 18 
1950, p . 56 . 
14 New York Times, October 20, l 9LL9, 28:5 . 
15 Leland and Nourse, ou . cit • • n 190 
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his Chief Executive by supporting conclusions different from the President 's 
and a fear of agreeing too consistently wi th him. I t seems also that the 
fault was not so much that other Cmmcil members testified in Congress , but 
that t Leir advice in the instances cited was perhaps not the best for the 
circumstances . l6 
Chairman Nourse 1 s most telling critic ism was of the Council's "arm's 
length" relation to the President . He envisioned a Council which could 
sit dOYfn in quiet contemplation vrith the Presi dent and cons i der the many-
sidedness of economic issues . If, however, no free discussion exi sts there 
no possibility of threshing out alternatives in conference, nor is it robab 
that the Presi dent will find the time to sift pros and cons for himself . I n 
such a situation, there may be snme merit to the view that the Council's adv · e 
b e clear-cut if at all possible . · 
It can be seen from the preceding chapter that the Council has en-
countered sharp citicism from all sides . It has been blamed both for includ 
ing and excluding certain concerns in its analyses . Perhaps the central 
roblem has been one of emphasis ) or lack of it. The criticism of those eco 
omists who have been in basic sympathy with the experiment bears atching . 
_ll_lvin Hansen 's feeling that by formulating desirable go2ls 11all over the map 1 1 
the Cotmcil has failed to plan for any real stabilization program through co 
16 Certain statements appeari ng in the Collier ' s article do not give 
the wri ter the i mpression that Dr ,. Nourse was as im:,artial and objective as r 
' i nsisted the Council sh01..l d be in preforming its functions . This is particu 
larly true of the statement proceeding: 
• • • As I pondered the meaning of the November election re-
turns and- noted -Ehe react2on o1· my reTl ow members , I became 
convi nced that my departure from the council ~cs only a mat-
ter of time--a very short time . (Emphasis mine . ) 
(Ibid., p . 56 . ) Ylliat meaning cold the election results have to an econo~is 
---- I whose advice must remain true and tmdevi ating whatever the political weather 
Dr . Nourse a lso indicates that he viewed some of the i deas of the other ad-
visers as a th...reat to 11fr ee com; :etitive enterprise 11 and as smacking of pl an-
ning and authoritarianism. In a sense , then, his disaffection came as much 
because he fo und his views in the mi nority as for any other reason . 
"-'=====If== == 17 AlvLn Hansen, op . cit., p . 542 . 
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crete measures to be put into action when the needs arise is, in this wr i ter Is 
vi evl, most pertinent . By attempting too much the Council has accomplished 
to litt l e . This failure has done much to turn those who would support the I 
eff orts of the Council away from it . Unless the country i s pr epar ed to have 
recourse to unorthodox measures it cannot hope to r emain l;rosperous.,l8 Un-
less the Cotmcil is prepared to formulate bol d programs and present them in 1 
a straightforward manner i t iTill not be fulfilling its func t ion. Albove all, l 
it needs t o remain f l exible and to narrow its efforts to those problem areas 
in the economy where acti on most needs to be taken immediately. 
Here we come to the crux of the Council's difficulty--the f act that 
no policy issues about the types of stabilization measures that were per-
missable and the goal s of economic pl anning were resolved by the Employment 
Act . Further, no subsequent legislative measures have resolved t hese issues • . 
In the absence of any accepted means or tools of analyses and stabilization 
or any agreement on institutional goals the Council has found itself wi t h no 
f r ame of reference against which to measure its policies . ~~ere the ends of 
national policy have not been made clear the Council has found itself in-
volved i n their formulation, with the consequent criticism that i t has gone 
beyond the proper scope of its duties . 
In the words of Lionel Robbins:l9 
• • • while i t is highly desirable that the economist who wi shes 
that the applications of his science should be f ruitful should 
be qualified in cognate disciplines , and should be prepared to 
invoke · their as sistance, it is also highly desirable that the 
distinction should be recognized between those generalizations 
which are economic in the sense in which the word has been used, 
and those generalizations of the "sociological penumbra" which 
do not have the same degree of probability. 
The Council has not always been careful ·Go specify the assumptions underlying 
its analyses and to caref ully delimit those which are primarily dependent on 
18 Seymour Harris, Economic Planning (New York: Alfred • Knopf , 19 ), 
p . 86. 
19 Robbins 
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economic science from those which contain large measures of nqn-economic 
considerations and j udgments of value . 
Because the difficulties inherent in its position, and magnified un-
duly by the unresol ved issues facing the Council, it may be seen to be de-
veloping like an ameba, along the paths of least resistance . It seems clear 
however , that the Employment Act did provide a framework for study and plan-
ning of great potential worth and with considerable scope in its task of 
surveying the nation ' s economic health and habits . 
p . 32. 
There is no royal road to economic stability by the 
r oute of informed judgment , to say nothing of the route of 
political vagaries . But there is a s low and painful road, 
through the process of bringing the best available thought 
and knowledge to bear upon the process, and through the 
willingness of those who exercise political and economic 
p:7NEr to be guided by such thought .20 
20 Council of Economic Advisers , Third Annual Report (December, 1948 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
THE FULL EMP:WYMENT BILL AS ORIGINALLY INTRODUCED 
79th Congress, 1st Session 
(S.380) 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
January 22, 1945 
Mr. Murray (for himself, Mr. Wagner, Mr. Thomas of Utah, Mr. O'Mahoney, 
Mr. Morse, Mr. Tobey, Mr. Aiken, and Mr. Langer) introduced the following 
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking and 
Currency 
A BILL 
To establish a national policy and program for assuring continuing full 
employment in a free competitive economy, through the concerted efforts 
of industry, agriculture, labor, State and local governments, and the 
Federal GOvernment. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, 
Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "Full Employment Act of 1945." 
Declaration of Policy 
Sec. 2 The Congress hereb,y declares that--
(a) It is the policy of the United states to foster free competitive 
enterprise and the investment of private capital in trade and commerce 
and in the development of the natural resources of the United States; 
(b) All Americans able to work and seeking rvork have the right to useful, 
remunerative, regular, and full-time employment, and it is the policy of 
the United States to assure the existence at all times of sufficient em-
ployment opportunities to enable all Americans who have finished their 
schooling and who do not have full-time housekeeping responsibilities free-
ly to exercise this right; . 
(c) In order to carry out the policies set forth in subsections· (a) and 
(b) of this section, and in order to (1) promote the general welfare of the 
Nation; (2) foster and protect the American home and the American family as 
the foundation of the American way of life; (3) raise the standard of liv-
ing of the American people; (4) provide adequate employment opportunities 
for returning veterans; (5) contribute to the full utilization of our 
natural resources; (6) develop trade and commerce among the several States 
and with foreign nations; (7) preserve and strengthen competitive private 
enterprise, particularly small business enterprise; (8) strengthen the 
national defense and security; and (9) contribute to the establishment and 
maintenance of lasting peace among nations, it is essential that continu-
ing full employment be maintained in the United states; 
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(d) In order to assist industry, agriculture, labor and State and local 
governments in achieving continuing full employment, it is the responsibil-
ity of the Federal Government to pursue such consistent and openly arrived 
at economic policies and programs as will stimulate and encourage the high- ~ 
est feasible levels of employment opportunities through private and other 
non-Federal investment and expenditure; · 
(e) To the extent that continuing full employment cannot otherwise be 
achieved, it is the further responsibility of the Federal Government to 
provide such volume of Federal investment and expenditure as may be needed 
to assure continuing full employment; and 
(f) Such investment and expenditure by the Federal Government shall be 
designed to contribute to the national wealth and well-being, and to stimu-
late increased employment opportunities by private enterprise. 
The National Production and Employment Budget 
Sec. 3. (a) The President shall transmit to Congress at the beginning of 
each regular session the National Production and Employment Budget (herein-
after referred to as the "National Budget"), which shall set forth in sum-
mary and detail, for the ensuing fiscal year or such longer period as the 
President may deem appropriate--
(1) the estimated size of the labor force, including the self-employed in 
industry and agriculture; 
(2) ~he estimated aggregate volume of investment and expenditure by pri-
vate enterprises, consumers, State and local governments, and the Federal 
Government, required to produce such volume of the gross national product, 
at the expected level of prices, as will be necessary to provide employment , 
opportunities for such labor force (such dollar volume being hereinafter 1· 
referred to as the "full employment volume of production"); and 
(3.) ) t he estimated aggregate volume of prospective investment and expendi-
ture by private enterprises, consumers, State and local governments, and the 
Federal Government {not taking into account any increased or decreased in-
vestment or expenditure which might be expected to result from the programs 
set forth in such Budget). The estimates and information herein called for 
shall take account of such foreign investments and expenditure for exports 
and imports as affect the volume of the gross national product. 
(b) The extent, if any, by whiCh the estimated aggregate volume of pro-
spective investment and expenditure for any fiscal year or other period, as 
set forth in the National Budget in accordance with paragraph (a) (3) of 
this section, is less than the estimated aggregate volume of investment and 
expenditure required to assure a full employment volume of production, as 
set forth in the National Budget in accordance with paragraph (a) (2) of 
this section, shall for the purposes of this title be regarded as a pro-
spective deficiency in the National Budget..,. .;When~ there is a prospective 
deficiency in the National Budget for any fiscal year or other peri od, the 
President shall set forth in such Budget a general program for encouraging 
such increased non-Federal investment and expenditure, particularly in-
vestment and expenditure which will promote increased employment oppor-
t unities by private enterprise, as will prevent such deficiency to the great-
est possible extent. The President shall also include in such Budget such 
recommendations for legislation relating to such program as he may deem 
necessary or desirable. Such program may include, but need not be limited 
1 to, current and projected Federal policies and activities with reference to 
banking and currency, monopoly and competition, wages and working condi-
tions, foreign trade and investment, agriculture, taxation, social security, 
t he development of natural resources, and such other matters as may directlJ 
133 
or indirectly affect the levelof non-Federal investment and expenditure. 
(c) To the extent, if any, that such increased non-Federal investment 
and expenditure as may be expected to result from actions taken under the 
program set forth in accordance with subsection (b) of this section are 
deemed insufficient to provide a full employment volume of production, the 
President shall transmit a general program for such Federal investment and 
expenditure as will be sufficient to bring the aggregat~ volume of invest-
ment and expenditure by private business, consumers, State and local govern 
ment, and the Federal Government, up to the level required to assure a full 
employment volume of production. Such program shall be designed to contri-
bute to the national wealth and well-being, and to stimulate additional 
non-Federal investment and expenditure. Any of such programs calling for 
the construction of public works by the Federal Government shall provide 
for the performance of the necessary construction work by private concerns 
under contracts awar ded in accordance with applicable laws, except where 
the performance of such work by some other method is necessary by reason of 
special circumstances or is authorized by other provisions of law. 
(d) If the estimated aggregate volume of prospective investment and ex-
penditure for any fiscal year or other peaod, as set forth in the National 
Budget in accordance with paragraph (a) (3) of this section, is more than 
the estimated aggregate volume of investment and expenditure required to as· 
sure a full employment volume of production, as set forth in the National 
Budget in accordance with paragraph (a) (2) of this section, the President 
shall set forth in such Budget a general program for preventing inflation-
ary economic dislocations, or diminishing the aggregate volume of invest-
ment and expenditure to the level required to assure a full employment vol-
ume of production, or both. · 
(e) The programs referred . to in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this 
section shall include such measures as may be necessary to assure that 
monopolistic practices with respect to prices, production, or distribution, 
or other monopolistic practices, will not interfere with the achievement of 
the purposes of this Act. 
(f) The National Budget shall include a report on the distribution of the 
national income during the preceding fiscal year, or such longer period as 
the President may deem appropriate, together with an evaluation ·of the ef-
fect upon the distribution of the national income of the progr~ set forth 
in such Budget. 
(g) The President may from time to time transmit to Congress such sup-
plemental or revised estimates, information, programs, or legislative re-
commendations as he may deem necessary or desirable in connection with the 
National Budget. 
Prep~tiDn of National Budget 
S ~e : c. 4 (a) The National Budget shall be prepared in the Executive OfficE 
of the President under the general direction and supervision of the Presi-
dent, and in consultation with the members of his Cabinet and other heads 
of departments and establishments. 
(16) ·The President shall transmit to the several departments and establish 
ments such preliminary estimates and other information as will enable them 
to IJrepare such plans and programs as may be needed during the ensuing or 
subsequent fiscal years to help achieve a full employment volume of pro-
duction. (c) The President may establish such advisory boards or conunittees com-
posed of representatives of industry, agriculture, labor, and State and 
local governments, and others, as he may deem advisable for the purpose of 
advising and consulting on methods of achieving the objectives of this Act. 
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Joint Committee on the National Budget 
Sec. 5 (a) There is hereby established a Joint Committee on the National 
Budget, to be composed of the chairmen and ranking minority members of the 
Senate Committees on Appropriations, Banking and Currency, Education and J 
Labor, and Finance, and seven additional Members of the Senate, to be appo· t-
ed by the President of the Senate; and the chairmen and ranking minority 
members of the House Committees on Appr~tions, Banking and Currency, 
Labor, and Ways and Means, and seven •addi tional Members ·of the House of 
Representatives. The party representation of the Joint Committee shall re-
flect the relative membership of the majority and minority parties in the 
Senate and the House of Representatives. 
(b) It shall be the function of the Joint Committee--
(1) to make -a study of the National Budget transmitted to Congress by the 
President in accordance with section 3 of this Act; and 
(2) to report to the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later 
than March 1 of each year, its findings and recommendations with re-
spect to the National Budget, together with a joint resolution set-
ting forth for the ensuing fiscal year a general policy with respect 
to such National Budget to serve as a guide to the several committees 
of Congress dealing with legislation relating to such National Budget 
(c) Vacancies in the membership of the Joint Committee shall not affect 
the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, 
and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selec 
tion. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among 
its members. 
(d):' The Joint Committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is 
authorized to sit and act at such places and times, to require by subpena 
or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such 
books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testi-
mony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures 
as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such 
hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words. The pro-
visions of sections 102 to 104, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes shall 
apply in case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpena, or 
to testify when summoned, under authority of this section. 
(e) The Joint Committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation 
of such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic 
assistance as it deems necessary and advisable, but the compensation so fix , 
ed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Ac 1 
of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties. The committee may utilize such 
voluntary and uncompensated services as it deems necessary and is authorize 
to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the de-
partments and establishments. 
(f) The expenses of the Joint Committee shall be paid one-half from the 
contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the 
House of Representatives upon vouchers signed by the chairman or vice chair 
man. 
Rate of Expenditures 
Sec. 6 (a) The President shall review quarterly all Federal investment 
and expenditure for the purpose of ascertaining the extent to which the cur 
rent and anticipated level of non-Federal investment and expenditure war-
rants any change in the volume of such Federal investment and expenditure. 
(b) SUbject to such principles and standards as may be set forth in ap-
licable a ro riation Acts and other statutes, the rate of Federal invest-
ment and expenditure inay~·be-.·varied to whatever extent and in vrhatever manner 
the President may determine to be necessary for the purpose of assisting in 
assuring continuing full employment, with due consideration being given to 
current and anticipated variations in savings and in investment and expendi-
ture b.1 private business, consumers, State and local governments, and the 
Federal ~overnment. 
Aid to Committees 
Sec. 7 The heads of departments and establishments shall, at the request 
of any committee of either House of Congress, furnish such committee with 
such aid and information with regard to the National Budget as it may requesp. 
Interpretation 
Sec. 8 Nothing contained herein shall be construed as calling for or 
authorizing-
( a) the operation of plants, factories, or other productive facilities by 
the Federal Government; 
(b) the use of compulsory measures of any type whatsoever in determining 
the allocation or distribution of manpower; 
(c) any change in the existing procedures on appropriations; or 
(d) the carrying out of, or any appropriation for, any program set forth 
in the National Budget, unless such program shall have been authorized by 
provisions of law other than this Act. 
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APPENDIX B 
EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946 
(Public Law 304--79th Congress, 2d Session) 
(15 u.s.c. 1021) 
(s.380) 
As amended by Public Law 601, sec. 226, 79th Gong., 2d sess. (Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946) and Public Law 405, 8oth Gong., 2d sess. 
AN ACT 
To declare a national policy on employment, production, and purchasing powei~ 
and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, 
Short Title 
Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "Employment Act of 194611 • I 
Sec. 2. The Congress hereby declares that it is the continuing policy anc 1 
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means con- J 
sistent with its needs and obligations and other essential considerations oi l 
national policy, with the assistance and cooperation of industry, agricul-
ture, labor, and State and local governments, to coo~dinate and utilize all 
its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and main- j 
taining, in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enter-
prise and the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afford-
ed useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those 
able, willing , and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, pro-
duction, and purchasing power. 
Economic Report of the President 
Sec. 3. (a) The president shall transmit to the Congress at the begin-
ning of each regular sessionl (commencing with the year 1947) an economic 
report (hereinafter called the "Economic Report") setting forth (1) the 
levels of employment, production, and purchasing power obtaining in the 
United States and such levels needed to carry out the policy declared in 
section 2; (2) current and foreseeable trends in the levels of employment, 
production, and purchasing power (3) a review of the economic program of 
the Federal Government and a review of economic conditions affecting em-
ployment in the United States or any considerable portion thereof during the 
preceding year and of their effect upon employment, production, and pur-
chasing power; and (4) a .program for carrying out the policy declared in 
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section 2, together with such recommendations for legislation as he may 
deem necessary or desirable. 
(b) The ~esident may transmit from time to time to the Congress reports 
supplementary to the Economic Report, each of which shall include such sup-
plementary or revised recommendations as he may deem necessary or desirable 
to achieve the policy declared in section 2. 
{c) The Economic Report, and all supplementary reports transmitted under 
subsection (b), shall, when transmitted to Congress, be referred to the 
joint committee created in section 5. 
Council of Economic Advi~ers to the President 
Sec. 4 (a) There is hereby created in the Executive Office of the Pres-
ident a Council of Economic Advisers (hereinafter called the "Council"). 
The Council shall be composed of three members who shall be appointed by 
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and each 
of whom shall be a person who, as a result of his training, experience, 
and attainments, is exceptionally qualified to analyze and interpret econ-
omic developments, to appraise programs and activities of the Government in 
the light of the policy declared in section 2, and to formulate and recom-
mend national economic policy to promote employment, production, and pur-
chasing power under free competitive enterr,rise. Each member of the Counci 
shall receive compensation at the rate of $15,000 per annum. The President 
shall designate one of the members of the Council as chairman and one as 
vice chairman, who shall act as chairman in the absence of the chairman. 
(b) The Council is authorized to employ, and fix the compensation of, 
such specialists and other experts as may be necessary for the carrying out 
of its functions under this Act, without regard to the civil-service laws 
and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, and is authorized, subject 
to the civil-service laws, to employ such other officers and employees as 
may be necessary for carrying out its functions under this Act, and fix 
their compensation in accordance with the Classification Act of 1923, as 
amended. 
(c) It shall be the duty and function of the Council--
(1) to assist and advise the President in the preparation of the Econ-
omic Report; 
(2) to gather timely and authoritative information concerning economic 
developments and economic trends, both current and prospective, to analyz 
and interpret such information in the light of the policy declared in 
section 2 for the purpose of determining whether such developments and 
trends are interfering, or are likely to interfere, with the achievement 
of such policy, and to compile and submit to the Pres~ent studies re-
latin~ to such developments and trends; 
(3) to appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal 
Government in the light of the policy declared in section 2 for the pur-
pose of determining the extent to which such programs and activities are 
contributing, and the extent to which they are not contributing, to the 
achievement of such policy, and to make recommendations to the President 
with respect thereto; (4) to develop and recommend to the President national economic policies 
to foster and promote free competitive enterprise, to avoid economic 
fluctuations or to diminish the effects thereof, and to maintain employ-
ment, production, and purchasing power; (5) to make and furnish such studies, reports thereon, and recommenda-
tions with respect to matters of Federal economic policy and legislation 
as the President may request. 
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(d) The Council shall make an annual report to the President in December 
of each year. 
(e) In exercising its powers, functions and duties under this Act--
(1) the Council may constit ute such advisory committees;~and may con-
sult with such representatives of industry, agriculture, labor, con-
sumers, State and local governments, and other groups, as it deems ad-
visable; 
(2) the Council shall, to the ful lest extent possible, utilize the 
services, facilities, and information (including statistical informa-
tion) of other Government agencies as well as of private research 
agencies, in order that duplication of effort and expense may be avoided. 
(f) To enable the Council to exercise its powers, functions, and duties 
under this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated {except for the 
salaries of the members and the salaries of officers and employees of the 
Council) such sums as may be necessary. For the salaries of the members 
and the salaries of officers and employees of the Council, there is author-
ized to be appropriated not exceeding $345,000 in the aggregate for each 
fiscal year. · 
Joint Committee on the Econondc Report 
Sec. 5. (a) There is hereby established a Joint Committee on the Economic 
Report, to be composed of seven Members of the Senate, to b~ appointed by 
the President of the Senate,and seven Members of the House of Representatives, 
to be appointed b.Y the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The party 
representation on the joint committee shall as nearly as may be feasible re-
flect the relative membership of the majority and minority parties in the 
Senate and House of Representatives. 
(b) It shall be the function of the joint committee--(1) to make a continuing study of matters relating to the Economic Re-
port; 
(2) to study means of coordinating programs in order to further the 
policy of this Act; and · 
(3J as a guide to the several committees of the Congress dealing with 
legislation relating to the Economic Report, not later than March 12 of 
each year (beginning with the year 1947) to file a report with the Senate 
and the House of Representatives containing its findings and recommenda-
tions with re~pect to each of the main recommendations made by the Presi-· 
dent in the Economic Report, and from time to time to make such other re-
ports and recommendations to the Senate and House of Representatives as 
it deems advisable. 
(c) Vacancies in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect 
the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint 
committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the 
original selection. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice 
chairman from among its members. 
(d) The joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is 
authorized to hold such hearings as it deems advisable, and, within the 
limitations of its appropriations, the joint committee is empowered to ap-
point and fix the compensation of such experts consultants, technicians, anc 
clerical and stenographic assistants, to procure such printing and binding, 
and to make such expenditures, as it deems necessary and advisable. The 
cost of stenographic services to report hearings of the joint committee, 
or any subcommittee thereof, shall not exceed 25 cents per hundred woras. 
The joint committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, and 
facilities of the departments and establishments of the Government, and alsc 
139 
of private research agencies. 
(e) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year, 
the sum of $50,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to carry out 
the provisions of this section, to be disbursed by the Secretary of the 
Senate on vouchers signed by the chairman or vice chairman. 
Approved February 20, 1946. 
1 In the original Act, before amendment, this read: ."within 60 days after 
the beginning of each regular session. 11 
2 In the original Act, before amendment, this read: 11 May 1. 11 This was 
changed to "February 1 11 in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and 
subsequently to 11March 1 11 in Public Law 405, 80th Cong., 2d sess. 
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APPENDIX C 
BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES OF COUNCIL MEMBERS 
Edwin Q• Nourse, first chairman of the Counci~ was especially equipped to 
handle problems relating to agricultural economics, having written a-
bout a dozen books in this field. Dr. Nourse was born in a small New 
York state town in 1883, is married and the father of one son. He 
did his undergraduate work at Cornell University, graduating Phi Beta 
Kappa, and obtaining a PhD in economics from the University of Chicago 
in 1915. During the years 1909 to 1923 he taught finance, economics, 
and sociology, first at the ~barton School of Finance of the University 
of Pennsylvania, and then variously at the Universities of South 
Dakota and Arkansas and at Indiana State College. It was while he was 
at the State College that he became associated with the Indiana Ex-
periment Station as chief of the agricultural economics section. From 
this position he rose in 1923 to Chief of the Agricultural Division. 
In 1929 he was called to Washington to become Director of the Institute 
of Economics of the Brookings Institution, a research foundation. In 
1942 he became vice-president of the Brookings Institution, a position 
which he held at the time of his appointment to the Council. Since his 
retirement from the Council in November of 1949 he has been lecturing 
throughout the country and is the author of a book warning of in-
flationary dangers entitled The Nineteen Fifties Come First. Dr. Nours 
was also a former head of the-American Economic Association and dele-
gate to international economic conferences. 
Leon H. Keyserling served as vice-chairman of the Council until after the r 
- signation of Nourse, becoming the chairman in May 1950. He was a win-
ner of the Pabst post-war essay contest and a figure in the battle to 
get an Employment Act passed. Borri in Charlestb .n _~ South Carolina in 
January 1908, married, and the youngest Council member, Mr. Keyserling 
brought to the Council a wide background of governmental experience as 
a lawyer. His undergraduate work was done in economics at Columbia 
University, where he graduated Phi Beta Kappa. He then proceeded to 
obtain a·law degree at Harvard, passing the New York Bar in 1931. Af-
ter a short teaching career in the Department of Economics at Columbia 
Mr. Keyserling became an attorney for the Agricultural Adjustment Ad-
ministration. From 1933 to 1937 he was the secretary and legislative 
assistant to Senator Robert F. Wagner . In 1937 he became associated 
with the u. s. Housing Authority as general counsel. He worked in the 
field of public housing as a counsel and administrator until 1946, at 
which time he was general counsel of the National Housing Agency. Fr om 
1933 until 1946, when he was called to the Council, Mr . Keyserling was 
a consultant to Senate committees on legislation dealing with industri 
recovery and public works, housing, social security, labor rel ations, 
employment, and banking and credit . He came to the Council i n a posi-
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tion to contribute much to these aspects of its inquir,y. 
John Q• Clark forsook an extremely successful business career in mid-life to 
get a doctorate in economics and teach. He was born in Colorado in 
1884 and most of his life has been spent in the mid-West. Graduating 
Phi Beta Kappa from the University of Nebraska in 1905 (which univer-
sity awarded him an LLD in 1938), he obtained a law degree at Columbia 
in 1907. Thereafter he settled down in Cheyanne, Wyoming with his 
wife and two children to practice law, becoming city attorney in 1915. 
In 1919 he became associated with the Mid West Refining Company as 
general counsel, rising in that organization from a vice-president to 
Director, and then President (1926-1928) . From 1923 to 1928 he was 
also vice-president and a director of Standard Oil of Indiana. At the 
age of forty-four Dr. Clark severed his business connections to pur-
sue a PhD in economics at Johns Hopkins University. After obtaining 
his degree he ·taught for ten years at the University of Denver and at 
the University of Nebraska, becoming, in 1941, the Dean of the Univer-
sity of Nebraska College of Business Administration. Dr . Clark ' s pre-
vious government experience was limited to a period between 1937 and 
1939, during which time he acted as advisor to a U. S. Senate Com-
mittee on Goverrunent Reorganization. He is recognized as an authority 
on Federal anti-trust policy, having published a book on this sub-
ject in 1931. 
Roy Blough was sworn in on June 29, 1950 to fill the vacancy created by Dr . 
Nourse's resignation . He brought to the Council wide experience in 
the field of taxation and public finance . Born in Pittsburg, Pennsyl-
vania in 1901, Dr. Blough received an A. B. from Manchester College, 
Indiana in 1921 and a PhD from the University of Wisconsin in 1929. 
He is married and the father of three children. ~1ter teaching for 
five years at both of his alma maters Dr . Blough became a statistician 
and later Chief Statistician in charge of tax research, for the Wis-
consin Tax Commission (1927-1932), and assistant director of research 
and statistics in charge of research in state and cityfinances for 
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration for seven months in 1933 
and 1934. After further teaching and study at the University of Cin-
cinnati and Columbia Dr . Blough became a part-time consultant to the 
u. s. Social Security Board and Treasury Departments in 1937, and was 
soon promoted to the position of Director of Tax Research for the 
Treasury Department. He became professor of economics and political 
science at the University of Chicago in 1946. 
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APPENDIX D 
THE WORK OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT 
In the legislative sphere the Joint Committee on the Economic Report 
has no parallel among the traditional committees of Congress. It bears the 
same relation to Congress as the Council of Economic Advisers does to the 
President; that is, it advises Congress on the reports which the President 
issues after conferring with his Council. It is not a legislative committee, 
having no authority to take action on specific measures. Normally made up 
of fourteen members, evenly divided between the House and the Senate, it 
influences the Congress in three ways: (1) by cross-membership on other co 
mittees; (2) by considering, in an advisory capacity, the bills of other 
committees; and (3) by its own reports and studies. · 
A brief summary of the work of the Committee serves to illustrate 
the studies which have grown out of Council reports. Below is a compilation 
of t he published reports of the Joint Committee through early 1951, exclusive 
of the regular Annual Retorts and Hearings on the President's Reports con-
ducted in pursuance of t e requirements of the Act. (See Sec. 5 (6)(3) of 
the Employment Act.) They represent some 5,261 pages of material covering 
over fourteen subjects which have come to the Committee's attention through 
the content of the President's Reports and the Council's Reviews. 
Reports of the Joint Committee or Sub-Committees thereof: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Hearings: 
The Economy of the South 
Profits 
Statistical Gaps 
Volume and Stability of Private Investment 
Money, Credit and Fiscal Policies 
December 1949 Steel Price Increases 
Selected Government Programs which Aid Unemployed 
and Low-Income Families 
(1) Corporate Profits (Dec. 6-21, 1948) 
(2) 
(3) 
Federal Expenditure and Revenue Policies 
(September 23, 1948) 
Volume and Stability of Private Investment 
(Sept. 27-29, 1949, Dec . 6-16, 1949) 
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(4) Money, Credit, and Fiscal Policies 
(Sept. 23-Dc. 7, 1949) 
(5) December 1949 Steel Price Increases 
(Jan. 24-27, 1950) 
(6) low-Income Families (Dec. 12-22, 1949) 
Staff Reports: 
Other 
(1) Factors Affecting Volume and Stability of Private 
Investment 
(2) Monetary, Credit and Fiscal Policies: A Col-
lection of Statements Submitted to the Sub-
Committee on Monetary, Credit, and Fiscal 
Policies by Government Officials, Bankers, 
Economists, and Others 
(3) Basic Data Relating to Steel Prices 
(4) Handbook of Regiongl Statistics (Assembled for 
the Sub-Committee on Unemployment) 
(5) Low-Income Families and Economic Stabilization 
(6) General Credit Control, Debt Management, and 
Economic Mobilization 
(7) Economic and Political Hazards of an Inflat ed 
Defense Economy 
(1) Highways and the Nation's Economy (In co-
operation with the ·Public Roads Bureau)l 
The Committee has undertaken such a quantity of work through its 
own reports and staff compilations that, to date, it has not functioned 
actively to appraise specific legislative programs being directed through 
other Congressional committees. The chief significance of the Joint Com-
mittee's work is that it provides a forum where the great issues of econ-
omic policy are threshed out and serv~s to focus the spotlight of publicity 
both on what the President has proposed and also on what the Council has 
said in its reports. 
1 Digest of United States Publications, 1947 through March 1951. 
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AliJ ABSTRACT 
THE PRESIDENT' S COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVI SERS 
This paper is an effort to examine the work of the President 1s 
Co mcil of Economic Advisers , created by the Employment Act of 1946, in 
its r elation to economic science a.s a guide to practical policy and 
anal ysis and to the f unctions of the economist in the public service, In 
its role as an advisory body, i nstrmnent of analysis , and an agency de-
voted to the appraisal and formulation of practical programs of action i n 
the economic spher~the Council is daily confronted with problems which 
are predominantl y extra-economic i n their implicati ons,and which it must 
meet Ln a manner having regard both for its professional responsi bilities 
to economics as a science and to the requirements and goals of the ~nploy­
ment Act . 
The author has used as principa_ sources the publications i ssued 
by the President's Council of Economic Advisers and the Joint Committee on 
the Economic Report since their inception, as well as having examined ex-
tensively the leading economic j ournals and recent publications for re-
ference to the Council's work . The paper covers a period from the be-
ginnings of agitation for an employment act, in 1944, to the first months 
in 1950. The origins of the Employment Act are traced, the structure and 
functioning of the Council is studied, and speci al emphasis given to the 
conflicts arising out of dif fering i nterpretations of the Council's role 
in presenting its analyses and in i ts relations with the President and 
with Congress . A section summarizing the leading observati ons from the 
Annual Reports reveal s the conflict within the Council as to the means and 
goals of stabilization. An attempt ·is made to analyze and discuss the 
adequacy of the tools being used by the Council in the preparation of its 
Analyses of the Economic Situation. This discussion is centered around 
the concept of the Nation's Economic Budget, the adequacy of statistics, 
and the problem of forecasting. Leading criticisms of the Council's work; 
pointing up the problems revealed in the previous chapters, are then tabula ed 
and analyzed, along with legislative attempts to implement the Employment 
Act and recommendations for modification of the Council's structure and 
responsibilities . 
In general, the major conclusion reached by the author is that 
the Employment Act itself, by its failure to resolve any policy issues or 
to specify any accepted means of stabilization or tools of analysis , as 
had been done in the original Full Employment Bill, placed the Council in 
an extremely difficult position. Without any agreement on inst itutional 
goals for the economy, the Council has no f rame of reference against 
which to measure its policies and hence is continually charged with speak-
ing beyond its rightful province and of mixing political, ethical, and 
social considerations with its analyses . Until the ends of national econ-
omic policy are more clearly delineated through l egislation,these d.if-
ficul ties will continue . For its ov-m part, the Council needs to be care-
ful to specify tpe assumptions underlying its an2.lyses and to separate 
those which are primarily non-economic fron1 those of a purel y economic 
character, in order that it may avoid i nvoking judgments0f ·-value as judg-
ments of economic fact . 
The Council has been too inclined to formulate desirable policy 
in .. all ·directions without giving due regard. to a concentrated stabiliza-
tion program to meet the immediate problems of the economy. I t needs 
larger public understanding and s trong Presidential support in its Yrork . 
Set fort h on a sea of unresolved issues , i t has tended to devel op, l ike 
an ameba, along the lines of least resistance . 
